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THE 


LIFE   AND    SERVICES 


OF 


GEN.  GEO.  B.  McCLELLAN. 


H^ocnmeiit,  IVo.  4. 


GEORGE  BRINTON  MCCLELLAN  was  born 
in  the  city  of  Philadelphia,  the  birthplace 
of  American  Independence  and  of  American 
Union,  on  the  3d  day  of  December,  1826. 

His  father  was  a  physician,  eminent  among 
the  eminent,  "praised  by  the  praised,'-'  con 
spicuous  by  his  abilities  and  his  character  even 
in  that  galaxy  of  accomplished  men  by  whom 
the  fame  of  Philadelphia,  as  the  metropolis  of 
physical  science  and  the  healing  art  in  Amer 
ica,  was  made  respectable  in  Edinburgh  and  in 
Paris,  in  London  and  in  Leyden.  No  man's 
ancestry  is  a  matter  of  indifference  when  we 
desire  to  study  his  nature  and  ascertain  the  true 
measure  of  his  worth.  In  monarchical  coun 
tries,  where  the  voice  of  the  people  has  little 
or  no  weight  in  determining  the  selection  of 
those  who  are  to  administer  the  government, 
it  matter*  little  to  the  masses  of  mankind 
whether  those  by  whom  they  are  ruled  come 
of  a  sound  or  an  unsound  stock,  of  an  honest 
and  vigorous,  or  of  a  corrupt  and  weakly  race. 
The  will  or  the  whim  of  a  prince  makes  such 
inquiries  superfluous.  Once  invested  by  his 
sovereign  with  the  insignia  of  office,  the  vilest 
caitiff  silences  all  questions  into  his  origin 
with  the  splendors  of  his  rank  and  the  ter 
rors  of  his  authority.  But  in  a  republic 
which  rests  for  its  permanence  and  its  power 
upon  the  virtue  of.  the  people  and  of  their 
public  servants,  it  can  never  be  an  insignifi 
cant  recommendation  of  a  public  man  to  that 
confidence  of  his  fellow-citizens  in  which  alone 
his  hope  of  distinction  and  of  influence  lies, 
that  his  fath«cs  in  their  ibime  were :  citizens  of 
credit,  men  who*  knew  'thelr'r  ights  and  main 
tained  thpin,  .knew  -tbfiir.  .duties  and  "fulfilled 
them.  -".  ,  V  » 

The  ancestors  of  George  Brinton  McClel- 
lan  were  men  of  this  stamp,  coming  of 
that  pure  and  hardy  .  Scottish  blood  which 
has  so  long  been  a  trouble  to  tyrants,  which 
has  throbbed  in  the  veins  of  so  many 
sturdy  champions  of  justice  and  order,  and 
which  has  been  poured  out  so  freely  on  the 
most  heroic  battle-fields  of  history.  Through 
one  of  those  mysterious  affiliations  which  the 
Scotch,  like  all  other  Celtic  tribes,  delight  to 
trace  out,  and  hold  above  all  things  sacred,  a 
kinsmanship  has  been  established  for  the 
American  McClellans  with  that  noble  old 
soldier,  Sir  Colin  Campbell,  who  fought 
his  way  honestly  up  from  a  shepherd's  plaid 
on  the  Caledonian  moors  to  a  Field  Marshal's 
baton  in  the  army  of  England,  and  a  baron's 
coronet  among  her  peers.  ^ 

Into  these  refinements  of  consanguinity,  how 
ever,  it  is  scarcely  worth  while  to  enter  Had 
Colin  Campbell  lived  and  died,  the  just  and 


God-fearing  man  he  was,  as  a  shepherd  on  the 
banks  of  Clyde,  no  man  in  whose  veins  his 
blood  ran  -would  have  been  the  less  enno 
bled  by  its  wholesome  life  ;  and  so  fur  as  the 
antecedents  go  of  George  Brinton  McClel- 
lan's  birth,  it  is  enough  for  us  to  know  that 
he  comes  of  a  people  renowned  the  world  over 
for  justice,  fidelity,  valor,  and  truth. 

As  a  boy  of  thirteen,  his  father  sent  him 
into  the  Freshman  Class  at  the  University  of 
Pennsylvania.  He  pursued  the  University 
course,  for  nearly  two  years,  patiently  and  suc 
cessfully  ;  but,  like  Washington,  he  had  an 
"  inward  longing  "  for  the  life  of  an  engineer 
and  a  soldier,  and,  in  1842,  a  Cadet  warrant 
having  been  obtained  for  him,  he  was  removed 
to  the  Military  Academy  at  West  Point. 

In  the  congenial  atmosphere  of  the  exact 
studies  to  which  he  here  found  himself  called, 
the  young  Cadet  very  s,oon  distinguished  him 
self,  and  rewarded  the  judicious  confidence  of 
his  friends.  He  was  graduated,  with  high 
honors,  in  the  Class  of  1846  ;  assigned  to 
duty  with  a  company  of  the  engineers,  and 
ordered,  before  the  close  of  the  year,  into  active 
service  on  the  line  of  the  Rio  Grande  River. 
The  war  with  Mexico  was  then  fairly  begun, 
and  Lieutenant  McClellan"  reached  his  post 
just  after  the  battle  of  Monterey. 

After  some  time  spend,  in  active  service  on 
the  Rio  Grande,  Lieutenant  McClellan  was 
ordered  to  Tampico  in  January,  1847,  to 
take  part  in  the  concentration  of  troops  then 
going  on  for  the  grand  expedition  which  was 
preparing, under  Gen.  Scott,  to  end  the  war,  and 
dictate  terms  of  peace  in  the  capital  of  Mexico. 
What  jealousies  and  intrigues;  and,  to  use 
the  veteran's  own  well-known  phrase,  what  a 
"fire  in  the  rear"  attended  the  organization 
of  this  expedition  no  one  familiar  with  the 
recent  history  of  the  country  can  need  to  be 
reminded. 

The  young  Lieutenant  was  thus  made  a 
witness,  at  the  very  beginning  of  his  career, 
of  the  political  difficulties  and  the  personal 
spites  which  so  often  confound  and  hamper 
the  action  of  the  most  earnest  and  devoted 
military  leaders. 

In  the  beginning  of  the  month  of  March 
the  assembled  army  disembarked  from  its 
transports  to  the  west  of  the  island  of  Sacri- 
ficios,  and  the  memorable  siege  of  Vera  Cruz 
"and  San  Juan  de  Ulloa  began. 

It  is  not  our  purpose  minutely  -to  pursue 
the  fortunes  of  Lieutenant  McClellan  through 
the  wonderful  campaign  of  which  this  siege 
was  the  initial  chapter. 

Who,  indeed,  can  now  find  the  heart  to  re 
write  or  even  to  re-peruse  the  annals  of  that 


3 


campaign  in  which,  as  the  lamentable  history 
of  the  last  four  years  too  sternly  bids  us  fear, 
American  soldiers  of  the  North  and  of  the 
South,  of  the  East  and  of  the  West,  for  the 
last  time,  marched  side  by  side  to  death  and 
victory  ? 

The  Executive  Documents  of  the  Thir 
tieth  Congress,  in  which  the  story  of  that 
glorious  campaign  lies  embalmed  and  awaits 
the  historian's  skilful  hand,  can  be  read  now 
without  overmastering  emotion  only  by  the 
fanatic  or  the  fool,  by  him  who  is  indifferent 
to  his  country's  fate,  or  by  him  who  rejoices 
in  her  ruin. 

To  those  formal  and  official  pages  the  course 
of  subsequent  events  has  given  the  painful  in 
terest  of  a  tragedy.  In  them  we  read  how, 
working  with  an  equal  zeal  to  serve  one  com 
mon  cause,  Lieutenants  Beauregard  and 
McClellan  earned  the  commendation  of  their 
commander  in  the  trenches  before  Vera 
Cruz;  in  them  we  read  how  the  escort  of 
Captain  Robert  E.  Lee,  engaging  the  skir 
mishers  of  Valencia  in  the  Pedregal,  opened 
that  stern  unswerving  march  which  led  the 
Stars  and  Stripes,  through  storm  and  stress  of 
strife  and  victory,  up  to  their  station  of  tri 
umph  on  the  heights  of  Chapultepec  and  the 
towers  of  the  city  of  Montezuma.  Heintzel- 
rnan  and  Magruder,  Kearney  and  Pillow, 
meet  us  here,  marching,  manoeuvring,  fighting 
manfully  together  for  the  one  old  flag.  One 
day  Lieutenant  T.  J.  Jackson  —  "  the  horses 
of  his  guns  nearly  all  killed  or  disabled,  his 
drivers  and  cannoneers  cut  up" — gets  one  of 
his  pieces  from  under  the  direct  fire  of  Cha 
pultepec,  opens  upon  the  enemy,  and  holds 
the  battle  till  the  Castle  is  carried.  Another 
day  Lieutenant  Reno,  "  in  the  advance  with 
his  mountain  howitzers,"  maintains,  against  the 
superior  artillery  of  the  enemy,  so  fierce  a  fire 
as  saves  the  bold  advance  of  "  Lieutenant 
Colonel  Albert  Sidney  Johnstone  "  with  his 
voltigeurs.  Now  we  have  "Captain  Hooker" 
riding  gallantly  down  alone  to  reconnoitre  the 
ground  for  Lieutenant  Colonel  Hebert,  of 
Louisiana;  anon,  "Lieutenant  Grant,"  of 
the  Fourth  Infantry,  "  pushed  forward  with  a 
party  "  to  aid  in  securing  advantages  won  by 
the  troops  of  Tennessee  and  South  Carolina. 

Between  these  once  fraternal  names  how 
wide  a  gulf  has  since  been  dug  by  passion,  by 
madness,  and  by  folly,  —  a  gulf  which,  in  the 
providence  of  God,  nothing  surely  but  reason 
.and  justice  can  ever  bridge  again  ! 

The  peculiar  importance  of  that  arm  of  the 
service  to  which,  in  virtue  of  his  distinction 
won  at  the  academy,  Lieutenant  McClellan 
was  attached  naturally,  gave  him  a  prominence 

M2f 


in  the  operations  of  General  Scott's  advance, 
to  which  his  years  and  his  rank  would  not 
otherwise  have  entitled  him.  He  won  his 
promotion  to  the  rank  of  2d  Lieutenant  early 
in  the  campaign,  and  received  his  brevet  as 
1st  Lieutenant  for  gallant  and  meritorious 
conduct  at  the  battle  of  Contrerays,  on  the  19th 
of  August  of  the  same  year.  The  service  of 
the  engineers  and  the  staff  officers  at  Contrerays 
was  of  the  most  arduous  kind,  testing  in  the 
highest  degree  the  coolness,  the  personal 
bravery,  and  the  powers  of  physical  endur 
ance,  as  well  as  the  professional  skill,  of  those 
engaged  in  it.  General  Valencia's  position 
was  infinitely  more  formidable  from  the 
broken,  rough,  and  impracticable  character  of 
the  country,  than  from  the  skill  with  which 
that  pompous  and  wordy  personage  had  se 
lected  and  entrenched  his  camp  ;  and  the  re- 
connojssance  which  determined  the  route  taken 
by  our  troops  to  assault  and  overwhelm  their 
enemy  had  to  be  executed  on  a  moonless 
night,  over  rocky  and  precipitous  mule  paths, 
through  a  region  of  wild  ravines  and  tangled 
forests. 

Deserted  in  disgust  by  Santa  Anna,  whose 
advice  he  had  scorned  and  whom  he  hoped,  by 
a  decisive  victory  over  the  American  invaders, 
to  oust  from  power,  Valencia  was  utterly 
bewildered  by  the  attack  to  which  this  dan 
gerous  night  reconnoissance  opened  the  way  ; 
his  troops,  finding  themselves  inextricably  in 
volved,  were  stricken  with  a  panic,  and  one 
of  the  most  complete  victories  of  the  war  re 
warded  the  skill  of  our  commanders  and  the 
valor  of  our  troops. 

When  compared  with  the  scale  on  which 
war  has  since  been  waged  by  American  ar 
mies,  the  battles  through  which  our  soldiers 
fought  their  way  to  the  city  of  Mexico  may 
seem,  indeed,  but  petty  and  insignificant  com 
bats.  But  the  campaign  of  1847  was,  in  truth, 
a  most  instructive  school  for  the  officers  who 
passed  through  it.  Not  less  by  the  mistakes 
and  failures  of  the  enemy  than  by  our  own 
successes  were  the  capable  and  the  thoughtful 
among  those  officers  taught  rightly  to  estim^-c 
the  tremendous  difficulties  which  attend  a  war 
of  invasion,  and  the  formidable  advantages  en 
joyed  by  an  army  acting  on  the  defensive  in 
a  country  sparsely  populated,  broken,  rugged, 
and  densely  wooded  ;  nor  is  it  easy  to  imagine 
the  extent  of  the  disasters  which  must  have 
befallen  the  cause  of  the  Union  had  the  abso 
lute  conduct  in  the  field  of  our  vast  and  un 
disciplined  armies  been  assumed,  in  the  outset 
of  the  existing  war  by  the  arrogant  and  inex 
perienced  civilians  whose  influence  has  beer, 
since  so.N lamentably  felt  in  the  disturbance  of 


well-considered  plans  of  campaign   and   the 
waste  of  well-organized  resources. 

The  hard-fought  action  of  Molino  del  Rey, 
on  the  8th  of  September,  1847,  afforded 
Lieutenant  McClellan  an  occasion  to  prove 
that  his  rapid  promotion  in  his  profession  had 
not  disturbed  that  well-balanced  sense  of  jus 
tice  which  is  one  of  the  rooted  qualities  of  his 
nature. 

The  conduct  of  the  attack  upon  the  Mex 
ican  positions  at  Molino  del  Rey.  had  been 
confided,  by  General  Scott,  to  General  Worth. 
The  ostensible  object  of  this  attack  was  the 
destruction  of  a  cannon-foundry  which  the 
Mexicans  were  believed  to  have  established  at 
that  point ;  but  as  General  Worth  found  rea 
son  to  anticipate  such  a  resistance  as  might 
lead  to  a  general  action  for  the  possession  of 
the  heights  and  fortress  of  Chapultepec,  it  was 
of  the  first  importance  for  him  to  be  thoroughly 
informed  of  the  true  nature  of  the  defences 
thrown  up  by  Santa  Anna  at  Molino  del  Rey, 
and  of  the  true  proportions,  of  the  force  which 
the  Mexican  President  would  there  array 
against  him. 

Two  serious  reeonnoissances  were  accordingly 
•ordered  by  General  Worth  before  the  attack 
was  made,  and  in  these  reconnoissances  Lieu 
tenant  McClellan  bore  a  distinguished  part. 

The  conflict  which  followed  assumed  the 
character  of  a  battle,  —  the  most  fiercely- 
contested  battle  indeed  of  the  whole  war,  in 
which,  after  hours  of  desperate  onslaught,  an 
aggregate  American  force  about  3,500  strong 
assailed  and  drove  from  their  formidable  in- 
trenchments  a  Mexican  army  numbering  at 
least  10,000  men,  with  a  loss  to  the  enemy  of 
four  pieces  of  artillery  and  nearly  a  thousand 
prisoners.  Lieutenant  McClellan  was  offered 
the  brevet  rank  of  Captain  for  his  share  in  this 
victory,  but  declined  to  receive  it  on  the 
ground  that  he  was  not  fully  entitled  to  it, 
having  been  concerned  in  the  preliminary  op 
erations  alone,  and  nob  in  the  actual  assault 
and  capture  of  the  enemy's  works. 

The  maxim,  Palmam  qui  meruit  feral,  is 
not  often  thus  rigorously  applied  to  his  own 
case  by  a  young  and  ambitious  man  actively 
engaged  in  the  most  exciting  of  professions ! 
Within  a  week,  however,  the  storming  of  Cha 
pultepec  and  the  consequent  occupation  of  the 
Mexican  capital  gave  the  magnanimous  young 
.  soldier  a  fresh  opportunity  of  winning,  by  act 
ual  service  and  exposure  in  the  stricken  field, 
the  rank  which  he  disdained  otherwise  to  wear. 
He  was  breveted  a  Captain  for  these  crowning 
operations  of  the  campaign  on  the  14th  Sep 
tember,  1847., 

As  Captain  McClellan,  he  remained  with 


the  army  in  Mexico  till  the  signing  of  the 
treaty  of  peace  with  that  republic.  The  ad 
ministration  of  a  conquered  city  necessarily 
afforded  to  a  soldier  of  his  character  and  train 
ing  many  valuable  opportunities  of  observa 
tion  and  reflection  upon  the  true  relations  of 
the  military  with  the  civil  authority.  The 
impotence  of  mere  force  to  maintain  or  re 
store  a  solid  tranquillity  in  the  social  order  is 
never  so  apparent  to  a  clear  and  vigorous  mind 
as  when  force  is  clothed  with  a  temporary  om 
nipotence  ;  the  beauty  and  the  majesty  of  law 
are  never  so  apparent  as  when  the  calm  and 
constant  operation  of  the  law  is,  for  a  time, 
suspended  in  favor  of  the  sword.  As  the 
Duke  of  Wellington  learned,  during  his  long 
military  mastery  of  the  Peninsula  and  his 
brief  practical  dictatorship  of  Paris,  that  pro 
found  dislike  of  all  unnecessary  military  in 
terference  with  civil  affairs  which,  at  a  later 
day,  when  England  was  convulsed  with  civil 
commotion,  made  the  veteran  of  a  hundred 
victories  the  calmest,  most  forbearing,  and 
most  conciliatory  of  English  statesmen,  so  we 
may  be  sure  that  his  experience  of  conquest 
and  of  military  rule  in  Mexico  contributed 
mainly  to  fix  in  the  mind  of  Captain  Mc 
Clellan  those  sound  and  moderate  principles 
of  policy  which  were  afterwards  to  develop 
themselves  so  fully  and  so  firmly  in  the  proc 
lamations  and  in  the  conduct  of  the  victor  of 
West  Virginia  and  the  leader  of  the  Peninsu 
lar  campaign. 

In  June,  1848,  Captain  McClellan  re 
turned  to  the  United  States,  and  was  almost 
immediately  ordered  to  the  post  at  West 
Point,  where,  for  three  years,  he  remained  in 
command  of  the  company  of-  sappers  and 
miners. 

In  June,  1851,  he  was  removed  to  Fort 
Delaware  to  superintend  the  construction  of 
the  works ;  and  early  in  the  next  year  he  ful 
filled  the  common  destiny  of  the  officers  of  the 
regular  army  of  the  Union  by  joining  an  ex 
pedition  for  tho  exploration  of  the  far  western 
territory  of  the  Red  River,  under  the  command 
of  Colonel  Marcy,  whose  daughter  has  since 
become  his  wife. 

From  the  Red  River  he  passed  into  Texas 
upon  the  staff  of  General  Persifer  F.  Smith, 
and  until  March,  1853,  was  occupied  in  the 
survey  of  the  Texan  coast.  From  the  sea- 
breezes  of  the  Gulf  and  the  lowlands  of  Texas 
he  was  suddenly  transferred  to  the  neighbor 
hood  of  the  Rocky  Mountains,  going  to  Wash 
ington  Territory  in  the  spiing  of  1853,  and 
remaining  there  until  May,  1854,  in  charge 
of  the  western  division  of  the  survey  for  the 
northern  route  to  the  Pacific  Ocean. 


5 


The  vast  extent,  the  magnificent  possibil 
ities,  the  grand  unity  in  a  variety  as  grand  of 
our  national  dominion,  which  are  but  sounding 
forms  of  words  on  the  lips  of  so  many  a 
blatant  orator,  become  simple  realities  to  the 
intelligent  American  officer  whose  routine  of 
duty  thus  leads  him  from  one  extremity  to 
another  of  the  imperial  republic  ;  and  the  sen 
timent  of  continental  patriotism,  so  vague  and 
passionate  in  the  minds  of  most  men,  is  thus 
made  to  him  a  substantial  and  controlling  im 
pulse  of  his  nature. 

But  Captain  McClellan's  love  and  rever 
ence  of  American  nationality  were  to  be  in 
tensified  by  a  wider  and  even  more  impres 
sive  experience.  In  March,  1855,  he  was  pro 
moted  to  a  full  captaincy  in  the  1st  Cavalry,and, 
with  Major  Delatield  and  Major  Mordecai/was 
ordered  to  proceed  to  Europe,  there  to  study 
the  operations  of  the  great  war  then  raging 
between  the  Western  Allies  and  the  Russian 
Empire.  War  on  a  scale  which  had  become 
traditional  in  our  time  —  war  waged  upon  the 
principles  of  the  Napoleonic  era,  but  with  all 
the  appliances  of  modern  progress  —  was 
now  to  pass  under  his  inspection. 

When  Captain  McClellan  and  his  compan 
ions  reached  the  Crimea,  in  the  early  part  of 
the  summer  of  1855,  the  most  trying  period 
of  the  great  Allied  invasion  had  already  been 
overpassed.  The  battle  of  the  Alma  had 
been  fought  and  won,  Sebastopol  had  been 
invested  so  far  as  its  investment  was  practica 
ble,  victory  had  been  snatched  by  the  troops 
of  France  and  England  from  the  very  jaws  of 
ruin  on  the  heights  of  Inkermann.  But  the 
spectacle,  which  now  met  the  eyes  of  the 
American  commissioners,  was  far  more  in 
structive  than  any  shock  of  battle  could  have 
been. 

In  the  course  of  his  investigations  into  the 
organization  and  establishment  of  the  Allied 
forces  before  the  Russian  stronghold,  Captain 
McClellan  learned  to  estimate  aright  the  tre 
mendous  hazards  which,  even  in  modern  times, 
"and  with  all  the  advantages  given  by  a  com 
plete  command  alike  of  the  sea  and  of  all  the 
"  sinews  of  war,"  attend  what  may  be  prop 
erly  called,  as  Mr.  Kinglake  has  called  it, 
a  colossal  "  adventure  of  invasion." 

A  brief  extract  from  this  author's  bitter, 
but  brilliant,  history  of  the  "  Invasion  of  the 
Crimea"  will  show  the  precise  nature  of 
the  great  military  lesson  set  before  the  Amer 
ican  observers,  and  will  enable  the  reader  to 
otimate  for  himself  the  grave  and  manifold 
bearings  of  that  lesson  upon  the  vast  enter 
prise  which  it  was  written  in  the  book  of  des 
tiny  that  but  a  few  years  afterwards  the  most 


conspicuous  of  these  observers  should  be  called 
to  undertake  :  — 

4 '  There  were  now  upon  the  coast  of  the 
Crimea  some  37,000  French  and  Turks,1  with 
sixty-eight  pieces  of  artillery,  all  under  the 
orders  of  Marshal  St.  Arnaud ;  and  we  saw 
that  27,000  English,  including  a  full  thou 
sand  of  cavalry,  and  together  with  sixty  guns, 
had  been  landed  by  Lord  Raglan.  Alto 
gether,  then,  the  allies  numbered  (33,000  inert 
and  128  guns.  These  forces,  partly  by  means 
of  the  draught  animals  at  their  command,  and 
partly  by  the  aid  of  the  soldier  hhr»self,  could 
carry  by  land  the  ammunition  necessary  for 
perhaps  two  battles,  and  the  means  of  sub 
sistence  for  three  days.  Their  provisions  be 
yond  those  limits  were  to  be  replenished  from 
the  ships.  It  was  intended,  therefore,  that 
the  fleets  should  follow  the  march  of  the  ar 
mies,  and  that  the  invaders,  without  attempt 
ing  to  dart  upon  the  inland  route  which  con 
nected  the  enemy  with  St.  Petersburg,  should 
move  straight  upon  the  north  side  of  Sebasto 
pol  by  following  the  line  of  the  coast. 

"  The  whole  body  of  the  Allied  armies  was 
to  operate  as  a  *  movable  column. ' 2 

"  Between  an  armed  body  engaged  in  regu 
lar  operations,  and  that  description  of  force 
which  the  French  cidi  a  '  movable  column,' 
the  difference  is  broad ;  and  there  is  need  to 
mark  it,  because  the  way  in  which-  regular 
operations  are  conducted  is  not  even  similar 
to  that  in  which  a  *  movable  column '  is 
wielded.  It  is,  of  course,  from  the  history  of 
continental  wars  that  the  principle  of  regular 
operations  in  the  field  is  best  deduced.  A 
prince  intending  to  invade  his  neighbor's  ter 
ritory  takes  care  to  have  near  his  own  frontier, 
or  in  states  already  under  his  control,  not  only 
the  army  with  which  he  intends  to  begin  the 
invasion,  but  also  that  sustained  gathering  of 
fresh  troops,  and  that  vast  accumulation  of 
stores,  arms,  and  munitions  which  will  suffice, 
as  he  hopes,  to  feed  the  war.  The  territory 
on  which  these  resources  are  spread  is  called 
the  'base  of  operations.'3  When  the  invad 
ing  general  has  set  out  from  this  his  strategic 
home  to  achieve  the  object  he  has  in  view,  the 
neck  of  country  by  which  he  keeps  up  his 
communications  with  the  base  is  called  the 
'  line  of  operations ; '  and  the  maintenance 

1  30,204  Frenchmen  and  7000  Turks,  according  to  the 
French  accounts.    Lord  Kaplan,  I  believe,  thought  that 
the  French  force  was  less,  and  put  it  at  ^7,600. 

2  I  make  this  endeavor  to  elucidate  the  true  character 
of  the  operation  for  the  purpose  of  causing  the  reader 
to  understand  the  kind  of  hazard  which  was  involved 
in  the  march  along  the  coast,  and  also  in  order  to  lay 
the  ground    for   explaining  (in  a  future    volume)  the 
causes  which  afterwards  brought  upon  the  army  cruel 
Bufferings  and  privations. 

'"  This  is  generally,  but  not  invariably,  the  same  line 
as  the  one  by  which  he  has  advanced. 


6 


of  this  line  of  operations  is  the  one  object 
which  must  never  be  absent  from  his  mind. 
The  farther  he  goes,  the  more  he  needs  to 
keep  up  an  incessant  communication  with  his 
'  base ; '  and  yet,  since  the  line  is  lengthen 
ing  as  he  advances,  it  is  constantly  becoming 
more  and  more  liable  to  be  cut.  Such  a  dis 
aster  as  that  he  looks  upon  as  nearly  equal  to 
ruin,  and  there  is  hardly  anything  that  he  will 
refuse  to  sacrifice  for  the  defence  of  the  dusty 
or  mud-deep  cart-roads,  which  give  him  his 
means  of  living  and  fighting. 

"  On  the  other  hand,  the  commander  of  a 
'  movable  column '  begins  his  campaign  by 
wilfully  placing  himself  in  those  very  circum 
stances  which  would  bring  ruin  upon  an  army 
carrying  on  regular  operations.  He  does  not 
profess  nor  attempt  to  hold  fast  any  '  line  of 
operations  '  connecting  him  with  his  resources. 
He  says  to  his  enemy,  '  Surround  me  if  you 
will ;  gather  upon  my  front ;  hover  round  me 
on  flank  and  rear.  Do  not  affront  me  too 
closely,  unless  you  want  to  see  something  of 
my  cavalry  and  my  horse-artillery ;  but,  keep 
ing  at  a  courteous  distance,  you  may  freely 
occupy  the  whole  country  through  which  I 
pass.  I  care  nothing  for  the  roads  by  which 
I  have  come.  What  I  need  whilst  my  task  is 
doing,  I  carry  along  with  me.  I  have  an  en 
terprise  in  hand.  That  achieved,  I  shall 
march  toward  the  resources  which  my  coun 
trymen  have  prepared  for  me.  Those  re 
sources  I  will  reach  or  else  perish.'  If  an 
army  engaged  in  regular  operations  were 
likened  to  an  engine  drawing  its  supplies  by 
means  of  long  pipes  from  a  river,  the  princi 
ple  of  the  '  movable  column '  would  be  well 
enough  tokened  by  that  skinful  of  water 
which,  curried  on  the  back  of  a  camel,  is  the 
life  of  men  passing  a  desert. 

"  Each  of  the  two  systems  has  its  advan 
tages  and  its  drawbacks.  The  advantages  en 
joyed  by  an  army  undertaking  regular  oper 
ations  are :  —  the  lasting  character  of  its 
power,  and  its  comparative  security  against 
great  disasters.  The  general  conducting  an 
army  in  regular  .operations  is  constantly  re 
plenishing  his  strength  by  drawing  from  his 
4  base  '  fresh  troops  and  supplies  to  compen 
sate  the  havoc  which  time  and  the  enemy,  or 
even  time  alone,  will  always  be  working  in 
his  army ;  and  if  he  meets  with  a  check,  he 
retires  upon  a  line  already  occupied  by  por 
tions  of  his  force,  already  strewed  with  his 
magazines.  He  retires,  in  short,  upon  a  road 
prepared  for  his  reception,  and  the  farther  he 
retreats,  the  nearer  he  is  to  his  great  resources. 
The  drawbacks  attending  this  system  are  the 


great  quantity  of  means  of  land  transports 
required  for  keeping  up  the  communication, 
and  the  eternal  necessity  of  having  to  be  ready 
with  a  sufficient  force  to  defend  every  mile  of 
the  '  line  of  operations '  against  the  enter 
prises  of  the  enemy. 

' '  The  advantages  of  the  '  movable  column  ' 
are  :  —  that  its  means  of  land  transport  may 
be  comparatively  small,  —  may,  in  fact,  be 
proportioned  to  the  limited  duration  of  the 
service  which  it  undertakes ;  and  that,  not 
being  clogged  with  the  duty  of  maintaining  a 
'  line  of  operations,'  it  has,  in  truth,  nothing 
to  defend  except  itself.  But  grave  drawbacks 
limit  the  power  of  a  'movable  column.'  In 
the  first  place,  it  .is  an  instrument  fitted  only 
for  temporary  use,  because,  during  the  service 
in  which  it  is  engaged,  it  has  no  resources  to 
rely  upon,  except  what  it  carries  along  with  it. 
Another  drawback  is  the  hazard  it  .incurs,  not 
of  mere  defeat,  but  of  total  extermination ; 
for  it  is  a  force  which  has  left  no  dominion  in 
its  wake,  and  if  it  falls  back,  it  falls  into  the 
midst  of  enemies  having  hold  of  the  country 
around,  and  emboldened  by  seeing  it  retreat. 

"  Then,  also,  a  movable  column,  even 
though  it  be  never  defeated  in  any  pitched 
battle,  is  liable  to  be  brought  to  ruin  bybaing 
well  harassed  ;  and  very  inferior,  troops,  or 
even  armed  peasants,  if  they  have  spirit  and 
enterprise,  may  put  it  in  peril ;  for,  having  the 
command  of  the  country  all  round  it,  they  can 
easily  prepare  their  measures  for  vexing  the 
column  by  day  and  by  night.  Again,  the 
'  movable  column  '  can  not  send  its  sick  and 
wounded  to  the  rear.  It  must  either  abandon 
the  sufferers,  or  else  find  means  of  carrying 
them  wherever  it  marches,  and  this,  of 
course,  is  a  task  which  is  rendered  more 
and  more  difficult  by  every  succeeding  com 
bat.  Again,  if  the  *  movable  column  '  is 
brought  to  frequent  halts  by  the  necessity  of 
self-defence,  there  is  danger  that  the  operation 
in  which  it  is  engaged  will  last  to  a  time  be 
yond  the  narrow  limit  of  the  supplies  which 
it  is  able  to  carry  along  with  it. 

' '  In  Algeria  the  French  had  brought  the 
system  of  using  small  '  movable  columns  '  to 
a  high  state  of  perfection ;  and  there  one 
might  soe  a  force  complete  in  all  arms,  cany- 
ing  with  it  the  bread  and  the  cartridges,  and 
driving  betwixt  its  battalions  the  little  herd  of 
cattle,  which  would  enable  it  to  live  and  to 
'fight ;  one  might  see  it  bidding  farewell  for 
perhaps  several  weeks  to  all  its  communica 
tions,  and  boldly  venturing  into  the  midst  of 
a  wilderness  alive  with  angry  foes ;  but  the 
Arabs  and  Kabyles,  though  not  without  some 
of  the  warlike  virtues,  were,  upon  the  whole, 


too  unintelligent  and  too  feeble  to  be  able  to 
put  the  system  of  the  *  movable  column '  to 
a  test  sufficing  to  prove  that  the  contrivance 
would  hold  good  in  Europe. 

"Upon  the  whole,' it  may  be  acknowledged 
that,  for  operating  in  a  country  where  the 
enemy  is  looked  upon  as  at  all  formidable,  the 
emplovment  of  a  '  movable  column '  is  a 
measure  which  will  be  likely  to  win  more 
favor  from  those  who  love  an  adventure  than 
from  those  who  are  acquainted  with  the  art 
of  war. 

' '  But  whichever  of  the  two  methods  be 
chosen,  it  is  of  great  moment  to  choose  deci 
sively,  taking  care  that  the  operations  are  car 
ried  on  in  a  way  consistent  with  the  principle 
of  the  system  on  which  they  proceed.  A 
general  conducting  regular  operations  must 
be  wary,  circumspect,'  and  resolutely  patient. 
The  leader  of  a  '  movable  column  '  must  be 
swift,  and,  even  for  very  safety's  sake,  -he 
jmay  have  to  be  venturesome,  for  what  would 
be  rashness  in  another  may  in  him  be  rigid 
prudence.  The  two  systems  are  so  opposite, 
that  to  confuse  the  two,  or  to'  import  into  the 
practice  of  one  of  them  the  practice  applica 
ble  to  the  other,  is  to  run  into  grave  troubles 
and  dangers.  Yet  this  is  what  the  Allies  did. 
When  the  English  Government  committed  to 
this  enterprise  a  large  proportion  of  their 
small,  brilliant  army,  and  appointed  to  the 
command  of  it  a  general  mature  in  years  and 
schooled  by  his  long  subordination  to  Wel 
lington,  they  acted  as  though  they  meant  that 
the  army  should  engage  with  all  due  pru 
dence  in  regular  operations.  When  they 
ordered  that  this  force  should  make  a  descent 
upon  the  Crimea  without  intending  to  prepare 
for  it  a  base  of  operations  at  the  landing- 
place,  they  caused  it  to  act  as  a  '  movable 
column.'  It  will  be  seen  hereafter  that  from 
this  ambiguity  of  purpose,  or  rather  from  this 
dimness  of  sight,  the  events  of  the  campaign 
took  their  shape. 

"Again,  it  is  right  to  see  how  far  it  be  pos 
sible  to  change  with  the  same  force  from  one 
of  the  two  systems  to  the  other.  Upon  this, 
it  can  be  said  that  an  army  engaged  in  regu 
lar  operations  may  well  enough  be  able  to 
furnish  forth  a  'movable  column;'  but  to 
hope  that  a  '  movable  column '  will  be  able  to 
gather  to  itself  all  at  once  the  lasting  strength 
of  an  army  prepared  for  regular  operations  is 
to  hope  for  what  cannot  be.  It  is  true,  as 
we  shall  see  hereafter,  that  by  dint  of  great 
effort,  and  the  full  command  of  the  sea,  the 
two  mighty  nations  of  the  West  were  able  in 
time  to  convert  the  remains  of  their  '  movable 
column  '  into  an  army  fitted  for  regular  opera 


tions,  but  we  shall  have  to  remember  that  be 
fore  the  one  system  could  bo  effectually  re 
placed  by  the-  other,  the  soldiery  underwent 
cruel  sufferings." 

All  that  it  was  the  rare  privilege  of  Capt. 
McClellan  to  see  and  learn  of  the  relations 
between  politics  and  the  military  art,  and  of 
the  practical  operations  of  war  conducted 
upon  the  grandest  scale  during  his  visit  to  Se- 
bastopol  might  however,  let  us  here  observe, 
have  produced  but  an  imperfect  and  inade 
quate  effect  upon  hi§  mind,  had  not  his  own  pre 
vious  and  priceless,  though  comparatively  lim 
ited  experience  in  Mexico  prepared  him  intel 
ligently  to  receive  it,  and  fitted  him  to  deduce 
from  it  the  most  solid  instruction  and  the 
most  durable  convictions. 

The  immediate  fruit  of  his  sojourn  in  Eu 
rope,  at  this  time,  was  an  elaborate  and  ex 
haustive  "  Report  upon  the  Constitution  of  the 
Greater  European  Armies,"  which  was  pub 
lished  under  the  authority  of  Congress  in  the 
early  part  of  the  year  1857,  and  which  bears 
irrefragable  witness  to  the  pains  and  zeal  with 
which  the  young  officer  had  devoted  himself 
to  mastering  the  minutest  details,  as  well  as 
the  broadest  principles  of  military  organiza 
tion. 

But  of  inSnitely  greater  pith  and  moment 
to  himself  and  to  his  country  were  the  larger 
and  deeper  results  of  this  military  tour  upon 
his  mental  constitution  and  his  habits  of 
thought. 

The  officers  of  the  Regular  Army  of  the 
United  States,  although  most  carefully  trained 
in  the  principles  of  mathematical  science  and 
of  the  military  art  during  the  four  years  of 
their  academic  course,  have  enjoyed  for  the 
most  part,  in  later  life,  but  few  and  limited 
opportunities  of  military  experience.  With 
the  exception  of  the  Mexican  war,  the  lives  of 
most  of  them  now  living  had  been  passed,  when 
the  great  rebellion  broke  upon  us,  in  a  routine 
of  post  and  garrison  duty  alternating  between 
the  peaceful  seaboard  of  the  Atlantic  and  the 
frontier  forts  of  the  far  West.  A  harassing 
but  contemptible  warfare  with  the  roving  In 
dian  tribes  of  the  trans-Mississippi  educated 
them  to  practical  skill  in  the  handling  of  small 
detachments,  but  could  do  nothing,  of  course, 
towards  familiarizing  them  with  the  spirit  and 
the  necessities  of  war  on  a  grand  scale.  Many 
of  them,  inspired  with  a  genuine  zeal  and  love 
for  their  profession,  were  at  great  pains  to 
master  all  that  text-books  could  teach  upon 
this  subject ;  but  as  the  most  scientific  and 
thoughtful  of  military  authorities,  Baron  Jo- 
mini,  has  well  observed,  ' '  War,  practical 
war,  is  not  an  affair  of  mathematical  dem- 


8 


ons (ration,  —  it  is  a  passionate  drama,"  — 
and  no  study  of  military  literature,  how 
ever  judicious  and  faithful,  can  teach  in 
years  so  much  available  military  truth  as  a 
soldier  like  McClellan  must  imbibe  from  a 
few  weeks  of  actual  living  contact  with  the 
realities  of  war  as  he  came  upon  and  mingled 
with  them  in  the  Crimea. 

After  the  publication  of  his  Report  of  the 
Armies  of  Europe,  in  January,  1857,  Capt. 
McClellan  resigned  his  commission  in  the 
army  and  went  into  civil  life. 

He  was  appointed  Chief  Engineer  of  the 
Illinois  Central  Railroad,  and  upon  the  com 
pletion  of  that  great  enterprise  was  elected 
Vice-President  of  the  company,  which  post 
he  continued  to  fill,  residing  at  Chicago, 
until  the  month  of  August,  1860,  when,  hav 
ing  been  chosen  President  of  the  Eastern  Di 
vision  of  the  Ohio  and  Mississippi  Railroad, 
he  removed  to  Cincinnati. 

He  was  busily  engaged  in  the  duties  of 
this  office,  an  office  which  with  his  previous 
experience  as  a  "railroad  man"  in  Illinois, 
naturally  introduced  him  to  a  wide  and  ac 
curate  familiarity  with  the  people  and  the 
resources  of  the  Central  West,  as  well  as  to 
a  practical  acquaintance  with  the  details  of 
the  modern  system  of  transportation  by  steam, 
when,  in  April,  1861,  he  was  suddenly  sum 
moned  from  the  pursuits  of  peace  by  the  roar 
of  the  cannon  fired  at  Sumter  and  the  crash 
of  impending  civil  war. 

Governor  Dennison,  of  Ohio,  in  response 
to  the  first  call  of  the  President  of  the  United 
States  for  volunteers  to  aid  in  the  suppression 
of  the  rebellion  and  in  maintaining  the  su 
premacy  of  the  Constitution,  appointed  Geo. 
Brinton  McClellan  Major-General,  to  com 
mand  the  contingent  of  the  State,  being  thir 
teen  regiments  of  infantry.  This  commission 
was  offered  and  accepted  on  the  23d  of 
April,  1861. 

There  was  no  difficulty  in  filling  the  ranks 
of  these  regiments.  Throughout  the  great 
State  of  Ohio,  as  throughout  the  entire  North 
and  West,  the  call  of  the  President  for  seventy- 
five  thousand  volunteers,  to  be  enlisted  for  a 
service  of  three  months,  was  answered  by  such 
a  general  uprising  of  the  people  as,  in  the 
words  of  General  McClellan  himself,  made  it 
"  a  struggle  as  to  who  should  be  received, 
and  not  as  to  who  should  avoid  the  call." 

Throughout  the  long  political  conflict  which 
had  preceded  the  assertion  by  force  of  arms 
at  Fort  Sunvter  of  the  right  of  secession,  the 
free  States  had  been  greatly  divided  in  opinion 
concerning  the  issues  so  hotly  debated  between 
numbers  of  their  own  citizens  on  the  one  side, 


and  the  citizens  of  the  slaveholding  States  on 
the  other. 

While  the  sentiment  of  hostility  to  slavery, 
as  an  institution  discreditable  to  the  republic, 
and  in  itself  both  criminal  and  dangerous, 
had  greatly  grown  in  fire  and  in  force  through 
out  the  North  during  the  thirty  years  which 
followed  the  emancipation  of  the  slaves  in  the 
West  Indian  colonies  of  Great  Britain,  and 
while  this  sentiment  had  in  some  places  made 
itself,  and  in  others  had  been  manipulated 
into  becoming  a  powerful  engine  of  partizan 
action,  an  overwhelming  majority  of  the  peo 
ple  of  the  North  and  the  West  still  firmly  ad 
hered  to  the  conviction  that  the  Constitution 
in  no  wise  authorized  any  interference  on  the 
part  either  of  the  non-slaveholding  States,  or 
of  their  citizens,  or  of  the  Federal  Govern 
ment,  with  the  institution  of  slavery  in  the 
States.  It  was  the  dominant  feeling  of  hon 
orable  and  enlightened  men,  that  it  would  be 
dishonest  and  disgraceful  for  an  anti-slavery 
North*  to  take  advantage  of  a  power  conferred 
upon  its  numerical  majority  solely  in  virtue  of 
the  Union  and  the  Constitution,  to  accom 
plish  purposes,  no  matter  how  laudable  they 
might  be  in  the  eyes  of  philanthropists  and 
philosophers,  which,  had  they  been  avowed 
when  the  original  compacts  between  the  States 
were  framed,  would  have  made  the  Union  it 
self  impossible,  and  put  a  final  stop  to  the 
formation  of  the  Constitution. 

It  was  plainly  and  painfully  true,  indeed, 
that  the  leaders  of  the  political  party  by  which 
Mr.  Lincoln-  had  been  lifted  into  power 
neither  shared  this  feeling  nor  were  disposed  to 
respect  it  in  their  policy.  But  so  long  as  the 
refusal  of  many  of  the  Southern  States  to 
submit  to  the  authority  of  the  newly-elected 
President  was  expressed  in  the  form  of  polit 
ical  action  alone,  the  great  majority  of  the 
Northern  people  were  indisposed  to  draw  the 
sword  against  those  whom  they  regarded  as 
their  fellow-citizens,  and  whom  they  believed 
to  be  governed  by  an  honest,  even  if  a  mis 
taken  fear  that  their  rights,  their  property,  and 
their  liberties  were  really  in  peril. 

It  was  well  known  throughout  the  North 
that  the  "right  of  secession"  was  not  more 
generally  accepted,  as  inherent  in  the  Consti 
tution  of  the  Union,  at  the  South  than  it  was 
at  the  North. 

Before  the  formation  of  the  Union,  indeed, 
a  disposition  had  been  manifested  by  the  East 
ern  States,  upon  the  invitation  of  the  Legis 
lature  of  Massachusetts,  to  separate  them 
selves  in  respect  to  many  of  the  most  im 
portant  elements  of  the  public  weal  from 
the  rest  of  the  country,  by  forming  a  conven- 


9 


reg- 


tion  with  the  State  of  New  York  for 
ulating  matters  of  common  concern."  This 
was  in  April,  1783  ;  and,  a  debate  arising 
upon  the  subject  in  the  Congress  of  the  Con 
federation,  Mr.  Bland,  of  Virginia,  had  de 
nounced  such  projects  as  tending  directly  to 
break  up  the  Union,  and  to  form  what  he  de 
scribed  as  "young  Congresses."  Alexander 
Hamilton's  proposition  that  the  Federal  Gov 
ernment  should  assume  the  debts  of  the 
States,  gave  occasion,  soon  after  the  adoption 
of  the  Constitution,  to  a  similar,  though  a  more 
formidable  manifestation.  That '  proposition 
was  supported  by  the  Northern  and  opposed 
by  the  Southern  States  with  so  much  acrimony 
on  either  side,  that  when  the  proposition  was 
finally  rejected,  Congress  adjourned  from  day 
to  day  without  transacting  any  business,  and 
the  members  from  the  Eastern  States  openly 
threatened  the  secession  of  those  States  from 
the  Union,  and  the  formation  of  an  Eastern 
Confederacy.  A  compromise  was  finally  ef 
fected  by  the  concession  to  the  South  of  the 
site  for  the  National  Capital,  on  the  banks  of 
the  Potomac,  in  return  for  the  reconsideration 
by  the  South  of  the  vote  which  had  defeated 
the  "  Assumption  Bill"  Under  the  Presi 
dency  of  the  elder  Adams,  hi  1788,  a  new 
menace  of  separation  came  upon  the  country, 
and  this  time  from  the  South,  the  States  of 
Virginia  and  Kentucky  passing  resolutions  in 
opposition  to  the  policy  of  Mr.  Adams,  which 
clearly  indicated  by  their  tone,  if  not  by  their 
express  phraseology,  a  determination  to  break 
asunder,  in  a  certain  contingency,  the  bonds 
which  united  the  Confederacy. 

The  annexation  of  Louisiana,  under  Mr. 
Adams's  successor,  changed  the  whole  sweep 
and  scope  of  the  future  of  the  Republic ;  and 
again  in  the  East  the  old  propositions  for  the' 
establishment  of  an  Eastern  Confederacy  were 
revived,  and  discussed  by  men  of  the  highest 
standing  and  in  the  most  serious  temper. 

President    John    Adams,    in    December, 
1828,  gave  Mr.  Harrison  Gray  Otis  and  oth- 
•ers,  of  Boston,  the  following  account  of  this 
matter :  — 

"  This  design  had  been  formed  in  the  win 
ter  of  1803—4,  immediately  after  and  as  a 
consequence  of  the  acquisition  of  Louisiana. 
.  .  .  The  plan  was  so  far  matured  that  the 
proposal  had  been  made  to  an  individual  (this 
was  Alexander  Hamilton)  to  permit  himself, 
at  the  proper  time,  to  be  placed  at  the  head 
of  the  military  movements,  which  it  was  fore 
seen  would  be  necessary  for  carrying  it  into 
execution."  In  a  subsequent  letter  to  Gov 
ernor  Plumer,  of  New  Hampshire,  an  avowed 


Disunionist,  President  Adams  states  that 
"three  projects  of  boundary  "  for  the  New 
England  Confederacy  had  been  prepared. 
These  were:  "1.  If  possible,  the  Potomac. 
2.  The  Susquebanna.  3.  The  Hudson 
River."  Of  the  truth  of  these  statements 
Governor  Plumer  himself  was  well  aware. 
He  had  written  to  New  Hampshire  from  his 
seat  in  Congress,  on  the  19th  of  January, 
1804,  "  What  do  you  wish  your  Senators  and 
Representatives  to  do  here?  We  have  no 
part  in  Jefferson  and  no  inheritance  in  Vir 
ginia.  Shall  we  return  to  our  own  homes, 
sit  under  our  own  vines  and  fig-trees,  and  be 
separated  from  the  slaveholders?  " 

The  admission  of  Louisiana  as  a  State  into 
the  Unipn,  seven  years -later,  led  to  a  section 
al  debate  in  Congress,  in  the  course  of  which 
the  Hon.  Josiah  Quincy,  of  Massachusetts,  de 
clared  (Jan.  14,  1811)  that  the  admission 
of  Louisiana  would  * '  free  the  States  from 
their  moral  obligations,  and,  as  it  will  be  the 
right  of  all,  so  it  will  be  the  duty  of  some  to 
prepare  for  separation,  amicably  if  they  can, 
violently  if  they  must." 

Without  pursuing  the  subsequent  history  of 
*this  theoretical  ' '  right  of  secession  ' '  through 
the  successive  collisions  of  sectional  interests 
and  sectional  passions,  which  again  and  again 
elicited  the  assertion  of  it,  now  from  States 
of  the  South  and  now  from  States  of  the 
North,  during  the  period  which  intervened  be 
tween  the  admission  of  Louisiana  and  the  first 
formal  attempt  of  an  American  State  to  act 
upon  the  right  in  December,  1861,  it  must 
be  evident  to  all  reflecting  minds  that  an  im 
petuous  and  passionate  determination  to  meet 
this  attempt  at  once  by  the  "  last  argument 
of  kings"  would  have  implied,  on  the  part 
of  the  people  of  the  Northern  States,  not 
only  a  discreditable  ignorance  of  the  prece 
dents  of  American  history,  but  a  lamentable 
incapacity  of  appreciating  the  importance  of 
time  and  argument  in  calming  the  efferves 
cence  of  popular  excitement,  and  dissipating 
the  delusions  which  so  often  seize  upon  the 
mind  of  a  whole  community.  No  such  im 
petuous  and  passionate  determination  we  have 
said  was,  however,  manifested  by  the  people 
of  the  North.  The  secession  of  one  after  an 
other  of  the  States  of  the  South  Atlantic  and 
the  Gulf  was  received  by  the  people  at  large 
with  a  kind  of  incredulous  amazement,  which 
was  gradually  giving  place  to  a  widespread 
conviction  that  the  whole  matter  must  event 
ually  be  referred  for  settlement  to  such  a 
convention  of  the  States  as  had  already 
twice  rescued  the  Republic  from  the  danger  of 


10 


disintegration,  when  the  commencement  of  act 
ual  hostilities  in  Charleston  harbor,  and  the 
call  of  the  President  for  troops  to  repel  an  as 
sault  made  upon  the  national  forces  and  to 
avenge  an  insult  offered  to  the  national  flag,  put 
an  entirely  new  face  upon  the  state  of  things. 

The  most  powerful  of  the  Southern  States 
were  still,  at  this  time,  standing  out  against 
the  movement  of  secession.  The  feeling  was 
almost  universal  at  the  North  that  the  attack 
upon  Fort  Sumter  could  not  possibly  be  sus 
tained  by  the  deliberate  judgment  of  these  un- 
secedcd  Southern  States.  The  existence  of 
State  Rights,  it  was  felt,  necessarily  implied 
the  existence  of  State  Duties ;  and  when  the 
President  appealed  to  the  nation  for  seventy- 
five  thousand  troops  to  maintain  the  na 
tional  authority,  the  people  of  the  North  and 
West  took  up  arms,  not  for  the  purpose  of 
annihilating  the  rights  even  of  the  seceded 
States,  but  for  the  purpose  of  compelling  those 
States  to  fulfil  their  duties. 

Had  it  then  been  understood  that  the  force 
called  into  the  field  was  but  the  advance 
guard  of  an  army  of  millions  of  men,  to  be 
employed  for  an  indefinite  term  of  years,  not 
merely  in  enforcing  the  authority  of  the  Con 
stitution  and  repressing  a  violent  assault  upon 
the  established  order  of  things,  but  in  coerc 
ing  the  popular  will  throughout  one  half  of 
the  territory  of  the  Republic,  and  in  over 
whelming  the  domestic  institutions  of  thirteen 
States  of  the  Federal  Union,  it  cannot  be 
doubted,  by  any  candid  man,  that  the  popular 
voice  of  the  North  would  have  called  a  per 
emptory  "  halt!  "  and  that  the  whole  course 
of  subsequent  events  would  have  been  mate 
rially  changed. 

There  are  not  wanting  injudicious  and  in 
considerate  friends  of  the  Union,  particularly 
upon  the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic,  who  de 
light  to  represent  the  "  uprising  of  the 
North  "  as  the  initial  movement  of  a  magnifi 
cent  moral  crusade  destined,  in  the  provi 
dence  of  God,  to  deliver  America  from  the 
sin  and  the  shame  of  slavery. 

Such  representations  give  an  indecently 
Jesuitical  cast  to  the  designs  of  ' '  provi 
dence,"  do  grave  injustice  to  the  spirit,  the 
character,  and  the  intelligence  of  the  North 
ern  people,  and  might  almost  seem  to  be 
made  in  the  direct  interest  of  that  originally 
small  and  fanatical  party  of  Disunion  at  the 
South,  which,  by  insisting  upon  the  imminence 
of  such  a  crusade,  and  lashing  therewith  the 
fears  and  doubts  and  passions  of  the  body 
of  the  Southern  people  into  frenzy,  precipita 
ted  the  movement  of  secession,  and  enlisted 
whole  commonwealths  in  the  service  of  their 


own  designs.  And  no  one  thing  assuredly 
will  bear  more  heavily  upon  the  administra 
tion  of  Mr.  Lincoln,  at  the  bar  of  history, 
than  the  fact  that  the  most  conspicuous  ad 
visers  of  the  Pxesident,  in  the  outset  of  this 
great  struggle,  were  men  who,  both  by  their 
antecedent  and  their  subsequent  course  in 
politics,  have  given  color  to  such  representa 
tions. 

Nowhere  is  that  blind  and  fanatical  passion 
which  would  precipitate  one  whole  community, 
or  section  of  a  community  of  human  beings 
against  another,  upon  a  mission  of  moral 
chastisement  and  correction,  so  odious  and  un 
pardonable  as  in  the  high  places  of  authority.  • 
"  The  whole  modern  mind,"  it  has  been  ad 
mirably  said,  "is  in  the  sovereignty  of  rea 
son,  the  rational  organization  of  society  by  re 
flection  ;  "  and  of  those  who  are  charged  with 
the  duty  of  administering  the  affairs  of  a 
great  nation  in  modern  times,  it  is  above  all 
required  that  they  should  be  capable  of  reflec 
tion  and  governed  by  reason. 

Reason  shows  us  that  in  the  long  course  of 
ages  past  there  is  no  one  movement  of  a  whole 
community  which  can  bo  wholly  condemned 
or  wholly  approved ;  reason  convinces  us, 
therefore,  that  the  future  will  judge  ourselves 
as  we  judge  the  past,  and  will  no  more  par 
take  our  passions  than  we  partake  those  of  the 
past.  Absent  as  it  would  seem  to  have  been 
where  most  its  presence  was  required,  in  the 
inner  councils  of  the  Administration,  this 
wholesome  faculty  of  reason  was  not  lacking 
to  the  people  in  general. 

Among  the  volunteers  who  thronged  the 
front  of  war  at  the  Presidential  summons  in 
April,  1861,  there  may  have  been,  and  doubt 
less  were  men  who  were  governed  solely  by 
their  passions ;  who  thought  only  of  chastising 
southern  insolence ;  of  abolishing  southern 
slavery,  and  of  settling  by  force  the  future  re 
lations  of  the  States.  But  the  vast  majority 
of  these  volunteers  were  men  of  a  very  differ 
ent  stamp,  —  men  who  could  discriminate  be 
tween  wrongs  to  be  redressed  and  rights  to  bo 
respected. 

Of  these  was  the  young  major-general  called 
to  the  command  of  the  contingent  of  Ohio. 
His  first  duty  obviously  was  the  organization 
of  the  force  put  under  his  orders  ;  and  to  this 
duty  he  addressed  himself  immediately  with 
all  the  energy  of  his  character.  Believing 
that  the  army  of  the  Union  had  a  single  and 
definite  work  to  do,  he  perceived  the  supreme 
importance  of  putting  the  army  into  such  a 
condition  as  should  make  the  doing  of  that 
work  the  certain  immediate  consequence  of 
the  attempt  to  do  it. 


11 


The  Western  States,  as  General  McClellan 
at  once  found  upon  commencing  his  labors, 
were  **' totally  unprepared  for  the  impending 
struggle."  The  Government  of  the  Union 
wfes  entirely  unable  to  assist  the  States  in  the 
organization  and  equipment  of  the  troops  which 
it  had  called  upon  them  to  furnish.  Lieuten 
ant-General  Scott,  commanding-in-chief  the 
whole  army,  at  once  recognized  the  dangerous 
condition  of  affairs,  recommended  the  appoint 
ment -of  General  McClellan  to  the  rank  of 
Major-General  in  the  Army  of  the  United 
States,  and  uniting  the  three  great  States  of 
Ohio,  Illinois,  and  Indiana  into  one  "  Depart 
ment  of  the  Ohio,"  confided  this  department  to 
his  care.  General  McClellan  instantly  called 
the  governors  of  these  States  into  council 
with  himself,  and  laid  before  them  the  true 
state  of  matters  in  the  West.  All  that  could 
possibly  be  done,  with  the  earnest  cooperation 
of  these  State  authorities,  was  done,  and  the. 
work  of  preparing  their  contingents  for  the 
field  was  pushed  forward  as  rapidly  as  the  cir 
cumstances  of  a  population,  quite  unused  to 
war  and  not  yet  in  the  least  aware  of  the  ex 
tent  of  the  conflict  upon  which  it  was  enter 
ing,  would  permit. 

-While  busily  engaged  in  this  exhausting 
and  harassing  duty,  General  McClellan  found 
time  to  scan,  with  the  practised  and  untroubled 
eye  of  a  skilful  soldier,  the  whole  field  over 
which  the  clouds  of  war  were  swiftly  rolling 
up. 

The  President's  proclamation  had  produced 
not  only  in  the  seceded  States,  but  throughout 
the  South,  an  effect  wholly  at  variance  with 
the  general  expectations  of  the  Northern  peo 
ple,  if  not  with  the  intimate  hopes  and  pur 
poses  of  those  who  were  most  busy  and  influ 
ential  in  the  Presidential  councils.  Instead 
of  intimidating  the  seceded  States,  it  had  in 
tensified  their  rage  against  the  Government 
and  the  Union ;  instead  of  rallying  the  unse- 
cedcd  States  of  the  South  to  the  support  of 
order  and  the  castigation  of  insults  offered  to 
the  flag,  it  had  been  made  the  instrument  of 
driving  the  great  States  of  Tennessee,  North 
Carolina,  and  Virginia  themselves  into  seces 
sion,  and  had  excited  a  most  formidable  fer 
ment  of  public  feeling  in  Kentucky  and  Mis 
souri. 

Within  a  month  from  the  date  of  that  proc 
lamation  it  had  become  evident  to  experienced 
military  men  that  an  extensive  collision  be 
tween  the  troops  and  people  of  the  States  act 
ually  armed  and  arming  at  the  South,  and 
the  hastily-organized  and  imperfectly-equipped 
though  brave  and  enthusiastic  volunteers  of 
the  ,North,  might  more  than  probably  result 


in  such  a  practical  humiliation  of  the  Govern 
ment  as  must  give  an  enormous  impulse  to 
the  now  gigantic  movement  of  rebellion. 

General  Scott,  at  Washington,  urged  this 
consideration  upon  the  Government  with  all 
the  weight  of  his  large  experience  and  all  the 
earnestness  of  his  already  historical  patriot 
ism.  General  McClellan,  from  his  position 
upon  the  Ohio,  reinforced  the  representations 
of  the  General-in-Chief,  pressed  most  strongly 
for  the  utmost  possible  activity  in  arming  and 
equipping  the  Western  contingents,  recom 
mending  the  largest  possible  increase  of  the 
whole  force  to  be  employed,  and  proposed 
such  a  flank  movement  up  the  valley  of  south 
western  Virginia  upon  Kichmond  as  would 
insure  the  possession  of  Tennessee  to  the 
Union,  guarantee  the  tranquillity  of  Ken 
tucky,  and,  above  all,  secure  decisive  results  to 
the  great  military  operations  preparing  in  the 
East  against  Virginia. 

But  in  the  temper,  at  once  frivolous  and 
fanatical,  which  then  prevailed  at  Washington, 
the  counsels  of  military  experience  were  un 
heard  or  unheeded. 

It  was  natural  enough,  perhaps,  that  the 
people  of  the  North  in  general  should  have 
been  insensible  to  the  gravity  of  the  events 
now  before  them.  The  great  majority  of  the 
Northern  people  having  neither  desired  nor 
labored  for  the  disruption  of  the  Union,  could 
not  possibly  bring  themselves  to  believe  that 
the  Union  was  really  in  danger  of  disruption. 
They  looked  upon  the  South  as  maddened  and 
misguided,  and  fully  expected  that  a  brief 
campaign  resulting  in  the  overthrow  of  the 
extemporized  "government"  at  Eichmond 
and  in  tjie  dispersion  of  the  extemporized  army 
of  the  rebellion,  would  be  followed  by  the  im 
mediate  return  of  the  States  to  their  alle 
giance,  and  to  such  a  general  revision  of  the 
political  sins  and  follies  of  both  sections  as 
should  insure  their  deserts  to  the  fanatics  and 
disorganizes  of  both. 

With  the  smaller,  but  for  the  moment,  un 
fortunately,  influential  party  at  •  the  North, 
which  really  preferred  the  disunion  of  the 
States  to  the  permanence  of  a  constitution 
which  recognized  and  protected  the  right  of 
the  Southern  States  to  regulate  their  own  do 
mestic  institutions,  it  was  an  article  of  faith 
that  the  South  was  incapable  of  a  vigorous 
effort  at  independence.  It  was  said  of  old 
that  "  a  fool  is  never  completely  a  fool  until 
he  knows  Latin; "  and  it  may  be  said,  with 
equal  truth,  that  a  fanatic  is  never  completely 
a  fanatic  till  he  has  taken  to  statistics.  Study 
ing  the  South  in  the  tables  of  the  census,  the 
political  Abolitionists  of  the  North  had  satis- 


12 


fied  themselves,  and  were  ready  to  crucify  all 
the  rest  of  the  world  into  believing,  that  the 
South  was  bankrupt  as  to  its  finances,  and 
emasculated  as  to  its  population ;  that  it  ex 
isted  as  a  social  fact,  indeed,  simply  by  virtue 
of  its  connection  with  the  North,  and  must 
tumble  hopelessly  to  pieces  at  the  moment 
when  it  should  attempt  to  stand  alone. 

Controlled  by  the  spirit  of  those  who  thus 
believed,  the  Administration  listened  impa 
tiently  to  such  counsels  as  those  of  General 
Scott  and  General  McClellan.  To  question, 
indeed,  the  certainty  of  an  immediate  collapse 
of  the  rebellion  upon  the  first  advance  of  the 
National  forces  was  considered  by  the  'more 
enthusiastic  supporters  of  the  Administration 
in  Congress  and  in  the  press  at  the  outset  of  the 
war,  as  proof  positive  of  a  secret  sympathy 
with  secession.  And  there  can  be  no  doubt 
that  much  of  the  strange  personal  animosity 
with  which  General  McClellan  has  been 
assailed  by  this  class  of  persons,  must  be  at 
tributed  to  the  intolerable  vindication  by  sub 
sequent  events  of  the  estimates  which  he  orig 
inally  made  of  the  strength  of  the  South,  and 
of  the  force  which  would  be  needed  to  make  a 
prompt  and  profitable  demonstration  of  the 
national  power.  There  is  nothing  which  most 
men  arc  so  slow  to  forgive  in  those  with  whom 
they  quarrel  as  the  crime  of  being  proved  to 
be  in  the  right. 

"  On  the  21st  of  May,"  says  General  Mc 
Clellan,  "  the  total  number  of  small  arms  in 
the  State  of  Ohio  was  twenty-five  thousand 
one  hundred  and  seventy-nine,  of  which  twen 
ty-two  thousand  and  seventyfive  were  smooth- 
Lores,  mostly  very  inferior  specimens  of  the 
altered  flint-locks.  Infantry  equipments  were 
still  more  difficult  to  obtain." 

With  this  miserable  provision  for  the  ar 
mament  of  the  Ohio  contingent  to  be  made  the 
best  of,  improved  and  increased  only  by  per 
sonal  unremitting  efforts ;  and  with  the 
knowledge  that  no  force  equal  to  the  vast  en 
terprise  before  the  country  had  yet  been  sum 
moned  by  tjie  President  into  the  field,  Gen 
eral  McClellan  did  not  hesitate  to  plan  and  to 
urge  upon  the  Government  such  comprehen 
sive  and  decisive  schemes  of  action  as  we  have 
already  alluded  to. 

But  these  schenies  of  action  were  schemes 
of  policy,  as  well  of  war.  The  young  general 
of  the  Ohio  troops,  whose  life  had  been  passed 
in  the  study  of  the  art  of  war,  had  less  faith 
in  the  virtue  of  mere  brute  force  to  bring 
American  citizens  to  reason,  than  many  a  new- 
fledged  captain  who  had  just  left  his  law- 
books  and  his  red  tape  to  don  the  ' '  harness  of 
battle." 


The  following  passage  will  show  how  anx 
iously  at  this  time  General  McClellan  sought 
to  combine  a  wise  abstinence  from  military  in 
terference,  where  such  interference  was  not 
absolutely  essential  to  the  main  tenance  of  the 
national  authority,  with  large  conceptions  of 
the  work  to  be  done  by  the  army  and  with 
adequate  preparation  for  doing  it :  — 

"  During  the  month  of  May  the  political 
aspect  of  affairs  in  Kentucky  and  Western 
Virginia  was  uncertain  and  threatening.  In 
the  latter  a  convention  had  been  called  to  as 
semble  at  Wheeling,  on  the  13th  of  May,  to 
decide  upon  the  question  of  separation  from 
the  eastern  portion  of  the  State,  while  the 
election  upon  the  question  of  ratifying  the 
Richmond  ordinance  of  secession  from  the 
United  States,  was  fixed  for  the  23d  of  the 
same  month.  Excitement  ran  high,  and  hon 
est  men  differed  widely  as  to  the  policy  that 
.should  bo  pursued  by  the  military  authorities 
of  the  general  government. 

"  I  received  a  multitude  of  letters  from  a 
large  number  of  sincere  Union  men  who  en 
tertained  widely  divergent  views  as  to  the 
measures  adequate  to  the  emergency.  Many 
urged,  as  early  as  the  beginning  of  May,  that 
troops  should  immediately  be  sent  into  Vir 
ginia,  to  encourage  the  Union  men  and  pre 
vent  the  secessionists  from  gaining  a  foothold. 
At  least  an  equal  number  insisted,  with  equal 
force,  that  the  arrival  of  troops  from  other 
States  would  merely  arouse  State  pride,  throw 
many  wavering  men  into  the  rebel  ranks,  and 
at  once  kindle  the  flames  of  civil  war. 

' '  In  Kentucky  the  struggle  was  much  more 
bitter  than  in  Western  Virginia.  The  State 
government,  the  arms,  and  the  military  or 
ganization,  were  to  a  great  extent  in  the  hands 
of  men  who  favored  the  secession  of  the  State ; 
but  so  able  and  determined  was  the  course  of 
the  Union  leaders,  and  so  marked  did  the  ma 
jority  of  the  people  soon  become  in  their  sup 
port,  that  the  secessionist  leaders  were  com 
pelled  to  content  themselves  with  the  avowal 
of  the  position  of  neutrality,  while  awaiting 
the  results  of  the  elections  to  be  held  on  the 
26th  June  for  congressmen,  and  on  the  4th 
August  for  members  of  the  legislature. 

"The  policy  of  the  leaders  of  the  Union 
party  was,  '  To  remain  in  the  Union  without 
a  revolution,  under  all  the  forms  of  law,  and 
by  their  own  action.'  The  words  of  Garret 
Davis  were,  '  We  will  remain  in  the  Union  by 
voting  if  we  can,  by  fighting  if  we  must,  and 
if  we  cannot  hold  our  own,  we  will  call  on 
the  general  government  to  aid  us.' 

"It  was  the  desire  of  these  true  and  able 
men  that  no  extraneous  elements  of  excite- 


13 


ment  should  be  introduced  in  the  State  until 
the  elections  were  over  ;  they  felt  sure  of  car 
rying  these  elections  if  left  to  themselves.  I 
fully  coincided  with  them  in  their  expectations 
and  opinions,  and,  so  far  as  was  in  my  power, 
lent  them  every  assistance  in  carrying  out 
their  views,  among  which  were  the  organiza 
tion  of  Home  Guards  and  the  distribution  of 
arms  to  Union  men.  In  Missouri,  hostilities 
had  already  broken  out,  and  it  was  evident 
that  that  State  was  destined  to  become  the 
seat  of  serious  fighting ;  nor  was  it  then  sup 
posed  that  our  tenure  of  St.  Louis  was  en 
tirely  secure. 

"Collections  of  Southern  troops  at  Mem 
phis  and  Union  City  threatened  Columbus, 
l£y.,  and  Cairo,  and  made  it  necessary  to 
keep  a  vigilant  watch  in  that  direction.  It 
should  also  be  remembered  that  in  the  early 
part  of  May  the  National  Capital  was  by  no 
means  secure,  and  it  was  not  at  that  time  an 
improbable  contingency  that  Western  regi 
ments  might  yet  be  needed  to  protect  or  re 
gain  Washington.  As  bearing  upon  this  point, 
it  may  be  stated  that  in  a  letter  addressed  to 
the  Gencral-in-chief  on  the  21st  May,  I  in 
formed  him  that  from  the  information  in  my 
possession  the  indications  were  that  the  dispo 
sable  troops  in  the  regular  Confederate  ser 
vice,  from  Mississippi,  Alabama,  Arkansas, 
and  Louisiana  had  gone  to  the  cast,  via  Lynch- 
burg ;  leaving  in  Tennessee  the  State  militia, 
who  were  badly  armed  and  under  no  disci 
pline.  On  the  26th  April,  when  my  com 
mand  was  confined  to  the  limits  of  the  State 
of  Ohio,  I  submitted  to  the  General-in-chief 
certain  suggestions,  the  substance  of  which 
was  :  That,  for  the  purposes  of  defence,  Cairo 
should  be  occupied  by  two  battalions,'  strongly 
intrenched,  and  provided  with  heavy  guns  and 
a  gun-boat  to  control  the  river ;  that  some  eight 
battalions  should  be  stationed  at  Sandoval  in 
Illinois  to  observe  St.  Louis,  sustain  the  gar 
rison  of  Cairo,  and,  if  necessary,  reinforce 
Cincinnati ;  that  a  few  companies  should  ob 
serve  the  lower  Wabash ;  that  some  four 
thousand  men  should  be  posted  at  Seymour 
in  Indiana  to  observe  Louisville,  and  be  ready 
to  support  either  Cincinnati  or  Cairo  ;  that 
there  should  be  five  thousand  men  at  or  near 
Cincinnati,  and  two  battalions  at  Chillicothe, 
Ohio.  With  the  troops  disposable  for  active 
operations,  it  was  proposed  to  move  up  the 
valley  of  the  Great  Kanawha  upon  Richmond ; 
this  movement  to  be  made  with  the  greatest 
promptness,  that  it  might  not  fail  to  relieve 
Washington,  or  to  insure  the  destruction  of 
the  enemy  in  eastern  Virginia,  if  aided  by  a 
prompt  advance  on  the  eastern  line  of  opera 


tions.  Should  Kentucky  assume  a  hostile 
attitude,  it  was  recommended  to  cross  the  Ohio 
with  eighty  thousand  men,  and  move  straight 
on  Nashville,  acting  thence  in  concert  with  a 
vigorous  defensive  on  the  eastern  line.  It 
was  strongly  urged  that  everything  possible 
should  be  done  to  hasten  the  equipment  and 
armament  of  the  Western  troops,  as  the  nation 
would  be  entirely  deprived  of  their  powerful 
aid  until  this  should  be  accomplished. 

"It  was  not  until  the  13th  May  that  the 
order,  forming  the  Department  of  the  Ohio 
and  assigning*  ine  to  the  command,  was  re 
ceived.  In  the  mean  time,  as  much  excite 
ment  existed  at  Cincinnati,  which  city  was 
regarded  as  a  tempting  object  to  the  enemy  in 
the  uncertain  condition  of  Kentucky,  I  took 
steps  to  concentrate  the  greater  part  of  the 
Ohio  troops  at  Camp  Dennison,  on  the  Little 
Miami  Railroad,  seventeen  miles  from  Cincin 
nati  ;  a  favorable  position  for  instruction,  and 
presenting  peculiar  facilities  for  movement  in 
any  direction.  As  .soon  as  the  new  depart 
ment  was  placed  under  my  command  I  took 
steps  for  the  immediate  erection  of  heavy  bat 
teries  at  Cairo.  In-  the  letter  of  May  21st, 
already  referred  to,  after  giving  the  informa 
tion  obtained  in  regard  to  the  position  of  the 
enemy  on  the  Mississippi  River,  it  was  stated 
that  I  was  convinced  of  the  necessity  of  hav 
ing,  without  a  day's  delay,  a  few  efficient  gun 
boats  to  operate  from  Cairo  as  a  base  ;  that  if 
they  were  rendered  shot-proof,  they  would  en 
able  us  at  least  to  annoy  seriously  the  rebel 
camps  on  the  Mississippi,  and  interfere  with 
their  river  communications  —  their  main  de 
pendence  ;  that  I  requested  authority  to  make" 
the  necessary  expenditures  to  procure  gun 
boats,  and  that  I  regarded  them  as  an  indis 
pensable  element  in  any  system  of  operations, 
whether  offensive  or  defensive.  In  the  same 
letter  .the  necessity  for  light  batteries  was 
strongly  set  forth." 

While  General  McClellan  was  thus  reflect 
ing  and  acting  at  the  West,  members  of  the 
cabinet  in  Washington  were  expressing  to 
foreigners  their  "  willingness  to  let  the  South 
have  its  way  and  go  in  peace,"  and  radical 
journalists,  ostensibly  of  the  same  party  with 
these  statesmen,  were  clamoring  for  the  coer 
cion  of  Kentucky  into  "  active  loyalty."  All 
was  chaotic,  indefinite,  passionate,  and  extrav 
agant  in  the  language,  the  policy,  and  the 
purposes  of  the  Administration. 

The  Southern  Government  had  been  auda 
ciously  removed  from  Montgomery  to  Rich 
mond,  with  an  open  threat  uttered  by  the 
Southern  Secretary  of  War,  that  the  "  Con 
federate  flag"  should  soon  wave  in  triumph 


14 


over  Washington  city.  Mr.  Davis,  availing 
himself  of  his  past  military  experience,  had 
secured  the  early  organization  of  his  army  by 
inducing  the  "  Confederate  Congress  "  to  pass 
a  law  enlisting  all  volunteers  for  the  period  of 
the  war ;  and  although  many  dissensions  ex 
isted  at  Richmond  and  in  the  Southern  camp, 
of  which  a  calm  and  thoughtful  mind  at  the 
head  of  the  affairs,  of  the  Union  might  have 
taken  signal  advantage,  the  military  prepa 
rations  of  the  South  were  going  on  with  a  gen- 
era<l  consistency  of  purpose  and  harmony  of 
action  unknown  upon  our  side  o'f  the  Potomac. 
General  Scott,  forgetting  his  many  infirmi 
ties,  labored  resolutely  to  perfect  the  arrange 
ments  necessary  to  put  an  army  into  the  field 
with  any  fair  prospect  of  success  ;  but  he  was 
daily  insulted  by  the  self-constituted  captains 
of  the  nation  in  the  columns  of  the  Adminis 
tration  press,  and  he  soon  found  that  he  could 
not  safely  count  upon  that  quiet  and  vigorous 
support  from  the  Administration  itself,  without 
which  all  his  efforts  must  .necessarily  be  vain. 
He  could  find  but  little  time  to  bestow  upon 
the  state  of  matters  west  of  the  Alleghanies  ; 
and  General  McClellan  was,  accordingly,  left 
very  much  to  himself.  The  responsibility  thus 
thrown  upon  him  was  very  great  and  solemn  ; 
but  he  did  not  shrink  from  the  burden. 

Having  made  up  his  mind  towards  the  end 
of  May  that  the  State  troops  of  Virginia,  then 
acting  independently  of  the  Confederate  forces, 
and  commanded  by  General  Robert  Lee,  were 
bent  upon  invading  Western  Virginia,  reduc 
ing  the  Union  sentiment  of  that  section,  and 
destroying  as  far  as  possible  the  communica 
tions  between  Washington  and  the  Central 
West,  General  McClellan,  though  he  had  un 
der  his  orders  at  that  time  no  more  than  nine 
available  regiments  of  infantry,  resolved  to 
advance  into  and  occupy  Western  Virginia. 

General  McClellan  felt  that  this  was  a  se 
rious  and  momentous  step  to  take.  His  mind 
was  too  deeply  imbued  with  the  spirit  of  the 
patriots  who  labored  together  at  the  building 
up  of  our  national  edifice,  to  rogard  the  inva 
sion  of  one  American  commonwealth  by  the 
armed  citizens  of  another  as  a  light  or  indif 
ferent  thing.  He  recognized  his  obligation  to 
make  a  full  explanation  of  the  feelings  and 
purposes  with  which  such  a  step  was  taken  to 
the  people  of  the  invaded  State,  and  to  im 
press  upon  the  troops  under  his  command  in 
the  clearest  manner  the  strict  limitations  of  the 
painful  duty  which  they -were  about  to  perform. 
And  he  accordingly  issued  to  the  inhab 
itants  of  Western  Virginia,  and  to  the  soldiers 
of  the  Department  the  following  proclamation 
and  address :  — 


PROCLAMATION. 
.  yif>.  iM  701?]  5  i«v<j  o-icr  wrofrvVttfl 

HEAD-QUARTERS,  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  OHIO, 
May  26,  1861. 

To  the  Union  Men  of  Western  Virginia : 

VIRGINIANS  !— The  general  government 
has  long  enough  endured  the  machinations  of 
a  few  factious  rebels  in  your  midst.  Arawd 
traitors  have  in  vain  endeavored  to  deter  you 
from  expressing  your  loyalty  at  the  polls. 
Having  failed  in  this  infamous  attempt  to  de 
prive  you  of  the  exercise  of  your  dearest 
rights,  they  now  seek  to  inaugurate  a  reign  of 
terror,  and  thus  force  you  to  yield  to  their 
schemes,  and  submit  to  the  yoke  of  the  traitor 
ous  conspiracy,  dignified  by  the  name  of  the 
Southern  Confederacy.  '  They  are  destroying 
the  property  of  citizens  of  your  State,  and 
ruining  your  magnificent  railways.  The  general 
government  has  heretofore  carefully  abstained 
from  sending  troops  across  the  Ohio,  or  even 
from  posting  them  along  its  banks,  although  fre 
quently  urged  to  do  so  by  many  of  your  prom 
inent  citizens.  It  determined  to  await  the 
result  of  the  late  election,  desirous  that  no  one 
might  be  able  to  say  that  the  slightest  effort- 
had  been  made  from  this  side  to  influence  the 
free  expression  of  your  opinions,  although  the 
many  agencies  brought  to  bear  upon  you  by 
the  rebels  were  well  l^iown.  You  have  now 
shown,  under  the  most  adverse  circumstances, 
that  the  great  mass  of  the  people  of  Western 
Virginia  are  true  and  loyal  to  that  bsneficent 
government  under  which  we  and  our  fathers 
have  lived  so  long.  As  soon  as  the  result  of 
the  election  was  known,  the  traitors  com 
menced  their  work  of  destruction.  The  gen- 
el-al  government  cannot  close  its  ears  to  the 
demand  you  have  made  for  assistance.  I  have 
ordered  troops  to  cross  the  Ohio  River.  They 
come  as  your  friends  and  brothers,  —  as  en 
emies  only  to  the  armed  rebels  who  are  preying 
upon  you.  Your  homes,  your  families,  and 
your  property  are  safe  under  our  protection. 
All  your  rights  shall  be  religiously  respected, 
notwithstanding  all  'that  has  been  said  by  the 
traitors  to  induce  you  to  believe  that  our  ad- 
"-.  vent  among  you  will  be  signalized  by  interfer 
ence  with  your  slaves.  Understand  one  thing 
clearly.  Not  only  will  we  abstain  from  all 
such  interference,  but  we  will  on  the  contrary, 
with  an  iron  hand,  crush  any  attempt  at  insur 
rection  on  their  part.  Now,  that  we  are  in 
your  midst,  I  call  upon  you  to  fly  to  arms  and 
support  the  general  government.  Sever  the 
connection  that  binds  you  to  traitors ;  proclaim 
to  the  world  that  the  faith  and  loyalty,  so  long 
boasted  by  the  Old  Dominion,  are  still  pre- 


15 


served  in  Western  Virginia,  and  that  you  re 
main  true  to  the  stars  and  stripes. 

GEORGE  B.  MCCLELLAN, 
Major-General  U.  S.  A.,  Comd'g  Dep't. 


ADDRESS. 

HEAD-QUARTERS,  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  OHIO, 

CINCINNATI,  May  26,  1861. 

SOLDIERS  !  —  You  are  ordered  to  cross  the 
frontier,  and  enter  upon  the  soil  of  Virginia. 
Your  mission  is  to  restore  peace  and  confidence, 
to  protect  the-  majesty  of  the  law,  and  to  res 
cue  our  brethren  from  the  grasp  of  armed 
traitcrs.  You  are  to  act  in  concert  with  Vir 
ginia  troops,  and  to  support  their  advance.  I 
place  under  the  safeguard  of  your  honor  the 
persons  and  property  of  the  Virginians.  I 
know  that  you  will  respect  their  feelings  and 
all  their  rights. 

Preserve  the  strictest  discipline  ;  —  remem 
ber  that  each  one  of  you  holds  in  his  keeping 
the  honor  of  Ohio  and  the  Union.  If  you 
are  called  upon  to  overcome  armed  opposition, 
I  know  that  your  courage  is  equal  to  the  task  ; 
—  but  remember,  that  your  only  foes  are  the 
armed  traitors,  —  and  show  mercy  even  to 
them  when  they  are  in  your  power,  for  many 
of  them  are  misguided.  When,  under  your 
protection,  the  loyal  men  of  Western  Virginia 
have  been  enabled  to  organize  and  arm,  they 
can  protect  themselves,  and  you  can  then  return 
to  your  homes,  with  the  proud  satisfaction  of 
having  saved  a  gallant  people  from  destruc 
tion. 

GEORGE  B.  MCCLELLAN, 

Major-General  U.  S.  A.,  Comd'g. 


Left  entirely  to  himself,  as  we  have  seen 
that  he  was  in  the  conduct  as  well  as  in  the 
conception  of  this  campaign  upon  which  he 
,  had  now  entered,  General  McClellan  could 
,  have  no  reason  to  suppose  that  the  Adminis- 
,  tration   desired    or    intended    to   wage   war 
;  against  the  seceded  States  otherwise,  than  as 
refractory  members  of  the  national  community. 
He  knew  for  himself  what  limits  the  Consti 
tution  had  plainly  put  upon  the  interference 
of  the  Federal  authority  with  the  internal  af 
fairs  of  the  States,  and  in  his  Proclamation 
and  Address  he  wisely  reiterated,  with  all  the 
solemnity  of  a   man  whose  words  were   so 
soon  to  be  tested  by  his  acts,  the  language 
used  by  President  Lincoln  in  his  Inaugural 
Address,  delivered   less  than  three   months 
before :  — 


"  I  declare  that  I  have  no  purpose,  direct 
ly  or  indirectly,  to  interfere  with  the  institu 
tion  of  slavery  in  the  States  where  it  exists. , 
I  believe  I  have  no  lawful  right  to  do  so,  and 
have  no  inclination  to  do  so.  .  .  .  The 
right  of  each  State  to  order  and  control  its 
own  domestic  institutions  according  to  its 
own  judgment  exclusively,  is  essential  to  the 
balance  of  power  on  which  the  perfection  and 
endurance  of  our  political  fabric  depend." 

Little  could  the  young  general  have 
dreamed  that,  ere  two  years  had  passed  over 
his  head,  the  author  of  this  Inaugural  Ad 
dress  would  tacitly  suffer  it  to  be  imputed  to 
him  as  a  crime  that  he  had  thus  honestly  in 
terpreted  these  solemn  professions  of  loyalty 
to  the  letter  of  the  Constitution  and  to  the 
spirit  of  the  Union. 

General  McClellan  soon  found  that  his 
military  instincts  had  guided  him  aright,  and 
that  he  had  not  entered  Western  Virginia  a 
day  too  soon.  The  enemy  were  gathering  in 
the  mountains  of  that  noble  and  picturesque 
country,  and  having  already  occupied  two 
strong  positions  at  Laurel  Hill  and  Rich 
Mountain  under  an  able  commander,  General 
Garnett',  of  Virginia,  were  preparing  them 
selves  to  take  the  offensive. 

From  Washington,  General  McClellan,  al 
though  he  regularly  forwarded  intelligence  of 
his  movements,  acts,  and  operations,  received 
no  orders  or  instructions  whatever.  He  knew 
nothing  of  the  campaign  in  the  East  save  that 
Richmond  was  its  object,  and  he  had  no  rea 
son  to  suppose  that  the  slightest  attention 
had  been  bestowed  upon  his  repeated  sugges 
tions  for  the  invasion  and  occupation  of 
Eastern  Tennessee,  a  movement  which,  had  it 
been  made  at  the  time  when  he  wished  it, 
must  almost  irresistibly  have  been  crowned 
with  success;  the  Confederate  army,  such 
as  it  tiien  was,  being  concentrated  in  Virginia 
and  Tennessee,  the  latter  State  full  of  ill-sup 
pressed  Union  feeling.  How  much  in  time,  in 
expense,  and  in  the  inestimable  waste  of  pre 
cious  blood  would  have  been  saved  to  us,  had 
those  to  whom  these  suggestions  were  thus 
early  and  thus  clearly  made,  had  ears  to  hear 
or  hearts  to  understand  ! 

By  the  end  of  June  the  columns  of  Gen 
eral  McOiellan  were  in  such  a  position  as  to 
promise  a  speedy  and  decisive  engagement 
with  the  troops  of  General  Garnett.  Once 
more  the  young  commander  thought  it  right 
to  preface  the  actual  shod:  of  war  with  a  frank 
appeal  to  his  army.  On  the  25th  of  June, 
1801,  he  issued,  from  his  head-quarters  at 
Grafton,  in  Virginia,  the  following  ad 
dress  :  — 


16 


"  To  THE  SOLDIERS  OF  THE  ARMY  OP  THE 
WEST:  — 

"  You  are  here  to  support  the  goverment 
of  your  country  and  to  protect  the  lives  and 
liberties  of  your  brethren,  threatened  by  a 
rebellious  and  traitorous  foe.  No  higher  and 
nobler  duty  could  devolve  upon  you,  and  I 
expect  you  to  bring  to  its  performance  the 
highest  and  noblest  qualities 'of  soldiers  — 
discipline,  courage,  and  mercy.  I  call  upon 
the  officers  of  every  grade  to  enforce  the 
strictest  discipline,  and  I  know  that  those  of 
all  grades,  privates  and  officers,  will  display 
in  battle  cool,  heroic  courage,  and  will  know 
how  to  show  mercy  to  a  disarmed  enemy. 

"  Bear  in  mind  that  you  are  in  the  country 
of  friends,  not  of  enemies  ;  that  you  are  here 
to  protect,  not  to  destroy.  Take  nothing, 
destroy  nothing,  unless  you  are  ordered  to  do 
so  by  your  general  officers.  Remember  that 
[  have  pledged  my  word  to  the  people  of 
Western  Virginia,  that  their  rights  in  person 
and  property  shall  be  respected.  I  ask  every 
one  of  you  to  make  good  this  promise  in  its 
broadest  sense.  We  come  here  to  save,  not 
to  upturn.  I  do  not  appeal  to  the  /ear  of 
punishment,  but  to  your  appreciation*  of  the 
sacredness  of  the  cause"  in  which  we  are  en 
gaged.  Carry  with  you  into  battle  the  con 
viction  that  you  are  right,  and  that  God  is  on 
your  side. 

'• '  Your  enemies  have  violated  every  moral 
law  —  neither  God  nor  man  can  sustain  them. 
They  have  without  cause  rebelled  against  a 
mild  and  paternal  government;  they  have 
seized  upon  public  and  private  property; 
they  have  outraged  the  persons  of  Northern 
men  merely  because  they  came  from  the 
North,  and  of  Southern  Union  men  merely 
because,  they  loved  the  Union;  they  have 
placed  themselves  beneath  contempt,  unless 
they  can  retrieve  some  honor  on  the  field  of 
battle.  You  will  pursue  a  different  course. 
You  will  be  honest,  brave,  and  merciful ; 
you  will  respect  the  right  of  private  opinion ; 
you  will  punish  no  man  for  opinion's  sake. 
Show  to  the  world  that  you  differ  from  our 
enemies  in  the  points  of  honor,  honesty,  and 
respect  for  private  opinion,  and  that  we  in- 
augurate  no  reign  of  terror  where  we  go. 

"Soldiers!  I  have  heard  that  there  was 
danger  here.  I  have  come  to  place  myself 
at  your  head  and  to  share  it  with  you.  I  fear 
now  but  one  thing  —  that  you  will  not  find 
foemen  worthy  of  your  steel.  I  know  that  I 
can  rely  upon  you. 

"GEO.    B.    McCEELT,AN, 

Major-General   ComcTg" 


This  address  was  issued  at  Grafton, 
where,  hampered  at  every  turn  by  the  want 
of  competent  staff  officers,  General  McClel- 
lan^was  rapidly  organizing  his  new  and  inex 
perienced  troops  into  a  movable  column,  for 
service  in  a  country  singularly  broken  and 
difficult  against  an  enemy  familiar  with  all 
the  intricacies  and  defiles  of  its  vast  forests 
and  its  almost  trackless  mountain  ranges. 
This  work  was  accomplished  with  a  rapidity 
and  a  success  which  enabled  General  McClel- 
lan  to  assail  the  enemy  in  their  formidable 
positions  before  the  arrival  of  the  heavy 
reinforcements  which  General  Garnett  was 
expecting  from  Richmond. 

The  Mexican  experience  of  the  young 
commander  now  came  into  play.  .  Rich 
Mountain,  near  the  foot  of  which  Colonel 
Pegram,  of  Garnett's  command,  had  roughly 
but  strongly  entrenched  himself,  was  turned 
by  the  manoeuvre  which  had  given  General 
Scott  the  victory  of  Cerro  Gordo.  Under 
the  command  of  Brigadier-General  Rose- 
crans,  a  force,  of  about  two  thousand  men, 
chiefly  troops  of  Ohio  and  Indiana,  and  all 
of  them  perfectly  new  to  battle,  passed  in  a 
heavy  rain  through  the  dense  forests,  climbed 
a  steep  and  difficult  mountain,  and  forming 
gallantly  upon  the  crest  of  the  ascent,  stormed 
and  carried  the  works  of  the  enemy  at  that 
point.  In  the  mean  time  General  McClellan 
had  got  the  rest  of  his  troops  in  position  to 
attack  the  position  of  Pegram  in  the  front. 
But  General  Rosecrans,  after  carrying  the 
enemy's  works  on  the  mountain,  failed  to 
complete  his  part  of  the  programme,  and 
move  upon  Pegram  from  the  rear.  This 
misfortune  disconcerted  the  plan  of  the  com 
manding  general,  and  gave  the  enemy  the 
opportunity  of  which  he  availed  himself, 
during  the  night,  of  evacuating  his  works 
and  endeavoring  to  join  the  main  body  of 
General  Garnett's  force.  General  Rose 
crans  did  not  succeed  in  communicating  with 
General  McClellan  until  nearly  noon  of  the 
next  day,  but  such  was  the  skilful  dispo 
sition  which  the  latter  had  made  of  his  army 
that  the  greater  part  of  the  fugitives  from 
Rich  Mountain  were  ultimately  forced  to 
surrender  themselves  prisoners  of  war. 

Garnett,  on  learning  the  fate  of  the  battle 
at  Rich  Mountain,  at  once  began  his  retreat 
from  his  own  position  of  Laurel  Hill.  He 
was  promptly  pursued,  and  in  an  action 
between  his  own  rear-guard  and  the  advance 
of  one  of  General  McClellan's  divisions  under 
General  Morris,  at  Carrick's  Ford,  fell,  while 
gallantly  striving  to  rally  his  troops.  He  was 
the  first  officer  of  conspicuous  rank  and 


17 


merit  who  perished  in  actual  conflict  in  this  ' 
great  war. 

General  Hill,  with  about  twenty-five  hun 
dred  men,  came  up  with  the  remnants  of 
General  Garnett's  army  on  the  14ih  of  July, 
Virce  days  after  the  battle  of  Rich  Mountain, 
et  a  point  beyond  the  Red  House,  on  the 
Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad,  but  for  some 
yet  unexplained  cause,  into  which  no  inves 
tigation  was  ever  ordered,  the  great  events 
or'  Bull  Run  and  Manassas  Plains  sweeping 
the  matter  swiftly  into  oblivion,  failed  to 
attack  them. 

Notwithstanding  these  short-eomings  of 
liis  subordinates,  however,  General  McClel- 


lan's 


successes 


in    Western  Virginia  were 


both  brilliant  and  substantial.  They  cheered 
the  whole  country  with  their  evidences  of 
the  work  that  might  be  expected  from  our 
volunteers  when  organized  and  led  by  a 
commander  worthy  of  his  post.  They 
cleared  Northwestern  Virginia  of  the  Con 
federate  troops,  and  the  population  of  that 
region  having  been  satisfied  by  the  procla 
mations  and  by  the  conduct  of  the  -victorious 
general  that  their  rights  would  really  be  pro- 
tec  t%d  and  their  institutions  respected  under 
the  flag  of  the  Union,  Northwestern  Vir 
ginia  at  once. became,  and  has  ever  since 
remained,  a  staunch  and  loyal  supporter  of 
the  Union  cause. 

Receiving  no  orders  from  the  East,  and 
having  satisfied  himself  that  no  danger  was 
left  to  threaten  Patterson,  at  Winchester,  from 
the  quarter  which  he  had  just  so  thoroughly 
cleaved  of  enemies,  General  McClellan 
turned  his  attention  at  once  to  Southwestr 
ern  Virginia,  where  General  Cox  was  strug 
gling  against  a  superior  force  in  the  Kan- 
awlia  Valley.  He  resolved  to  repair  thither 
in  person. 

His  preparations  were  rapidly,  making, 
his  troops  in  motion,  and  General  Cox 
informed  of  his  general  intentions,  when  the 
whole  aspect  of  affairs  was  suddenly  changed. 
On  the  21st  of  July  the  army  of  the  Union 
hurled  on  the  enemy  at  Manassas  Plains  by 
the  clamor  of  the  radical  press  and  poli 
ticians,  was  utterly  and  disastrously  defeated. 
On  the  22d  the  Administration  tele 
graphed  to  General  McClellan,  summoning 
him  at  once  to  the  defence  of  the  country 
and  the  protection  of  the  government. 

Before  leaving  Western  Virginia  in  obedi 
ence  to  the  summons  of  the  Government,  for 
Washington,  General  McClellan  released  on 
parole  the  prisoners  taken  by  him  from  Gen 
eral  Garnett's  command.  This  measure  pro 
duced  the  happiest  effects  for  the  cause  of 


the  Union,  in  that  part  of  the  country 
Taken  in  connection  with  the  calm  and  con 
ciliatory  tone  of  the  Federal  General's  procla 
mations,  it  served  to  confound  the  passionate 
representations  of  the  Southern  press  in 
respect  to  the  purposes  of  the  Federal  inva 
sion  ;  arid  many  months  afterwards  the  Rich 
mond  papers  bitterly  complained  of  the  "  de 
moralizing  "  influence  exerted  upon  the  Con 
federate  forces  and  upon  the  popular  senti 
ment  in  Western  Virginia,  by  the  clemency 
and  forbearance  which  had  marked  these  first 
victories  of  the  Union  army. 

It  was  of  the  first  importance  to  the  suc 
cess  of  the  revolutionary  movement  at  the 
South  that  the  worst  impressions  of  the 
Northern  temper,  and  of  the  purposes  of  the 
Administration  elevated  to  power  by  an 
exclusively  Northern  majority,  which  had 
been  propagated  throughout  the  Southern 
States  during  the  contest  which  preceded  the 
Presidential  election  of  1860,  should  be 
confirmed  and  reinforced  by  the  conduct  of  the 
armies  of  the  Union,  and  by  the  tone  of 
the  Government.  This  General  McClellan 
perfectly  well  understood.  He  saw  that  the 
battle  for  the  Union  was  neither  to  be  fought 
nor  to  be  won  in  the  field  alone,  but  that 
military  victories  which  might  be  decisive  in 
the  cnse  of  a  foreign  war,  would  be  little 
more  profitable  than  defeats,  in  the  case  of 
a  civil  war,  unless  they  were  made  the  oppor 
tunity  of  such  appeals  to  the  better  reason 
of  the  defeated  party,  as  an  honest  devotion 
to  the  avowed  object  of  the  war  must  dictate 
to  every  sincere  and  patriotic  rnind.  It  was 
above  all  things  ess'ontiul,.  he  held,  that 
nothing  should  be  done  either  to  countenance 
the  idea  that  the  war  was  to  be  waged  for 
the  abolition  of  slavery,  or  to  justify  the 
notion  that  the  Northern  people  were  actu 
ated  by  a  spirit  of  vengeful  hostility  towards 
their  alienated  fellow-citizens  of  the  South. 

Such  had  been  the  condition  of  the 
Southern  States  under  the  Union,  such  theii 
prosperity,  and  go  great  the  general  wcltire 
of  their  people,  that  it  was  impossible  for 
any  well-informed  and  intelligent  mind  to 
believe  that  anything  less  than  a  wide-sprea.l 
conviction  of  danger  immediately  imminent 
over  their  peace  and  happiness,  could  have 
driven  the  inhabitants  of  those  States  into 
acquiescing  in  the  violent  rupture  of  the 
ties  which  bound  them  to  their  confederates 
of  the  North  and  West.  The  whole  past 
history  of  the  world  unfortunately  proves 
that  a  conviction  need  by  no  means  be  rea 
sonable  or  well-founded,  in  order  to  drive 


whole    communities    into    taking    the   most 
aerious  measures. 

In  our  own  country,  and  in  the  year  1832, 
Henry  Clay  had  not  hesitated  to  declare  in 
his  place  in  the  Senate  of  the  United  States, 
while  urging  the  claims  of  that  protective 
tariff  which  was  styled  the  "American  sys 
tem,"  "let  New  "England  and  the  West, 
and  tli a  Middle  States  all  feel  that  they 
arc  tho  victims  of  a  mistaken  policy,'  and 
let  those  vast  portions  of  our  common 
country  despair  of  any  favorable  change, 
and  then,  indeed,  might  we  tremble  for  the 
continuance  and  safety  of  this  Union." 
If  a  statesman  so  cordially  and  intensely 
patriotic  as  the  "Sage  of  Ashland,"  could 
thus  recognize  the  power  which  might  reside 
in  a  wide-spread  popular  feeling  in  respect 
to  a  point  of  economical  interest  mainly,  to 
break  up  the  bonds  of  the  Union,  it  was 
surely  imperative  upon  all  those  whose  duty 
called  them  to  deal  with  an  actual  disruption 
of  the  Union  under  the  influence  of  a  wide 
spread  popular  fe3ling,  in  respect  to  a  point 
of  vital  social,  as  well  as  economical  impor 
tance,  that  they  should  bear  that  feeling  in 
mind  in  all  their  measures,  and  devote  them 
selves  sedulously  to  allaying  and  dissipating 
its  force  by  all  proper  and  possible  means. 

Thus,  at  least,  Major-General  McClellan 
construed  the  obligations  of  his  position  as 
a  commander  of  the  forces  charged  to  main 
tain  the  authority  of  the  Federal  laws.  That 
this  construction  of  his  obligations  was  as 
politic  as  it  was  honest  and  manly,  and  his 
conduct  in  obedience  to  this  construction 
of  his  obligations,  as  wise  as  it  was  honorable, 
*  would  seem  to' be  abundantly  established 
by  the  simple  fact  that  out  of  all  the  region 
embraced  within  the  scope  of  the  movement 
of  secession,  the  territory  of  West  Virginia 
alone  can,  even  now,  be  truly  said  to  have 
been  restored  to  its  allegiance  to  the  Union, 
it  may  well  be  questioned  whether  the 
measure  by  which  that  territory  has  since 
been  severed  from  the  State  of  Virginia, 
•uiiJ  erected  into  a  separate  sovereignty  was 
any  more  politic  than  constitutional ;  but  of 
West  Virginia  alone  in  the  South,  can  it 
be  with  accuracy  affirmed,  that  its  inhabitants, 
as  a  body,  have  been  reclaimed  to  the  sup 
port  of  the  Federal  authority ;  nor  can  there 
be  any  doubt  in  the  minds  of  candid  men 
that  this  result -was  brought  about  by  that 
brief  but  brilliant  campaign  of  July,  1861, 
in  which  General  McClellan,  at  once  un 
assisted  and  unhampered  by  any  communica 
tions  with  the  administration  at  Washington, 
was  wise  and  fortunate  enough  to  bo  r.ble  to 


"  superadd  to  the  exercise  of  force  the  policy 
of  conciliation,"  in  dealing  with  this  section 
of  the  "Old  Dominion." 

On  the  27th  of  July,  1861,  General  Mc 
Clellan  assumed  the  command  in  the  city  of 
Washington,  of  the  "  Division  of  the  Poto 
mac." 

Six  days  before,  the  greater  part  of  the 
troops  comprising  this  division  had  suffered 
an  overwhelming  defeat  from  the  army  of  the 
rebellion  on  the  plains  of  Manassas.  The 
moral  effects  of  this  defeat  had  been  as 
portentous  as  the  popular  confidence  of  vic 
tory  by  which  the  army  of  the  Union  was 
driven  into  the  field  had  been  absolute  and 
unquestioning. 

The  cabinet  of  Mr.  Lincoln  contained  no 
one  man  possessed  of  the  slightest  military 
experience.  The  President  .indeed,  in  his 
earty  youth,  had  made  a  brief  campaign 
against  the  Indians  of  the  Northwest  in  tho 
capacity  of  a  captain  of  militia,  but  the 
experience  he  had  gained  in  this  campaign 
was  not  of  a  nature  greatly  to  serve  him  in 
the  administration  of  a  great  civil  war  to  be 
waged  against  the  whole  force  of  elevea 
proud  and  powerful  American  States.  *By 
a  singular  fatality,  too,  neither  he  nor  any 
one  of  his  ministers  had  ever  enjoyed  any 
opportunities  of  familiarity  even  with  tho 
civil  administration  of  the  federal  power.  In 
the  earlier  times  of  the  republic  a  certain 
education  in  one  or  another  department  of 
the  cabinet  was  regarded  almost  as  a  con 
dition  precedent  to  the  elevation  of  any  man 
to  the  Presidency ;  but  Mr.  Lincoln  bad 
passed  at  once  from  the  practice  of  the  law 
in  the  interior  of  a  great  Western  State, 
and  from  the  "  caucuses  "  of  an  opposition 
party  into  the  first  administrative  office  of 
the  land.  Nor  had  one  of  the  Secretaries 
whom  he  called  around  him  ever  filled  a 
position  of  any  importance  in  the  administra 
tion  of  federal  affdrs. 

From  this  condition  of  things  at  Washing!-'  i 
it  resulted  that  the  Government  was  equal  j 
unskilled  to  control  and  to  direct  the  popular 
enthusiasm.  When  the  President  and  his 
advisers  saw  themselves  surrounded  in  tho 
capital  by  a  force  of  armed  men  vastly 
larger  than  had  ever  before  been  arrayed 
under  the  flag  of  the  Union  they  believed 
themselves  to  be  looking  upon  an  army  ready 
for  and  equal  to  any  enterprise,  however 
arduous.  It  was  in  vain  that  Lieutenant- 
General  Scott  urged  upon  them  the  utter 
worthlessness  for  all  purposes  of  invasion 
of  such  a  force,  unorganized,  undisciplined, 
imperfectly  equipped,  and  still  more  impor- 


19 


fbetly  officered  as  it  was.  The  partisan 
journals  of  tho  Administration  daily  clamored 
for  the  advance  of  the  "irresistible  host," 
which  by  the  sheer  force  of  its  numbers,  its 
enthusiasm,  and  its  holy  cause,  was  destined, 
as  they  said  and  shouted,  to  sweep  secession 
Into  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  like  chaff  before  the 
wind.  All  this  appeared  eminently  reason 
able  to  the  general  masses  of  the  public  hap 
pily  unfamiliar  with  the  realities  of  war,  and 
dazzled  by  the  patriotic  arithmetic  of  the 
press.  For  years,  too,  it  had  been  the  custom 
,  of  the  Anti-Slavery  leaders,  orators,  and 
writers,  to  represent  the  Southern  States  as 
etiolated  and  emaciated  by  the  fatal  influences 
of  slavery.  Upon  the  strength  of  economi 
cal  and  statistical  returns,  dating  back  beyond 
the  census  of  1850,  the  population  and  the 
wealth  of  the  South  had  been  steadily  and 
systematically  underrated.  While  the  South 
had,  in  truth,  been  growing  rapidly  stronger 
and  richer  during  the  period  of  thirteen  years 
which  had  elapsed  since  the  great  gold  dis 
coveries  in  California  and  Australia,  coinciding 
in  point  of  time  with  the  first  development  of 
the  modern  free-trade  policy  of  England, 
had  began  to  treble  and  quadruple  the  world's 
demand  for  the  great  Southern  staples,  it  was 
a  belief  almost  universal  throughout  the  North 
that  the  resources  of  the  South  had,  during  all 
this  period,  been  wasting  away  and  decaying. 

Unbounded,  therefore,  were  the  expecta 
tions  of  victory  which  everywhere  throughout 
the  North,  from  Maine  to  Minnesota,  had 
attended  the  "  advanced  guard  of  the  grand 
army  of  the  Union,"  when  it  passed  at  mid 
night  across  the  Long  Bridge  at  Washington, 
and  invaded  the  "  sacred  soil  of  Virginia." 

Over  the  story  of  the  fatal  day  on  which 
these  expectations  came  so  cruelly  to  naught, 
amid  the  thunders  of  the  rebel  artillery,  it  is 
not  necessary  for  us  now  to  linger.  But  it 
is  important  for  us  to  bear  clearly  in  mind 
the  real  condition  of  the  army  which  General 
McClellan  was  called  from  his  victories  to 
command,  at  the  time  when  i{;  passed  under 
his  hands. 

The  strength  of  the  army  of  General  Mc 
Dowell,  defeated  by  the  Confederates  under 
Beauregard  and  Johnston,  on  the  21st  July, 
is  estimated  by  well-informed  officers,  as  for 
example  by  Brigadier-General  Barnard,  at 
about  30,000  men.  In  artillery  it  was 
miserably  deficient,  having,  says  an  experi 
enced  eye-witness,  "  not  more  than  five  com 
plete  'batteries,  or  six  batteries  including 
scratch  guns,  and  these  of  different  calibre, 
badly  horsed,  miserably  equipped,  and  pro 
vided  "with  the  worst  set  of  gunners  and 


drivers  wh*ch  I,  wiio  have  seen  the  Turkish 
field-guns,  ever  beheld."  It  had  no  cavalry 
of  any  value,  save  a  few  regulars  from  the 
frontiers;  no  carriages  for  reserve  ammuni 
tion  ;  no  adequate  transportation  service  ;  no 
organized  commissariat;  and,  above  all, 
scarcely  any  staff-officers  at  all.  So  pitiably 
deficient  was  the  army  in  this  vital  element 
of  efficiency,  that  General  McDowell  himself 
was  seen  by  Mr.  Russell  in  Washington, 
looking  after  the  arrival  of  some  guns  which 
he  expected ;  and  in  the  hottest  and  most 
important  moments  of  the  action  on  the  21st 
July,  Colonel  Burnside,  then  in  command  of- 
a  brigade,  was  forced  to  carry  his  own  orders, 
having  no  aide-de-camp  at  his  command ! 
The  troops  had  never  been  paraded  or 
put  through  their  evolutions  by  brigades; 
the  line  and  company  officers  were,  for  the 
most  part,  totally  inexperienced;  and  the 
great  bulk  of  the  troops  were  men  enlisted 
for  but  three  months,  that  being  the  limit  set 
to  the  possible  resistance  of  the  South,  by 
the  heads  of  the  Administration.  Such  was 
the  evil  influence  exerted  upon  the  temper  of 
the  troops  by  the  tone  of  the  Government  in 
regard  to  the  war,  that  the  movement  of  Gen 
eral  Patterson  on  the  Upper  Potomac,  to  pre 
vent  Johnston,  at  Winchester,  from  forming 
a  junction  with  Beauregard  at  Manassas,  was 
paralyzed  by  the  point  blank  refusal  of 
his  troops  to  serve  even  for  ten  days  beyond 
the  expiration  of  their  term  of  enlistment; 
while  it  is  well  known  that  certain  Pennsyl 
vania  regiments  were  met  on  the  day  of  the 
critical  battle  of  the  21st,  absolutely  march 
ing  off  the  field,  to  the  sound  of  the  cannon, 
"because  their  time  had  expired."  * 

And  it  was  an  army  in  this  condition 
which  the  Administration  and  its  friends  in 
Congress,  pliant  to  the  impatient  pressure  of 
the  ignorant  public,  literally  compelled  Gen 
eral  Scott  to  launch  against  the  enemy. 

'  Who  can  properly  describe  the  condition 
of  this  army  when  it  had  hurried  and  hud 
dled  itself  back  into  Washington,  beaten, 
broken  up,  "demoralized,"  and  despairing? 
Had  the  Southern  army  been  composed  of 
veteran,  disciplined  troops,  or  had  the  South 
ern  leaders  bean  equal  to  the  crisis  of  the 
tremendous  revolution  which  they  had  begun, 
there  can  be  little  question  that. the  army  of 
the  Union,  notwithstanding  the  brief  and 
creditable  stand  made  by  the  reserve  at  Cen- 
treville,  might  have  been  speedily  dispersed, 
and  the  cities  of  Washington  and  Baltimore 
captured  by  the  victorious  Confederates. 

"  If  they  had  immediately  advanced  on 
Washington,"  says  General  Barnard,  in  his 


20 


sketch  of  the  battle  of  Bull  Run,  "  and  im 
mediately  crossed  tho  Potomac,  and  seized 
Baltimore  (and  they  could  command  any 
number  of  troops,  flushed  with  success,  while 
all  our  three  months'  men  were  leaving  us, 
and  we  had  to  organize  a  new  army),  they 
would  have  placed  the  Government  in  a  situ 
ation  from  which  it  could  with  difficulty  have 
extricated  itself." 

The  work  which  Major-General  McClellan 
found  himself  called  upon  to  do  when  he 
reached  Washington,  cannot  be  more  com 
pletely  set  before  the  mind  of  the  reader  than 
it  is  in  these  words  of  an  officer  by  no  means 
friendly  to  him,  and  upon  whose  systemat 
ically  prepared  evidence  the  Congressional 
Committee  of  Inquiry  into  the  Conduct  of 
the  War  -lay  great  stress,  as  vindicating  the 
subsequent  course  of  the  Administration  to 
wards  the  man  on  whom  it  had  called  in  the 
extremity  of  the  nation,  for  counsel  and  for 
safety. 

General  McClellan  was  indeed  charged 
with  the  "  organization  of  a  new  army,"  and 
this  army  was  to  be  organized  in  the  face  of 
a  success  on  the  part  of  the  enemy,  which 
was  sure  to  enable  them  to  "  command  any 
number  of  men,"  and  to  put  their  active 
forces  in  the  field  on  a  footing  of  the  highest 
efficiency,  under  an  act  of  the  rebel  Congress 
which  had  sagaciously  secured  the  enlistment 
of  all  troops  for  "  three  years  or  during  the 
war,"  and  under  the  administration  of  a 
President  whose  past  experience  as  a  gradu 
ate  of  West  Point,  as  a  soldier  in  Mexico, 
and  as  Secretary  of  War  of  the  United  States, 
had  given  him  everything  in  the  way  of  mili 
tary  knowledge  and  administrative  skill, 
which  the  President  of  the  Union  lacked. 

The  first  thing  to  be  done  obviously  was, 
to  provide  for  the  safety  of  Washington. 
While  ignorance  and  inexperience  were  noi 
sily  insisting  all  over  the  North  upon  the  ne 
cessity  of  an  immediate  levy  en  masse  of  the 
Northern  people,  and  upon  the  feasibility  of 
"  sweeping  the  rebellion  into  the  Gulf"  by 
a  kind  of  Peter  the  Hermit's  crusade,  all 
intelligent  soldiers  at  Washington  saw  that 
the  immediate  conditions  of  the  problem  had 
been  profoundly  modified  by  the  disaster  of 
July  2  Vst.  It  was  known  to  them  that  the 
advance  of  the  Confederates  upon  the  Capital 
was  restrained  by  political  influences  and 
considerations,  which  might  at  any  moment 
be  overruled  in  favor  of  the  obvious  military 
feasibility  and  advantages  of  such  a  step. 
The  maxim  of  Napoleon  that  "  all  capitals 
should  be  fortified,"  had  a  peculiar  and  per 
emptory  application  to  the  case  of  Washing 


ton  ;  and  however  eager  the  country  might 
be  for  a  campaign  in  the  field,  and  for  the 
"  crushing  of  t*he  rebellion,"  General  McClel 
lan  had  the  military  sense  to  see  and  the 
moral  courage  to  insist  that  months  of  inces 
sant  labor  must  pass  away  before  we  could 
possibly  hope  to  resume  active  host:lities  with 
any  rational  prospect  of  success,  and  that  un 
less  we  gave  precedence  over  all  other  consid 
erations  to  the  proper  fortification  of  Washing 
ton,  no  amount  of  patriotic  enthusiasm,  of 
senatorial  thunder,  or  of  popular  sacrifices 
would  save  us  from  the  most  dangerous  blow 
which  could  possibly  be  struck  at  our  domes- 
.tic  organization  and  at  our  consideration 
abroad. 

But  General  McClellan  was  also  perfectly 
calm  and  self-possessed  in  his  estimate  of  the 
measures  necessary  to  be  taken  to  secure  this 
object.  It  was  not  difficult  for  him  to  inocu 
late  the  President  and  the  Cabinet  with  a 
decent  concern  for  the  safety  of  the  Capital 
in  which  it  was  their  duty  personally  to  re 
side.  But  it  was  much  more  difficult  for  him  to 
impress  upon  them  a  due  sense  of  the  propor 
tion  which  ought  to  be  borne  by  the  measures 
immediately  taken  for  the  security  of  Wash 
ington  'to  the  general  plans  of  campaign 
for  the  suppression  of  the  rebellion.  Napo 
leon  has  laid  it  down  that  a  force  of  50,000 
men,  with  3,000  artillerists,  should  suffice  for 
the  defence  of  a  properly  fortified  capital 
against  the  attack  of  an  army  of  300,000  men ; 
being  about  in  the  proportion  of  about  one 
defender  to  six  assailants.  Assuming  it  to 
be  altogether  improbable  that  the  Confeder 
ates  would  be  able  to  attack  the  Federal  city 
with  an  army  of  more  than  100,000  men. 
General  McClellan  set  down  the  numbers  of 
the  force  necessary  for  the  defence  of  Wash 
ington  after  its  fortifications  should  have 
been  completed,  at  20,000  men,  being  in 
the  proportion  of  one  defender  to  five  assail 
ants.  This  estimate;  though  based  on  the 
soundest  military  principles,  excited  great 
uneasiness  at  the  time  when  it  was  made  in 
the  minds  of  many  eminent  persons  condemned 
by  their  station  in  life  to  inhabit  Washington  ; 
and  the  influence  of  this  uneasiness  may  be 
traced  throughout  all  the  subsequent  relation? 
of  General  McClellan  with  the  Federal  au 
thorities. 

General  Barnard,  in  his  capacity  of  chief 
engineer  of  the  defences  of  Washington, 
bears  the  fullest  testimony  in  his  report  to 
the  promptitude  and  energy  with  which  Gen 
eral  McClellan,  on  his  assumption  of  the  com 
mand  in  July,  1861,  set  about  developing 
and  completing  the  fortifications  of  the  Capi- 


21 


tal.  Of  the  condition  of  these  fortifications, 
and  of  the  army  at  that  moment,  General 
McClellan  himself  thus  speaks  :  — 

"  When  I  assumed  command  in  Washing 
ton  on  the  27th  of  July,  1861,  the  number 
of  troops  in  and  around  the  city  was  about 
50,000  infantry,  less  than  1,000  cavalry,  and 
650  artillerymen,  with  nine  imperfect  field- 
batteries  of  thirty  pieces. 

"  On  the  Virginia  bank  of  the  Potomac 
the  brigade  organization  of  General  McDowell 
still  existed,  and  the  troops  were  stationed  at 
and  in  rear  of  Fort  Corcoran,  Arlington,  and 
Fort  Albany,  at  Fort  Runyon,  Roach's  Mills, 
Colo's  Mill,  and  in  the  vicinity  of  Fort  Ells 
worth,  with  a  detachment  at  the  Theological 
Seminary. 

"  There  were  no  troops  south  of  Hunting 
Creek,  and  many  of  the  regiments  were  en 
camped  on  the  low  grounds  bordering  the 
Potomac,  —  seldom  in  the  best  positions  for 
defence,  and  entirely  inadequate  in  numbers 
and  condition  to  defend  the  long  line  from 
Fort  Corcoran  to  Alexandria. 

"On  the  Maryland  side  of  the  river,  upon 
the  heights  overlooking  the  Chain  Bridge, 
two  regiments  were  stationed,  whose  com 
manders  were  independent  of  each  other. 

"  There  were  no  troops  on  the  important 
Tenallytowa  road,  or  on  the  roads  entering  the 
city  from  the  south. 

"  The  camps  were  located  without  regard  to 
purposes  of  defence1  or  instruction ;  the  roads 
were  not  picketed,,  and  there  was  no  attempt 
ab  an  organization  into  brigades. 

"In  no  quarter  were  the  dispositions  for 
defence  such  as  to  offer  a  vigorous  resistance 
to  a  respectable  body  of  the  enemy  either  in 
the  positions  and  numbers  of  the  troops,  or 
the  number  and  character  of  the  defensive 
works.  Earthworks  in  the  nature  of  '  tetes- 
de-pont '  looked  upon  the  approaches  to  the 
Georgetown  aqueduct  and  ferry,  the  Long 
Bridge,  and  Alexandria  by  the  Little  'River 
Turnpike,  and  some  simple  defensive  arrange 
ments  were  made  at  the  Chain  Bridge.  With 
the  latter  exception,  not  a  single  defensive 
work  had  been  commenced  on  the  Maryland 
side. 

"  There  wd,s  nothing  to  prevent  the  enemy 
shelling  the  city  from  heights,  within  easy 
range,  which  could  be  occupied  by  a  hostile 
column  almost  without  resistance.  Many, 
soldiers  had  deserted,  and  the  streets  of 
Washington  were  crowded  with  straggling  offi 
cers  and  men,  absent  from  their  stations  with 
out  authority,  whose  behavior  indicated  the 
general  want  of  discipline  and  organization." 

The  task  of  educing  order  and  safety  from 


this  chaos  of  perils  was,  indeed,  as  a  foreign 
observer  styles  it,  ' '  one  of  Herculean  magni 
tude."  But  this  task,  gieat  as  it  was,  was  but 
a  part  of  the  duty  imposed  upon  the  young 
commander  of  the  Potomac  army.  Al 
though  Lieutenant-General  Scott  still  retained 
the  command  of  the  armies  of  the  Union,  the 
President  applied  to  General  McClellan,  al 
most  immediately  upon  his  arrival  in  Wash 
ington,  to  draw  up  a  memorandum  of  a  gener 
al  programme  of  operations  by  land  and  sea, 
to  cover  the  whole  field  of  conflict.  This 
memorandum  was  handed  by  General  Mc 
Clellan  to  the  President  on  the  4th  of  August, 
1 861  -1  When  it  is  remembered  that  this  paper 
was  written  amid  the  diversified  excitements 
of  that  fortnight  of  passion  and  fear,  which 
followed  upon  the  defeat  at  Bull  Run ;  that 
it  was  written  by  a  young  commander,  sud 
denly  invested  with  the  highest  rank  in  the 
army,  from  which  he  had  retired  but  three 
years  before  as  a  modest  subaltern,  and  hailed 
as  a  hero  of  the  Napoleonic  order  by  the  uni 
versal  voice  of  press  and  people,  in  a  country 
to  which  his  very  name  had,  six  months  before, 
been  scarcely  known  ;  and  that  it  was  written 
for  the  eye  of  a  President  who  looked  upon 
the  civil  war  as  an  evanescent  absurdity, 
which  must,  sooner  or  later  disappear  before 
the  blast  of  the  political  trumpet,  it  is  diffi 
cult  to  speak  too  highly  of  the  modesty  of 
tone,  the  sagacity  of  political  insight,  the  just 
and  patriotic  temper,  and  the  far-reaching 
military  forecast  which  mark  it. 

One  quality  of  General  McClellan's  nature 
shines  conspicuously  throughout  this  remark 
able  document :  a  quality  admirable  in  itself, 
but  which  will  appear  still  more  admirable  to 
the  future  student  of  our  times  when  he  shall 
contrast  it  with  the  spirit  which  colored  and 
controlled  the  utterances  and  the  policy  of  the 
leading  partizans  of  the  Administration  when 
this  paper  was  laid  before  the  President. 
There  is  nothing  here  of  those  vehement  and 
vulgar  fuhninations  against  "  rebels  and  trai 
tors,"  which  weak  and  silly  or  malignant  and' 
designing  men  were  then  everywhere  impos 
ing  upon  the  public  sense,  as  evidences  of 
loyalty  and  love  of  country.  The  general 
who  lays  before  the  President  such  a  compre 
hensive  and  vigorous  plan  for  the  employment 
of  the  military  forces  of  the  nation,  that  all 
our  subsequent  successes  have  been  achieved 
by  acting  in  harmony  with  its  conceptions,  and 

1  It  is  a  striking  illustration  of  the  spirit  in  which 
General  McClellan  is  attacked  by  the  organs  of  the 
Administration,  that  this  obedience  to  the  suggestion 
is  charged  upon  him  by  Mr.  Lincoln's  authorized  biog 
rapher  as  a  proof  of  his  "  ambition  and  presumption  !  " 
H,  J.  Raymond's  Life  of  Lincoln,  p.  2~1. 


our  most  lamentable  subsequent  reverses  in 
curred  by  departing  from  their  scope  and  tenor, 
exhibits  throughout  his  formidable  pro 
gramme  the  most  anxious  desire  for  the  miti 
gation  of  the  horrors  of  war  to  all  his  coun 
trymen,  -whether  arrayed  for  or  against  the 
cause  of  their  country  —  refuses  utterly  to 
look  upon  the  angry  and  misguided  popula 
tions  of  the  South,  otherwise  than  as  citi 
zens  to  be  coerced  into  obedience  to  laws  as 
truly  designed  for  their  own  welfare  as  for 
that  of  their  fellow-citizens  from  whom  they 
have  wrenched  themselves  away,  and  earnestly 
pleads  for  such  a  complete  preparation  of  the 
national  arms  to  strike,  as  shall  make  a  single 
blow  decisive,  and  terminate  the  war  in  one 
thorough  and  victorious  campaign :  and  this 
not  merely  because  a  long  war  involves  a  fear 
ful  waste  of  human  life  and  happiness  and 
wealth ;  but  because  a  long  war  must  inevi 
tably  bequeath  to  future  ages  a  fearful  legacy 
of  passion  and  vengeance  and  mutual  hate. 

As  has  been  excellently  said,  by  one  who 
had  himself  passed  through  the  terrors  of  a 
great  revolution  and  the  fiery  furnace  of  a 
civil  war  :  —  "  The  most  frightful  feature  of  a 
civil  war  is  not  the  blood  which  flows  on  every 
side,  or  the  dead  who  strew  the  streets  and 
roads,  or  the  shattered  walls  of  onqe  happy 
homes  —  it  is  the  passions  which  ferment  in 
men's  souls.  Nothing  is  so  terrible  as  the 
mutual  hatred  of  those  who  were  born  to  love 
one  another.  Tho  sombre  legend  which  be 
gins  the  story  of  the  world  —  the  legend  of 
Cain  and  Abel  —  seems  to  hover  over  these 
fratricidal  conflicts,  and  to  stamp  them  with  a 
seal  of  infernal  rage.  In  ordinary  war  men 
hate  each  other  like  enemies  :  in  civil  war  they 
hate  each  other  like  brothers." 

It  is  told  of  one  of  the  noblest  of  the 
French  Republicans  of  our  own  tune,  Jean 
Reynaud,  that  on  the  third  day  of  that  hide 
ous  battle  of  Paris,  kno,wn  as  the  "  days  of 
June,  1848,"  he  was  on  his  way  to  the  Na 
tional  Assembly,  when  his  attention  was 
arrested  by  a  terrible  scene  in  the  Place  de  la 
Concorde.  The  fiercest  fighting  of  the  day 
was  just  over.  It  was  about  four  o'clock  in 
the  afternoon  ;  a  workman  in  his  blouse,  un 
armed  and  inoffensive,  was  traversing  the 
place,  then  occupied  by  a  battalion  of  the  Na 
tional  Guards  from  one  of  the  provinces.  At 
the  *  sight  of  the  blouse  the  rural  soldiery 
cried  out,  "  An  insurgent !  an  insurgent !  " 
and  rushed  upon  the  unfortunate  man,  bayonet 
in  hand.  Their  officers  vainly  sought  to  re 
strain  them.  The  wretched  workman  took 
to  flight,  and  was  distancing  his  pursuers, 
when  some  cuirassiers  stationed  near  by,  see 


ing  him  run  at  full  speed,  made  up  their 
minds  that  he  had  escaped  from  some  cap 
tured  barricade,  and  dashed  directly  athwart 
his  path.  In  a  moment  the  helpless  fugitive 
was  surrounded  ;  sabres  gleamed  above  him, 
bayonets  were  thrust  at  him  ;  his  blood  had 
already  begun  to  flow,  when  suddenly,  at  the 
risk  of  his  own  life,  a  citizen  forced  his  way 
through  the  excited  throng,  seized  the  un 
happy  workman,  arid,  with  the  quickness  of 
thought,  threw  over  him  the  tri-colored  scarf 
of  a  Representative  of  the  French  people. 

At  the  sight  of  this  scarf,  the  emblem  not 
of  a  party  nor  of  a  passion,  but  of  France 
herself,  of  the  nation  and  of  the  people, 
the  lifted  weapons  were  dropped,  and  the 
destined  victim  was  safe. 

In  the  mind  of  General  McClellan  the 
banner  of  the  Union  was  meant,  like  the  tri 
color  of  Jean  Reynand,  to  speak  to  all  classes 
and  sections  of  his  countrymen,  —  in  the 
midst  of  their  passion,  in  the  moment  of  bat 
tle,  of  victory,  or  of  vengeance,  —  not  of 
classes  nor  of  sections,  but  of  the  republic, 
of  the  nation,  of  liberty  protected  by  law, 
and  of  force  consecrated  by  justice. 

Read  in  the  light  of  its  author's  spirit  and 
with  the  eloquent  commentary  of  subsequent 
events,  how  instructive  a  contribution  is  thia 
memorandum  to  the  right  understanding  of 
that  "  history  "  which  Mr.  Lincoln  and  his 
administration  have  for  now  four  years  been 
"  making,"  and  suffering 'to  be  made,  for  this 
people. 

"MEMOBANDTTM. 

"  The  object  of  the  present  war  differs  from 
those  in  which  nations  are  usually  engaged, 
mainly  in  this :  That  the  purpose  of  ordi 
nary  war  is  to  conquer  a  peace,  and  make  a 
treaty  on  advantageous  terms.  In  this  con 
test  ic  has  become  necessary  to  crush  a  popu 
lation  sufficiently  numerous,  intelligent,  and 
warlike  to  constitute  a  nation.  .  We  have,  not 
only  to  defeat  their  armed  and  organized 
forces  in  the  field,  but  to  display  such  an 
overwhelming  strength  as  will  convince  all 
our  antagonists,  especially  those  of  the  gov 
erning  aristocratic  class,  of  the  utter  impossi 
bility  of  resistance.  Our  late  reverses  make 
this  course  imperative.  Had  we  been  suc 
cessful  in  the  recent  battle  (Manassas),  it  ia 
possible  that  we  might  have  been  spared  the 
labor  and  expense  of  a  great  effort :;  now  we 
have  no  alternative.  Their  success  will  ena 
ble  the  political  leaders  of  the  rebels  to  con 
vince  the  mass  of  their  people  that  we  are 
inferior  to  them  in  force  and  courage,  and  to 


23 


command  all  their  resources.  The  contest 
began  with  a  class ;  now  it  is  with  a  people, 
our  military  success  can  alone  restore  the  for 
mer  issue. 

'"By  thoroughly  defeating  their  armies,  tak 
ing  their  strong  places,  and  pursuing  a  rig-  j 
idly  protective  policy  as  to  private  property 
and  unarmed  persons,  and  a  lenient  course 
as  to  private  soldiers,  we  may  well  hopo  for 
;-  permanent  restoration  of  a  peaceful  Union. 
l>ut,  in  the  first  instance,  the  authority  of  the 
Government  must  be  supported  by  overwhelm 
ing  physical  force. 

**  Our  foreign  relations  and  financial  credit 
also  imperatively  demand  that  the  military 
action  of  the  Government  should  be  prompt 
and  irresistible. 

"  The  rebels  have  chosen  Virginia  as  their 
battle-field,  and  it  seems  proper  for  us  to  make 
the  first  great  struggle  there.  But  while 
thus  directing  our  main  efforts,  it  is  necessary 
to  diminish  the  resistance  there  offered  us,  by 
movements  on  other  points,  both  by  land  and 
water 

"  Without  entering  at  present  into  details,  I 
would  advise  that  a  strong  movement  be  made 
on  the  Mississippi,  and  that  the  rebels  be 
driven  out  of  Missouri. 

"  As  soon  as  it  becomes  perfectly  clear  that 
Kentucky  is  cordially  united  with  us,  I  would 
advise  a  movement  through  that  State  into 
Eastern  Tennessee,  for  the  purpose  of  assist 
ing  the  Union  men  of  that  region,  and  of 
seizing  the  railroads  leading  from  Memphis 
to  the  cast. 

"  The  possession  of  those  roads  by  us,  in 
connection  with  the  movement  on.  the  Missis 
sippi,  would  go  far  towards  determining  the 
evacuation  of  Virginia  by  the  rebels.  In  the 
mean  time,  all  the  passes  into  Western  Virgin 
ia,  from  the  east,  should  be  securaly  guarded, 
but  I  would  advise  no  movement  from  that 
quarter  towards  Richmond,  unless  the  politi 
cal  condition  of  Kentucky  renders  it  impos 
sible  or  inexpedient  for  us  to  make  the  move 
ment  upon  Eastern  Tennessee,  through  that 
State.  Every  effort  should,  however,  be 
made  to  organize,  equip,  and  arm  as  many 
troops  as  possible  in  Western  Virginia,  in 
order  to  render  the  Ohio  and  Indiana  regi 
ments  available  for  other  operations.  At  as 
early  a  day  as  practicable  it  would  be  well  to 
protect  and  re-open  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio 
Railroad. 

"  Baltimore  and  Fort  Monroe  should  be  oc 
cupied  by  garrisons  sufficient  to  retain  them 
incur  possession.  -The  importance  of  Har 
per's  Ferry  and  the  line  of  the  Pctomac  in 
the  direction  of  Leesburg  will  be  very  mate 


rially  diminished  so  soon  as  our  force  in  this 
vicinity  becomes  organized,  strong,  and  effi 
cient,  because  no  capable  general  will  cross 
the  river,  north  of  this  city,  when  we  have  a 
strong  army  Here,  ready  to  cut  off  his  retreat. 

"  To  revert  to  the  West,  it  is  probable  that 
no  very  large  additions  to  the  troops  now  in 
Missouri,  will  be  necessary  to  secure  that 
State. 

"  I  presume  that  the  force  required  for  the 
movement  down  the  Mississippi  will  be  deter 
mined  by  its  commander  and  tli3  President. 
If  Kentucky  assumes  the  right  position,  not  j 
more  than  20,000  troops  will  be  needed,  to-  j 
gether  with  those  that  can  be  raised  in  that 
State  and  Eastern  Tennessee,  to  secure  the 
latter  region  and  its  railroads,  as  well  as  ulti-' 
mately  to  occupy  Nashville. 

"  The  Western  Virginia  troops,  with  not 
more  than  5,000  to  10,000  from  Ohio  and 
Indiana,  should,  under,  proper  management, 
suffice  for  its  protection.  When  we  have  re 
organized  our  main  army  here,  10,000  men 
ought  to  be  enough  to  protect  the  Baltimore 
and  Ohio  Railroad  and  the  Potomac.  Five 
thousand  will  garrison  Baltimore,  3,000  Fort 
Monroe,  and*  not  more  than  20,000  will  be 
necessary,  at  the  utmost,  for  the  defence  of 
Washington. 

"  For  the  main  army  of  operations,  I  urge 
the  following  composition  :  — 

250  regiments  of  Infantry,  say      .  225,000  men 

100  Field  Batteries,  600  guns  "  .     .  15,000      " 

28  regiments  Cavalry     ....  25.500      " 

5          "         Engineer  troops       .  7,500      <v 


Total, 


273,000 


"  The  force  must  be  supplied  with  the  ne 
cessary  engineer  and  pontoon  trains,  and  with 
transportation  for  everything  save  tents.  Its 
general  line  of  operations  should  be  so  directed 
that  water  transportation  can  be  availed  of, 
from  point  to  point,  by  means  of  the  ocean 
and  the  rivers  emptying  into  it.  An  essential 
feature  of  the  plan  of  operations  will  be  the 
employment  of  a  strong  naval  force,  to  pro 
tect  the  movements  of  a  fleet  of  transports  in 
tended  to  convey  a  considerable  body  of  troops 
from  point  to  point  of  the  enemy's  sea-coast, 
thus,  either  creating  diversions,  and  rendering 
it  necessary  to  detach  largely  from  their  main 
body,  in  order  to  protect  such  of  their  cities 
as  may  be  threatened,  or  else  landing  ana 
forming  establishments  on  their  coast  at  any 
favorable  places  that  opportunity  might  offer. 
This  naval  force  should  also  cooperate  with 
the  main  army,  in  its  efforts  to  seize  the  im 
portant  sea-board  towns  of  the  rebels. 

1 '  It  cannot  be  ignored  that  the  construction 


of  railroads  has  introduced  a  new  and  very 
important  clement  into  war,  by  the  great  facil 
ities  thus  given  for  concentrating  at  particu 
lar  positions,  large  masses  of  troops  from  re 
mote  sections,  and  by  creating  new  strategic 
points  and  lines  of  operation.  It  is  intended 
to  overcome  this  difficulty  by  the  partial  oper 
ations  suggested,  and  such  other,  as  the  par 
ticular  case  may  require.  "We  must  endeavor 
to  seize  places  on  the  railways,  in  the  rear  of 
the  enemy's  points  of  concentration,  and  we 
must  threaten  their  sea-board  cities,  in  order 
that  each -State  may  be  forced,  by  the  neces 
sity  of  its  own  defence,  to  diminish  its  contin 
gent  to  the  Confederate  army. 

' '  The  proposed  movement  down  the  Missis 
sippi  will  produce  important  results  in  tl*is 
connection.  That  advance,  and  the  progress 
of  the  main  army  at  the  East,  will  materially 
assist  each  other  by  diminishing  the  resistance 
to  be  encountered  by  each.  The  tendency  of 
the  Mississippi  movement  upon  all  questions 
connected  with  cotton,  is  too  well  understood 
by  the  President  and  Cabinet,  to  need  any  il 
lustration  from  me.  There  is  another  indepen 
dent  movement  which  has  often  been  suggest 
ed,  and  which  has  always  reconimended  itself 
to  my  judgment.  I  refer  to  a  movement  from 
Kansas  and  Nebraska  through  the  Indian 
Territory  upon  lied  River  and  Western  Tex 
as,  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  and  develop 
ing  the  latent  Union  and  free-state  sentiment, 
well  known  to  predominate  in  Western  Texas, 
and  which,  like  a  similar  sentiment  in  West 
ern  Virginia,  will,  if  protected,  ultimately  or 
ganize  that  section  into  a  free  State.  How  far 
it  will  be  possible  to  support  this  movement 
by  an  advance  through  New  Mexico  from 
California,  is  a  matter  which  I  have  not  suffi- 
cently  examined  to  be  able  to  express  a  de 
cided  opinion.  If  at  all  practicable,  it  is  emi 
nently,  desirable,  as  bringing  into  play  the 
resources  and  warlike  qualities  of  the  Pacific 
States,  as  well  as  identifying  them  with  our 
cause,  and  cementing  the  bond  of  Union  be 
tween  them  and  the  general  government. 

"  If  i$  is  not  departing  too  far  from  my  prov 
ince,  I  will  venture  to  suggest  the  policy  of 
an  intimate  alliance  and  cordial  understanding 
with  Mexico ;  their  sympathies  and  interests 
are  with  us ;  their  antipathies  exclusively 
against  our  enemies  and  their  institutions.  I 
think  it  would  not  be  difficult  to  obtain  from 
the  Mexican  government  the  right  to  use,  at 
least  during  the  present  contest,  the  road  from 
Guyamas  to  New  Mexico.  This  concession 
would  very  materially  reduce  the  obstacles  of 
the  column  moving  from  the  Pacific.  A  sim 
ilar  permission  to  use  their  territory  for  the  pas 


sage  of  troops  between  the  Panueo  and  the 
Rio  Grande,  would  enable  us  to  throw  a  col 
umn  of  troops,  by  a  good  road  from  Tampico, 
or  some  of  the  small  harbors  north  of  it,  upon 
and  across  the  Rio  Grande,  without  risk,  and 
scarcely  firing  a  shot.  To  what  extent,  if  any, 
it  would  be  desirable  to  take  into  service  and 
employ  Mexican  soldiers,  is 'a  question 'en 
tirely  political,  on  which  I  do  not  venture  to 
offer  an  opinion. 

"  The  force  I  have  recommended  is  large, 
the  expense  is  great.  It  is  possible  that  a 
smaller  force  might  accomplish  the  object  in 
view ;  but  I  understand  it  to  be  the  purpose 
of  this  great  nation  to  reestablish  the  power 
of  its  government,  and  to  restore  peace  to  ita 
citizens  in  the  shortest  possible  time.  The 
question  to  be  decided  is  smply  this  :  shall  wo 
crush  the  rebellion  at  one  blow,  terminate  the 
war  in  one  campaign,  or  shall  we  leave  it  for 
a  legacy  to  our  descendants  ? 

"  When  the  extent  of  the  possible  line  of 
operations  is  considered,  the  force  asked  for 
the  main  army  under  my  command  cannot  bo 
regarded  as  unduly  large.  Every  mile  wo 
advance  carries  us  farther  from  our  base  of 
operations,  and  renders  detachments  neces 
sary  to  cover  our  communications,  while  tho 
enemy,  will  be  constantly  concentrating  as  he 
falls  back.  I  propose,  with  the  force  which  I 
have  requested,  not  only  to  drive  the  enemy 
out  of  Virginia  and  occupy  Richmond,  but  to 
occupy  Charleston,  Savannah,  Montgomery, 
Pensacola,  Mobile,  and  New  Orleans ;  in 
other  words,  to  move  into  the  heart  of  tho 
enemy's  country,  and  crush  out  the  rebellion 
in  its  very  heart. 

"  By  seizing  and  repairing  the  railroads  as 
we  advance,  the  difficulties  of  transportation 
will  be  materially  diminished.  It  is,  perhaps, 
unnecessary  to  state,  that,  in  addition  to  tho 
forces  named  in  this  memorandum,  strong  re 
serves  should  be  formed,  ready  to  supply  any 
losses  that  may  occur. 

"In  conclusion,  I  would  submit  that  the 
exigences  of  the  treasury  may  be  lessened  by 
making  only  partial  payments  to  our  troops, 
when  in  the  enemy's  country,  and  by  giving 
the  obligations  of  tho  United  States  for  such 
supplies  as  may  there  .be  obtained. 

"GEO.    B.    McCLELLAN, 

"  jMajor-General" 

WJiile  the  organization  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  was  going  on,  to  use  the  words  of  the 
Prince  do  Joinville,  a  most  competent  and 
candid  witness  of  the  mighty  enterprise,  "  with 
a  rapidity  and  a  success  which  are  extraordi 
nary,  when  we  think  that  the  whole  thing  had 


25 


to  be  accomplished  without  any  assistance 
from  the  past  j : '  the  whole  fabric  of  the  West 
ern  armies  had  also  to  bo  constructed.  The 
Western  States,  though  abounding  in  men  and 
in  patriotic  fervor,  were  still  more  destitute  of 
all  the  materials  of  war  than  the  Eastern ;  and, 
although  General  McClellan  was  not  formally 
invested  with  the  rank  of  commander-in-chief 
until  the  month  of  November,  he  performed 
the  greater  part  of  the  then  inconceivably  oner 
ous  duties  of  that  office  almost  from  the  first 
moment  of  his  taking  command  in  Washing 
ton.  His  suggestions  were  not  always  adopted, 
his  plans  were  subjected  to  revision  and  mod 
ification  at  the  hands  of  the  President,  and  of 
all.  those  whom  the  President  chose  to  take 
into  his  military  confidence.  But  the  solid 
work  of  organization,  —  the  creation,  we  may 
truly  say, — of  the  commissariat  service,  the 
transportation  service,  the  ordnance  service, 
the  artillery  reserves,  the  engineer  corps,  the 
pontoon  corps,  the  telegraph  corps,  the  topo 
graphical  brigade,  the  coast  reserves,  the  hos 
pital  corps  of  such  armies  as  no  American  had 
ever  dreamed  he  should  live  to  see  assembled 
on  American  soil,  —  all  this  was  put  upon  the 
shoulders  of  fc!ie  young  general.  And  to  do  this 
work  it  was,  that  through  good  report  and  evil 
report  while  inquisitive  senators  frowned  and 
fretted  at  his  reticence,  and  arrogant  journalists 
denounced  his  imbecile  inactivity,  lie  labored 
incessantly  through  the  long  months  of  tho 
autumn.  A  "Herculean  task,"  truly,  and 
a  Herculean  task  of  such  a  nature,  too,  that 
the  popular  eye,  greedy  of  whatsoever  is  glitter 
ing,  sudden,  and  electrical,  is  slow  to  rest 
with  just  approval  and  true  appreciation  upon 
him  who  achieves  it. 

Whatever  measures  seemed  really  likely  to 
accelerate  the  moment  when  the  troops  of  the 
Union  could  onco  more  take  the  field  with 
.'•olid  force  enough  to  overcome  the  vast  increase 
( £  momentum  given  to  the  rebellion  by  the 
weak  and  ill-advised  measures  which  brought 
about  the  defeat  of  July  21,  received  a  cor- 
di^J  support  from  General  McClellan,  no  mat- 
tor  from  what  quarter  they  came  to  him. 

Thus  he  urged  upon  the  Secretary  of  War 
an  appeal  to  the  States  for  a  draft  such  as  the 
Constitution  had  empowered  the  State  authori 
ties  to  make  in  case  of  need,  and  had  the  ap 
peal  been  wisely  heeded  and  answered,  it  is 
more  than  probable  that  such  a  law  as  the 
Conscription  Act,  passed  by  the  Congress  of 
1863,  would  never  have  been  so  much  as 
heard  of  among  us. 

Again,  in  September,  1801,  the  President 
and  the  Secretaries  of  War  and  of  State  be 
came  convinced  that  a  project  existed  in 


Maryland  for  forcing  an  act  of  secession  upon 
the  legislature  of  that  State,  then  about  to 
meet  at  the  city  of  Frederick.  The  evidences 
of  such  a  project  were  collected  under  the 
authority  of  Mr.  Cameron,  the  Secretary  of 
War,  and  Mr.  Seward,  the  Secretary  of  State ; 
and  having  been  laid  by  them  before  the 
President,  it  was  judged  expedient  to  order 
the  arrest  of  certain  members  of  the  legisla 
ture  more  particularly  implicated  in  the 
alleged  conspiracy. 

On  the  eleventh  of  September,  Mr.  Came 
ron  sent  the  following  letter  to  Major-General 
Banks,  commanding  our  forces  in  Maryland  : 

' '  GENERAL  :  The  passage  of  any  act  of 
secession  by  the  Legislature  of  Maryland  must 
be  prevented.  If  necessary,  all,  or  any  part 
of  the  members  must  be  arrested.  Exercise 
your  own  judgmsnt  as  to  the  time  and  man 
ner,  but  do  the  work  effectively. 
"  Very  respectfully, 

"  Your  obedient  servant, 

"  SIMON  CAMEUON, 
"  Secretary  of  War" 

On  the  same 'day  Goaeral  McClellan  was 
called  into  council  with  the  President,  the  Sec 
retaries,  and  General  Scott,  upon  the  subject ; 
and  it  having  been  asserted  to  him  by  the 
highest  functionaries  in  tho  land  that  Mary 
land  was  really  about  to  be  thrown  into  the 
tide  of  secession,  his  judgment,  as  a  military 
man,  as  to  what  should  bo  done,  was  necessa 
rily  prompt  and  clear.  To  permit  even  a  possi 
bility  of  the  secession  of  Mary  land' in  the  rear 
of  Washington,  at  the  base  of  the  whole  army, 
and  of  all  the  operations  then  planning,  was 
not  for  a  moment  to  be  thought  of.  The 
duty  of  ascertaining  the  reality  of  the  danger 
rested  not  upon  General  McClellan,  but  upon 
his  informants,  the  heads  of  the  Government. 
The  duty  of  preventing  the  danger  asserted 
by  them  to  be  real,  rested  upon  him,  and  it 
was  done,  promptly  and  vigorously  done. 

Circumstances  have  since  come  to  light 
which  make  it  very  doubtful  whether  any  such 
project  as  that  denounced  to  General  Mc 
Clellan  was  really  entertained  at  the  time  by 
the  persons  charged  with  being  concerned  in 
it.  But  the  crisis  at  which  General  Mc 
Clellan  was  called  upon  to  act,  forbade  all 
hesitation  on  his  p.-irt.  He  rejnforced  the 
order  sent  by  Mr.  -Secretary  Camera*  to  Gen 
eral  Banks,  with  a  letter  from  himself  to  that 
officer.  The  arrests  were  made,  and  the 
prisoners,  mostly  gentlemen  of  character,  in 
telligence,  and  high  standing,  were  properly 
turned  over  to  the  control  of  the  Secretary  of 
State.  Under  the  orders'  of  this  functionary 


26 


and  against  the  protest  of  the  military  officer^, 
who  upon  the  suggestion  and  at  the  request 
of  tho  Federal  authorities,  had  acted  in  the 
matter,  these  gentlemen  were  removed  from 
their  own  State 'to  Fort  Warren,  in  Boston 
Harbor,  were  treated  with  great  indignity  and 
indecency,  and  their  guilt  being  assumed  as 
unquestionable,  were  detained  in  a  close  and 
cruel  confinement  long  after  all  danger  from 
any  possible  evil  influence  of  theirs  in  Mary 
land  had  passed  away  ;  no  such  opportunity 
being  conceded  to  them  of  establishing  their 
innocence  as  would  have  been  granted  to  the 
meanest  soldier  accused  of  a  violation  of  his 
military  duty. 

On  the  1st  of  November,  18G1,  General 
McClellan  was  called  to  relieve  General  Scott 
of  the  gcneial  command  of  the  armies  of  the 
Union. 

This  high  distinction  was  conferred  and  this 
grave  responsibility  imposed  upon  General 
McClellan  by  the  President,  after  three  months 
of  constant  intercourse  with  him  in  the  dis 
charge  of  his  duties  as  Commander  of  the- 
Potomac  army,  and  in  consultation  upon  tha 
affairs  of  the  Union.  It  was  a  step  which  It 
would  be  doing  the  President  great  injustice 
to  suppose  lightly  taken;  and  in  taking  it 
the  President  certainly  assumed  a  substantial 
moral  obligation  to  do  all  that  might  in  him 
lie  to  make  easier  the  task  of  the  man  upon 
whom  he  had  deliberately  imposed  the  onerous 
responsibility  of  the  command  of  the  armies 
of  the  Republic.  History  will  one  day  pass 
her  final  verdict  upon  the  character  of  the 
way  in  which  that  obligation  was  fulfilled  by 
Mr.  Lincoln.  It  will  be  enough  for  us  to 
show  what  that  way  was. 

The  disastrous  affair  which  had  occurred  at 
Ball's  Bluff  but  a  few  days  before  President 
Lincoln  conferred  the  supreme  command  of 
the  forces  upon  General  McClollan,  ought  to 
have  warned  the  President  of  the  danger  of 
interference  with  the  well-considered  plans  of 
a  commander  in  the  field. 

In  the  beginning  of  the  month  of  October, 
General  McClellan  had  found  reason  to  believe 
that  the  enemy  were  preparing  to  evacuate 
thoir  positions  at  and  about  Manassas  Plains. 
Watching  the  whole  field  of  operations  with 
an  instructed  and  intelligent  eye,  he  had  not 
failed  to  perceive  that  the  victory  of  July 
21st,  while  it  had  given  a  certain  spirit  and 
prestige  to  tho  army  of  tho  Confederates, 
actually  in  service,  had  indisposed  the  Southern 
people  in  general  to  making  any  particular 
efforts  to  increase  their  army,  or  to  strengthen 
the  hands  of  their  government.  They  had 
been  trapped  by  the  successes  of  that  day 


into  a  condition  of  careless  self-confidence, 
which  must  prove  eminently  advantageous 
to  the  cause  of  the  Union  if  the  renewal  of 
active  hostilities  could  be  postponed  until  the 
Army  of  the  Union  should  be  strong  enough 
to  take  the  offensive  at  one  and  the  same  time 
against  all  the  great  -points  of  Southern  resist 
ance.  Little  had  been  done  towards  ade 
quately  fortifying  the  Southern  seaports. 
New  Orleans,  the  most  important  city  of  the 
South,  was  almost  literally  defenceless,  and 
the  whole  Confederate  army  in  Kentucky  and 
Tennessee  scarcely  amounted  to  the  strength 
of  a  single  army  corps.  This  being  the 
general  condition  of  affairs  at  the  South,  the 
Confederate  Government  perceived  that  it 
was  absolutely  necessary  to  the  defence  of 
their  capital  —  Richmond  —  that  the  army 
under  General  Johnstone,  at  Manassas,  should 
be  kept  prepared  to  fall  back  upon  and  cover 
that  city,  at  the  first  intimation  of  a  probable 
Federal  movement  for  its  capture  by  the  way 
of  the  lower  Rappahannock  or  the  James 
and  York  Rivers.  The  value  of  the  position 
at  Manassas,  as  a  base  for  offensive  operations 
against  Washington,  had  passed  away  during 
the  inaction  which  was  enforced  upon  General 
Beauregard  immediately  after  his  victory  of 
July.  The  Southern  army  at  Manassas  had 
suffered  ao  much  from  disease,  arid  from  a 
defective  organization,  during  the  months  of 
August  and  September,  that  it  was  in  no  con 
dition,  in  the  beginning  of  October,  either  to 
assume  the  offensive  or  even  to  join  battle 
with  a  superior  force  advancing  from  Washing 
ton.  In  the  very  improbable  contingency 
that  General  McClellan  should  suffer  himself 
to  be  hurried  by  non-military  influences  into 
making  the  lamentable  blunder  of  such  an 
advance,  General  Johnstone  had  accordingly 
prepared  himself  to  retreat  at  once  towards 
his  true  base  at  Richmond. 

Nothing  of  this  was  commonly  understood 
at  the  North,  where  the  continued  presence 
of  Johnstone  at  Manassas  was  perpetually  de 
nounced  as  an  insult,  a  menace,  and  a  peril 
to  Washington  avid  to  the  Union ;  and  Presi 
dent  Lincoln  was  incessantly  besieged  with 
entreaties,  more  or  less  imperious,  to  command 
a  direct  movement  upon  the  enemy. 

On  the  19th  of  October,  General  McClellan, 
clearly  conceiving  the  true  state  of  the  case, 
ordered  General  McCall  to  cover  a  grand 
reconnaissance  in  force  to  be  made  the  next 
day  from  Drainsville.  This  reconnoissancu 
was  successfully  made ;  and  on  the- next  day, 
October  20th,  General  Stone,  occupying 
Poolesville  in  Maryland,  was  ordered  to  make 
a  feint  of  crossinc;  the  Potomac  in  order  to 


27 


feel  the  enemy  at  Lee*burg  in  Virginia,  which 
General  McOlellan  bolieved  them  to  be,  as 
they  in  fact  wore,  abandoning.  This  feint  was 
made.  But  in  making  it  General  Stone  em 
ployed  an  officer  whose  direct  personal  relations 
with  the  President,  and  whose  official  rank  as 
a  Senator  of  the  United  States  seem  to  have 
misled  him  into  adventuring  further  than  it 
was  expected  or  intended  he  should  go ;  and 
the  events  of  the  next  day,  Oct.  21st,  con 
verted  the  simple  reconnoissance  of  Edward's 
Ferry  into  the  disastrous  battle  of  Ball's 
^  Rluff,  a  battle  fought,  certainly,  without  the 
knowledge  or  the  orders  of  the  commanding 
general,  fought  where  there  was  no  direct  mili 
tary  purpose  to  be  gained  even  by  a  victory  ; 
and  fought  with  so  little  skill  and  judgment 
that  it  resulted  in  the  complete  and  humiliat 
ing  defeat  of  our  troops  by  a  body  of  the 
enemy  largely  inferior  in  point  of  numbers 
and  of  artillery. 

All  that  could  possibly  have  been  won  by 
»  successful  issue  of  this  unhappy  movement 
would  have  been  a  stimulation  of  the  public 
appetite  for  **  brilliant  and  exciting  intelli 
gence,"  and  a  powerful  reinforcement  of  the 
already  formidable  Aulic  Council  of  military 
citizens  by  whom  the  Government  was  sur 
rounded  and  the  commanding  general  beset. 
Its  failure  confirmed  the  exulting  confidence 
of  the  Southern  troops  in  their  own  invincibil 
ity,  and  cast  another  shade  of  gloom  over  the 
bravery  -which  the  defeat  of  Bull  Run  had 
already  clouded. 

Good  might,  however,  have  come  out  of 
this  evil,  had  the  President  learned  from  it 
the  absolute  necessity  of  trusting  the  control 
of  the  armies  implicitly  to  their  nominal  com 
mander,  and  of  abstaining  himself,  and  caus 
ing  others  to  abstain,  from  ignorant  and  im 
patient  interference  with  operations  which 
imperatively  demanded  time  for  their  ripening, 
and  unity  of  authority  for  their  successful 
execution. 

Immediately  after  taking  command  of  the 
armies  of  the  Union,  General  McClellan 
addressed  letters  of  instruction  to  Generals 
Halleek,  Buell,  Sherman,  and  Butler,  com 
manding  respectively  the  departments  of  Mis 
souri  and  Ohio,  and  the  expeditions  of  the 
SouthjAtlantic  a»d  the  Gulf.  In  these  letters 
the  whole  field  of  operations  before  the  army  is 
surveyed  with  masterly  judgment,  and  the 
special  part  to  be  taken  in  those  operations  by 
each  commander,  sketched  out  for  him  with 
clearness  and  with  precision,  and,  as  subse 
quent  events  have  proved,  with  an  almost 
marvellous  sagacity.  The  restoration  of  pub 
lic  confidence  in  Missouri  by  a  thorough 


reform  in  the  military  administration  of  that 
State,  and  the  chastisement  of  corruption,  the 
conciliation  .of  the  weil-4'wpo.- .-oil  population 
of  Kentucky  by  a  "  religious  respect  for  the 
rights  of  all ;  "  the  prompt  and  decisive  occu 
pation  of  Knoxville  and  East  Tennessee,,  cut 
ting  off  all  communication  bet  ween  Virginia 
and  the  Mississippi;  the  reduction  of  Fort 
Pulaski  in  the  Savannah  River,  and  the  or 
ganization  of  a  formidable  attack  upon  Charles 
ton.  These  were  the  principal  measures 
which  General  McClellan  proposed  to  himself 
as  the  constituent  parts  of  his  grand  cam 
paign  for  the  reduction  of  the  seceded  States 
to  their  allegiance  to  the  Union. 

Had  these  measures  been  carried  into 
effect  simultaneously  in  the  spring  of  1862, 
under  the  untrammelled  supervision  of  a  sin 
gle  military  mind,  and  with  forces  adequate 
as  well  in  point  of  preparation  as  in  point  of 
numbers,  to  the  work,  it  is  difficult  to  resist 
the  conviction  that  they  mu^t  have  resulted  in 
the  complete  prostration  of  the  organized 
force  of  the  Confederate  States.  As  we  shall 
shortly  see,  such  was  the  condition  of  the 
Confederate  armies  at  the  time  when  General 
McClellan  was  maturing  his  plan?,  that  the 
hastily  prepared  and  somewhat  hurriedly 
executed  movements  which  were  made  in  the 
West,  under  the  direct  authority  of  President 
Lincoln,  in  February  and  March,  sufficed  to 
make  an  impression  upim  the  front  of  Con 
federate  resistance  in  that  quarter,  which,  had 
it  been  accompanied  by  an  equal  impact  upon 
the  eastern  and  south  em  bulwarks  of  the  then 
loosely-jointed  Confederate  system,  could  hard 
ly  have  failed  to  determine  a  speedy  issue  of 
the  war.  Won  as  they  were,  these  isolated 
and  premature  triumphs  in  the  Wc&t  simply 
aroused  the  Confederates  to  a  full  sense  of 
their  danger.  The  great  scheme  of  the  war 
was  broken  up  by  them,  and  the  nation  expi 
ated,  in  more  than  a  year  of  desperate  and 
costly  efforts  to  master  the  Mississippi  and 
open  a  way  into  Eastern  Tennessee,  the  im 
patience  which  refused  to  recognize  the  infinity 
advantages  of  the  delay  which  perfects  concen 
tration,  over  the  desultory  and  incoherent 
energy  which  spends  itself  in  ill-combined 
and  in  spasmodic  efforts.  * 

The  period  during  which  General  MeClel- 
lan  really  held  command  of  the  armies  of  the 
Union,  and  was  really  in  a  position  to  enable 
him  to  plan  and  prepare  a  campaign  propor 
tionate  to  the  area  of  the  war,  extended  over 
but  a  little  more  than  two  months.  He  was 
called  to  fill  the  post  vacated  by  Lieut. -Gen 
eral  Scott  in  November,  1861.  Incessantly 
occupied  with  the  details  of  the  organization 


28 


of  the  main  army,  which  was  to  be  directly 
commanded  by  himself,  General  McClellan 
was,  at  the  same  time,  burdened  with  the 
duty  of  supervising  all  the  military  prepara 
tions  of  the  Union,  and  of  elaborating  the 
vast  plan  of  campaign  already  sketched. 

It  is  not  surprising  that,  while  sparing- 
neither  body  nor  brain  in  this  collossal  task, 
the  young  Commander-in-Chief  should  have 
overtaxed  even  his  vigorous  constitution. 
Towards  the  middle  of  December  he  con 
tracted  a  serious  illness,  which,  for  a  short 
time,  conn  tied  him  to  his  head-quarters  at 
•  Washington. 

During  this  time  the  political  pressure  upon 
the  President,  for  an  advance  of  the  armies, 
became  daily  more  and  more  vehement.  The 
Secretary  of  War,  Mr.  Cameron,  left  the  Cab 
inet,  and  was  succeeded  by  Mr.  Stanton,  who, 
while  he  professed  the  warmest  regard  for  the 
young  General  in  command  of  the  armies, 
gave  his  most  strenuous  efforts  in  support  of 
the  external  clamor  which  was  driving  the 
President  towards  a  practical  nullification  of 
his  influence  arid  his  authority. 

Before  General  McClellan  had  fully  recov 
ered  his  health,  and  without  any  consultation 
whatever  had  with  him,  the  President  finally, 
on  the  27th  of  January,  1862,  succumbed  to 
these  demoralizing  forces,  and  assumed  him 
self  the  command  of  the  national  forces. 

On  that  day  he  issued,  from  the  Executive 
Mansion,  the  following  War  Order  :  — 

' '  Ordered,  That  the  twenty-second  day  of 
February,  ^  1862,  be  the  day  for  a  general 
movement *of  the  land  and  naval  forces  of  the 
United  States  against  the  insurgent  forces. 
That  especially  the  army  at  and  about  For 
tress  Monroe,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  the 
Army  of  "Western  Virginia,  the  army  near 
Mumfordsville,  Kentucky,  the  army  and  flo 
tilla  at  Cairo,  and  a  naval  force  in  the  Gulf  of 
Mexico,  be  ready  to  move  on  that  day. 

"  That  all  other  forces,  both  land  and  naval, 
with  their  respective  commanders,  obey  ex 
isting  orders  for  the  time,  and  be  ready  to 
obey  additional  orders  when  duly  given. 

"That  the  heads  of  departments,  and  espec 
ially  the  Secretaries  of  War  and  of  the  Navy, 
with  all  their  subordinates,  and  the  General- 
in-Chief,  with  all  other  commanders  and  sub' 
ordinatcs  of  land  and  naval  forces,  will  sev 
erally  be  held  to  their  strict  and  full  responsi 
bilities  for  prompt  execution  of  this  order. 
"ABRAHAM  LINCOLN." 

From  the  moment  of  the  promulgation  of 
this  most  extraordinary  order,  the  General 
whom  it  so  peremptory  and  so  insultingly 


superseded,  ceased,  of  course,  to  be  responsi 
ble  for  the  conduct  of  any  military  operation, 
not  carried  on  directly  under  his  own  eyes 
and  specially  committed  to  his  own  direct 
control. 

It  is  necessary  to  remember  here  that  the 
armies  thus  directed  to  be  set  in  motion  upon 
a  given  day,  thus  publicly  announced  to  foes 
and  friends  alike,  were  made  up  of  many 
thousands  of  men  entirely  unfamiliar  with 
war,  and  commanded,  for  the  most  part,  by 
officers  as  inexperienced  as  themselves. 

The  few  "  veterans  "  of  this  host  were  men 
whose  nominal  service,  under  armies,  had  a 
date  of  but  from  four  to  five  months.  As  to 
the  condition  of  these  great  branches  of  the 
military  service,  on  which  the  practicability  of 
k  moving  such  a  force  must  have  been  absolute 
ly  dependent,  had  the  troops  been  troops  of 
the  line  inured  to  war,  no  one  could  possibly 
form  an  intelligent  notion,  excepting  the  com 
manding  general,  under  whom  they  had  teen 
organized,  and  who,  as  we  have  seen,  was  not 
so  much  as  consulted  upon  the  subject. 

Viewed  in  the  light  of  these  considerations, 
this  singular  Order  would  seem  as  unaccount 
able  in  itself  as  it  is  certainly  unique  in 
the  history  of  human  warfare,  were  not  an 
adequate,  if  not  a  satisfactory,  explanation  of 
its  origin  and  intent  furnished  to  us  by  ono 
of  the  most  intrepid  defenders  of  Mr.  Lincoln 
and  his  administration. 

In  his  "Life  of  President  Lincoln,"  Mr. 
Raymond,  of  New  York,  thus  simply  and 
clearly  states  the  case  :  — 

"As  winter  approached  without  any  indi 
cations  of  an  intended  movement  of  our  ar 
mies,  the  public  impatience  rose  to  the  high- 
mt  point  of  discontent.  The  Administration 
was  everywhere  held  responsible  for  these 
unaccountable  delays,  and  was  freely  charged 
by  its  opponents,  with  a  design  to  protract 
the  war  for  selfish  political  purposes  of  its 
own  ;  and  at  the  fall  elections  tlic  piiblic  dis 
satisfaction  made  itself  manifest  bij  adverse 
votes  in  every  considerable  State  where  elec 
tions  were  -held" 

From  the  moment  when  considerations  of 
political  and  partizan  expediency  thus  invaded 
the  great  question  of  the  conduct  of  the  war 
in  the  mind  of  the  President,  all  harmonious 
concert  of  action  between  that  functionary 
and  General  McClellan  necessarily  came  to 
an  end.  With  such  considerations  General 
McClellan,  as  an  honest  and  single-minded 
soldier  laboring  solely  for  the  defeat  of  the 
armed  enemies  of  the  Union,  had  and  could 
have  nothing  whatever  to  do.  The  "public 
dissatisfaction,"  which  "made  itself  manifest 


29 


by  adverse  votes"  in  the  fall  eleclions  of 
1861,  had  its  origin  in  many  other  causes  be 
sides  the  delays  in  the  movement  of  our 
armies.  The  civil  administration  of  the  gov 
ernment  had  been  conducted  with  an  extraor- 
4dinary  recklessness,  alike  of  the  laws  of  the 
land  and  of  the  liberties  of  the  citizens,  while 
the  bare  fact  of  the  civil  war  itself  necessarily 
shook  the  public  confidence  in  the  statesman- 
*  ship  of  a  party  who*se  leading  representative 
had  openly  laughed  the  possibility  of  such  a 
war  to  scorn,  and  had  predicted  the  complete 
restoration  of  order  throughout  the  nation  within 
"  sixty  days"  from  the  passage  of  the  Ordi 
nance  of  Secession  by  the  State  of  South 
Carolina.  To  concentrate  this  "public  dis 
satisfaction,"  if  possible,  upon  the  delays  in 
the  movement  of  our  armies ;  to  brand  those 
delays  as  "unaccountable;"  and  to  fix  the 
responsibility  of  them  upon  the  commander 
of  the  forces,  was  such  a  move  in  partizan  tac 
tics  as  seems  to  have  tempted  the  Administra 
tion  into  entire  forgctfulness  of  the  fatal  conse 
quences  which  it  was  to  entail  upon  the  public 
service  and  the  welfare  of  the  state. 

It  would  appoar,  too,  that  a  singular  con 
fidence  in  his  own  capacity  as*  a  military 
leader,  was,  at  the  same  time,  growing  up  in 
the  mind  of  the  President.  For,  not  content 
with  assuming  the  general  command,  by 
proclamation,  of  the  armies  of  the  Union, 
Mr.  Lincoln  at  once  proceeded  to  assume  the 
direct  control  of  the  campaign  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  in  particular. 

On  the  81st  of  January,  1862,  appeared 
the  President's  Special  War  Order,  No.  1, 
couched  in  the  following  terms  :  — 

"  EXECUTIVE  MANSION,  WASHINGTON,  Jan.  31, 1862. 

"Ordered,  That  all  the  disposable  force  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  after  providing 
safely  for  the  defence  of  Washington,  be 
formed  into  an  expedition  for  the  immediate 
object  of  seizing  and  occupying  a  point  upon 
the  railroad  southwestward  of  what  is  known 
as  Manast?.is  Junction ;  all  details  to  be  in  the 
discretion  of  the  Commander-in-Chief,  and 
the  expedition  to  move  before  or  on  the  twenty- 
second  day  of  February  next. 

"ABRAHAM  LINCOLN." 

Had  the  civil  war  been  suddenly  brought 
to  an  end,  by  the  submission  of  the  South,  be 
fore  a  single  movement  had  been  made  in  the 
campaigns  of  1862,  this  "  Special  War  Order, 
No.  1"  would,  doubtless,  live  in  history  as 
the  most  grotesque  document  which  ever 
emanated  from  a  man  elevated  by  his 
fellow-men  to  a  position  of  great  trust  and 


grave  responsibility.  The  accredited  biographer 
'of  Mr.  Lincoln  informs  us  that  he  distinguished 
himself  in  his  early  life  by  his  bravery  and 
skill  in  conducting  the  defence  of  a  flafe- 
boat  on  the  Mississippi  River  against  an 
attack  made  upon  it  by  seven  negroes.  The 
remembrance  of  this  exploit  does  not  seem 
to  have  impelled  the  President  to  relieve 
our  naval  commanders  of  the  responsibilities 
of  their  profession.  And  it  is  highly  improb 
able  that  it  would  ever  have  occurred  to  the 
President  had  he  found  himself  on  board  of 
the  "  Monitor,"  during  her  memorable  conflict 
with  the  "Merrimac,"  to  assume  the  com 
mand  of  that  gallant  little  craft,  and  prescribe 
manoeuvres  of  battle  to  Lieutenant  Worden. 
Yet  the  brief  land  campaign  against  the 
Indians,  in  which  we  are  assured  that  Mr.  Lin 
coln  once  took  a  creditable  part  as  a  captain  of 
militia,  appears  to  have  inspired  him  with  the 
belief  that  he  might  reasonably  and  respecta 
bly  undertake  to  handle  one  of  the  largest 
armies  of  modern  times,  engaged  in  one  of 
the  most  formidable  and  difficult  invasions 
upon  record  ! 

General  McClellan  has  many  times,  in  the 
course  of  iiis  career,  exhibited  a  power  of  self- 
command,  and  a  forgetfulness  of  all  merely 
personal  considerations  in  behalf  of  his  obli 
gations  to  his  country  and  to  the  troops 
under  his  command,  which  entitle  him  to  a 
lofty  placo  among  those  true  heroes  who  have 
dared  to  feel  that 

"  The  path  of  duty  is  the  way  to  glory." 

But  never,  surely,  were  these  qualities  more 
keenly  tested  than  they  must  have  been  by  this 
"  War  Order,"  which  at  once  shocked  hia 
common  sense  as  a  soldier,  and  outraged  his 
self-respect  as  an  officer  high  in  command. 

Before  this  "  Order"  was  issued,  General 
McClellan  had  explained  to  the  President  the 
plan  of  campaign  which  he  intended  to  pur 
sue  in  Virginia.  Like  the  immortal  Dutch 
Commissioners,  who  harassed  the  soul  of 
Marlborough  with  their  incessant  interference 
in  his  campaigns,  the  President  certainly  had 
a  right,  in  virtue  of  his  position,  to  know 
what  operations  the  general  in  command  of 
his  armies  was  about  to  undertake  ;  but,  like 
those  high  and  mighty  marplots,  also,  his 
Excellency  abused  this  right  into  a  warrant  for 
assuming  the  control  of  those  operations, 
objecting  to  them,  and  modifying  all  the  con 
ditions  essential  to  their  success.  Had  Mr. 
Lincoln  consulted  General  Halleck  on  the 
subject  of  these  pretensions  of  his,  that  officer, 
who  has  done 'his  country  the  service  of  trans- 


30 


lating  Jomini's  great  work  on  the  "  Art  of 
War,"  might  have  enlightened  him  as  to  the" 
Kraits  of  executive  duty,  with  the  following 
passage  upon  which  the  campaign  of  1862, 
on  the  Peninsula,  has  furnished  a  commentary 
more  striking  than  any  which  the  elder  history 
of  war  has  bequeathed  to  us  :  — 

' '  In  my  j  adgment, ' '  observes  Baron  Jomini, 
upon  the  part  taken  by  the  Executive  Aulic 
Council,  of  Vienna,  in  directing  the  opera 
tions  of  the  Austrian  armies,  "  the  only 
duty  which  such  a  council  can  safely  under 
take  is  that  of  advising  as  to  the  adoption  of 
a  general  plan  of  operations.  Of  course  I 
do  not  mean  by  this  a  plan  which  is  to  em 
brace  the  whole  course  of  a  campaign,  tie 
down  the  generals  to  that  cours<?,  and  GO  inev 
itably  lead  to  their  being  beaten ;  I  mean  a 
plan  which  shall  determine  the  objects  of  the 
campaign,  decide  whether  offensive  or  defen 
sive  operations  shall  be  undertaken,  and  fix 
the  amount  of  material  means  which  may  be 
relied  upon,  in  the  first  instance,  for  the  open 
ing  of  the  enterprise,  and  then,  for  the  possi 
ble  reserves  in  case  of  invasion.  It  can  not 
be  denied  that  all  these  things  may  be,  and 
even  should  be  discussed  in  a  council  of  gov 
ernment  mades  up  of  generals  and  of  minis 
ters  :  but  hsre  the  action  of  such  a  council 
should  stop ;  for  if  it  pretends  to  say  to  a 
commando i -in-chief  not  only  that  he  shall 
march  on  Vienna  or  on  Paris,  but  also  in 
what  way  he  is  to  manoeuvre  to  reach  those 
points,  the  unfortunate  commander-in-chief 
will  certainly  be  beaten,  and  the  WHOLE  RE 
SPONSIBILITY  OF  HIS  REVERSES"  WILL  REST 
UPON  THOSE  WHO,  TWO  HUNDRED  MILES  OFF 
FROM  THE  ENEMY,  PRETEND  TO  DIRECT  AN 
ARMY,  WHICH  IT  IS  DIFFICULT  ENOUGH  TO 
MANAGE  WHEN  ACTUALLY  IN  THE  FIELD." 

How  completely  the  President,  while  leav 
ing  to  General  McClellan  the  nominal  com 
mand  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  undertook 
to  direct  that  army,  appears  from  the  following 
note,  sent  by  him  to  General  McClellan, 
while  the  latter,  animated  by  an  honorable 
determination  to  remember  only  the  respect 
due  the  exalted  office  of  the  Chief  Magistrate, 
was  preparing  a  paper  in  which  his  reasons 
for  the  movement  he  had  resolved  upon  should 
be  clearly  set  forth. 

"EXECUTIVE  MANSION, 
"WASHINGTON,  February,  3,  1862. 

"MAJ.-GSN.  McCLELLAN, 

"  MY  DEAR  SIR  :  You  and  I  h-ive  distinct 
and  different  plans  for  a  movement  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac.  Yours  to  be  done  by 
the  Chesapeake,  up  the  Rappahannock  to 
Urb.ina,  and  across  and  to  tha  terminus  of 


the  railroad  on  the  York  River ;  mine  to  move 
directly  to  a  point  on  the  railroad  southwest 
of  Manassas. 

"  If  you  will  give  me  satisfactory  answers 
to  the  following  questions,  I  shall  gladly 
yield  my  plan  to  yours. 

"  1st.  Does  not  your  plan  involve  a  greatly 
larger  expenditure  of  time  and  money  than 
mine  ? 

"  2d.    Wherein  is  a  victory  more  certain   t 
by  your  plan  than  mine  ? 

"  3d.  Wherein  is  a  victory  more  valuable 
by  your  plan  than  mine  ? 

"  4th.  In  fact  would  it  not  be  less  valuable 
in  this  ;  that  it  would  break  no  great  line  of 
the  enemy's  communications,  while  mine 
would  ? 

"  5th.  In  case  of  disaster,  would  not  a  re 
treat  be  more  difficult  by  your  plan  than 
mine?" 

"Yours  truly, 

* '  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN.  ' ' 

It  will  be  observed  that  there  is  no  ques 
tion,  in  this  strange  note',  of  the  general  ob 
jects  of  the  campaign  about  to  be  undertaken ; 
of  the  nature,  whether  offensive  or  defensive, 
of  the  operation  about  to  be  begun ;  nor  of  the 
material  means  to  be  provided  for  the  exe 
cution  of  these  operations. 

The  President  desires  the  Commander-in- 
Chief  to  discuss  with  him  the  way  in  which 
Richmond,  the  admitted  objective  point  of 
the  campaign,  is  to  be  reached.  He  assumes 
that  he  is  himself  at  least  as  good  a  judge  of 
that  way  as  the  Commander-in- Chief  can  be, 
and  proposes,  in  fact,  though  "not  in  form, 
that  General  McClellan  shall  undertake  to 
execute  not  his  own  plan  of  operations,  but 
a  plan  of  operations  conceived  by  the  supe 
rior  military  ability  of  the  Chief  Magistrate 
of  the  republic.  The  importance  of  this  note 
to  a  first  comprehension  of  all  the  subsequent 
events  not  of  the  Peninsula  campaign  alone, 
but  of  the  whole  war,  cannot  well  be  exag 
gerated. 

It  was  answered  by  General  McClellan,  so 
far  as  concerned  the  Peninsula  campaign,  in 
the  paper  which,  as  we  have  already  said,  he 
was  drawing  up  when  it  was  handed  in  to 
him.  It  has  been  answered,  so  far  as  the 
welfare  of  the  republic,  the  honor  of  our' 
arms,  and  the  prospects  of  the  cause  of  the 
Union  are  concerned,  by  two  long  and  weary 
and  wasting  years  of  Herculean  efforts  thwart 
ed  and  misdirected ;  by  the  unnecessary  expen 
diture  of  hundreds  of  millions  of  dollars, 
diverted  from  the  pursuits  of  industry  and 
subtracted  from  the  national  wealth ;  by  the 


31 


hearfc-breaking  sickness  of  a  nation's  hope 
deferred  ;  by  the  irreparable  sacrifice  of  thou 
sands  upon  thousands  of  lives  ;  answered  in 
blood  and  tears  f  orii  the  heights  of  Freder- 
icksburg,  and  the  plains  of  Manassas,  from 
the  wildernesses  of  CbancellorsviJle,  and  the 
unnamed  unnumbered  graves  of  Spottsylva- 
nia. 

The  paper  presented  by  General  McClollan 
to  the  Secretary  of  War,  on  the  very  day  of 
the  receipt  of  this  note,  is  so  full  and.  manly 
a  statenront  of  the  whole  case  as  it  then  stood, 
and  throws  so  clear  a  light  not  only  on  the 
whole  military  history  of  the  war  as  well 
subsequently  to  its  date  as  before  that  time, 
that  it  cannot,  be  too  often  reproduced  or  too 
carefully  pondered. 

"  HEAn-QUATVTERS    OF    THE    ABiLT, 

"  WASHINGTON,  Feb.  3, 1862. 
"  HON.  E.  M.  STANTON,  Sec'y  of  War. 

"  SIR  :  I  ask  your  indulgence  for  the 
following  paper,  rendered  necessary  by  cir 
cumstances. 

"  I  assumed  command  of  the  troops  in  the 
vicinity  of  Washington  on  Saturday,  July  27, 
1801,  six  days  after  the  battle  of  Bull  Run. 
I  found  no"  army  to  command  ;  a  mere  collec 
tion  of  regiments  cowering  on  the  banks  of 
the  Potomac,  some  perfectly  raw,  others  dis 
pirited  by  the  recent  defeat.  Nothing  of  any 
consequence  had  b.en  done  to  secure  the 
southern  approaches  to  the  capital  by  means 
of  defensive  works;  nothing  whatever  had 
been  undertaken  to  defend  tho  avenues  to 
the  city  on  the  northern  side  of  the  Potomac. 
The  troops  were  not  only  undisciplined,  un- 
drillecl,  and  dispirited ;  they  were  not  even 
placed  in  military  positions,  —  the  city  was 
almost  in  a  condition  to  have  been  taken  by 
a  dash  of  a  regiment  of  cavalry. 

"  Without  one  day's  delay  I  undertook  the 
difficult  task  assigned  to  me ;  that  task  the 
Hon.  Secretary  knows  was  given  to  me  with 
out  my  solicitation  or  foreknowledge.  How 
far  I  have  accomplished  it  will  best  be  shown 
by  the  past  and  the  present.  The  capital  is 
secure  against  attack  ;  the  extensive  foitifica- 
tions  erected  by  the  labor  of  our  troops  ena 
ble  a  small  gamson  to  hold  it  against  a 
numerous  army ;  the  enemy  have  been  held 
in  check ;  the  State  of  Maryland  is  securely 
in  our  possession  ;  the  detached  counties  of 
Virginia  are  again  within  the  pale  of  our 
laws,  —  and  all  apprehension  of  trouble  in 
Delaware  is  at  an  end ;  the  enemy  are  con 
fined  to  the  positions  they  occupied  before  the 
disaster  of  the  21st  of  July;  more  than  all 
this,  I  have  now  under  my  command  a  well 
drilled  and  reliable  army,  to  which  the  desti 


nies  of  the  country  may  be  confidently  com 
mitted  ;  this  army  is  young  and  untried  in 
battle, — but  it  is  animated  by  the  highest 
spirit,  and  ia  capable  of  great  deeds.  That 
so  much  has  oecn  accomplished,  and  such  an 
army  created  in  so  short  a  time,  from  noth 
ing,  will  hereafter  be  regarded  as  one  of  the 
highest  glories  of  the  Administration  and  the 
nation.  M'»ny  weeks,  I  may  «ry  many  months 
ago,  this  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  fully  \i\ 
condition  to  repel  any  attack ;  but  there  is  a 
vast .'difference  between  that  and  the  efficiency 
required  to  enable  troops  to  attack  success 
fully  an  army  elattd  by  victory  and  intrench 
ed  in  a  position  long  since  selected,  studied, 
and  fortified.  In  the  earliest  papers  I  sub 
mitted  to  the  President,  I  asked  for  an  effec 
tive  and  movable  force  far  exceeding  the 
aggregate  now  on  the  banks  of  the  Potomac. 
I  have  not  the  force  I  asked  for.  Even 
when  in  a  subordinate  position,  I  always 
looked  beyond  the  operations  of  (he  Army  of 
Potomac ;  I  was  never  satisfied  in  my  own  faind 
with  a  barren  victory,  —  but  looked  to  com 
bined  and  decisive  operations.  When  I  wa* 
placed  in  command  of  the  armies  of  the 
United  States,  I  immediately  turned  my  at 
tention  to  the  whole  field  of  operations, 
regarding  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  as  only 
one,  while  the  most  important,  of  the  masses 
under  my  command.  I  confess  ihat  I  did 
not  then  appreciate  the  total  absence  of  a 
general  plan,  which  had  before  existed,  — 
nor  did  I  know  that  utter  disorganization  and 
want  of  preparation  pervaded  the  Western 
armies.  I  took  it  for  granted  that  they  were 
nearly,  if  not  quite,  in  condition  to  move 
toward  the  fulfilment  of  my  plans ;  I  ac 
knowledge  that  I  made  a  great  mistake. 
I  sent  at  once,  with  the  approval  of  the  Ex 
ecutive,  officers  I  considered  competent  to 
command  in  Kentucky  and  Missouri,  —  their 
instructions  looked  to  prompt  movements,  — 
I  soon  found  that  the  labor  of  creation  and 
organization  had  to  be  performed  there ; 
transportation,  arms,  clothing,  artillery,  disci 
pline,  all  were  wanting  :  these  things  required 
time  to  procure  them.  The  generals  in  com 
mand  have  done  their  work  most  creditably  ; 
but  we  are  still  delayed.  I  had  hoped  that 
a  general  advance  could  be  made  during  the 
good  weather  of  December  ;  I  was  mistaken. 
My  wish  was  to  gain  possession  of  the  East- 
em  Tennessee  Railroad  as  a  preliminary 
movement,  — then  to  follow  it  up  immediately 
by  an  attack  on  Nashville  and  Richmond,  as 
nearly  at  the  same  time  as  possible.  I  have 
ever  regarded  our  true  policy  as  being  that  of 
fully  preparing  ourselves,  and  then  seeking 


32 


for  the  most  decisive  results.  I  do  not  wish 
to  waste  life  in  useless  battles,  —  but  I  prefer 
to  strike  at  the  heart.  -.Two  bases  of  opera 
tions  seem  to  present  themselves  for  the  ad 
vance  of  the  Army  of  the  Porornac.  1st. 
That  of  Washington,  its  present  position, 
involving  a  direct  attack  upon  the  intrenched 
positions  of  the  enemy  at  Centreville,  Manas- 
pas,  &c.,  or  else  a  movement  to  turn  one  or 
l)oth  flanks  of  those  positions ;  or  a  combina- 
iion  of  the  two  plans.  The  relative  force  of 
the  two  armies  will  not  justify  an  attack  on 
both  flanks  ;  an  attack  on  his  left  flank  alone 
involves  a  long  line  of  wagon  communication, 
and  cannot  prevent  him  from  collecting  for 
the  decisive  battle  all  the  detachments  now 
on  his  extreme  right  and  left.  Should  we 
attack  his  right  flank  by  the  line  of  the  Occo- 
quan,  and  a  crossing  of  the  Potomac  below 
that  river  and  near  his  batteries,  we  could, 
perhaps,  prevent  the  junction  of  the  enemy's 
right  with  his  centre  (we  might  destroy  the 
former),  we  would  remove  the  obstructions 
to  the  navigation  of  the  Potomac,  reduce  the 
length  of  wagon  transportation  by  establish 
ing  new  depots  at  the  nearest  points  of  the 
Potomac,  and  strike  more  directly  his  main 
railway  communication. 

"  The  fords  of  Occoquan,  below  the  mouth 
of  Bull  Run,  are  watched  by  the  rebels  ;  bat 
teries  are  said  to  be  placed  x>n  the  heights  in 
rear  (c  mcealed  by  the  woods) ,  and  the  ar 
rangement  of  his  troops  is  such  that  he  can 
oppose  some  considerable  resistance  to  a  pas 
sage  of  that  stream.  Information  has  just 
been  received,  to  the  effect  that  the  e«einy 
are  intrenching  a  line  of  heights,  extending 
from  the  vicinity  of  Sangster's  (Union  Mills) 
towards  Evansport.  Early  in  January 
Sprigg's  Ford  was  occupied  by  Gen.  Rhodes 
with  3,600  men  and  eight  guns.  There  are 
strong  reasons  for  believing  that  Davis's  Ford 
is  occupied.  These  circumstances  indicate,  or 
prove,  that  the  enemy  anticipates  the  move 
ment  in  question,  and  is  prepared  to  resist  it. 
Assuming,  for  the  present,  that  this  operation 
i.i  determined  upon,  it  may  be  well  to  exam 
ine  briefly  its  probable  progress.  In  the 
present  state  of  affairs,  our  columns  (for  tho 
movement  of  so  large  a  force  must  be  made 
in  several  columns,  at  least  five  or  six)  can 
i each  the  Accotink  without  danger ;  during 
the  march  thence  to  the  Occoquan,  our  light 
flank  becomes  exposed  to  an  attack  from 
Fairfax  Station,  Sangsters,  and  Union  Mills,' 
this  danger  must  be  met  by  occupying,  in 
some  force,  either  the  two  first-named  places, 
or  better,  the  point  of  junction  of  the  roads 
leading  to  the  village  of  Occoquan.  This 


occupation  must  be  sustained  so  long  as  we 
continue  to  draw  supplies  by  the  roads  from 
this  city,  or  until  a  battle  is  won. 

"The  crossing  of  the  Occoquan  should  be 
made  at  all  the  fords  from  Wolf's  Run  to  the 
mouth,  the  points  of  crossing  not  being  neces 
sarily  confined  to  the  fords  themselves.  Should 
the  enemy  occupy  this  line  in  force  we  must, 
with  what  assistance  the  flotilla  can  afford, 
endeavor  to  force  the  passage,  near  the  mouth, 
thus  forcing  the  enemy  to  abandon  the  whole 
line,  or  be  taken  in  flank  himself. 

"  Having  gained  the  line  of  the  Occoquan,  it 
would  be  necessary  to  throw  a  column,  by  the 
shortest  route,  to  Dumfries,  partly  to  force 
the  enemy  to  abandon  his  batteries  on  the 
Potomac,  partly  to  cover  our  left  flank  against 
an  attack  from  the  direction  of  Acquia,  and, 
lastly,  to  establish  our  communication  with 
!  the  river  by  the  best  roads,  and  thus  give 
'  us  new  depots.  The  enemy  would  by  this 
time  have  occupied  the  line  of  the  Occoquan 
above  Bull  Run,  holding  Brentsvillo  in  the 
force,  and  perhaps  extending  his  lines  some 
what  further  to  the  southwest. 

"  Our  next  step  would  be  to  prevent  the  ene 
my  from  crossing  the  Occoquan  between  Bull 
|  Run  and  the  Broad  Run,  to  fall  upon  cur  right 
flank  while  moving  on  Brentsville.  This 
might  be  effected  by  occupying  Bacon  Race 
Church  and  the  cross-roads  near  the  mouth  of 
Bull  Run,  or  still  more  effectually,  by  moving 
to  the  fords  themselves,  and  preventing  him 
from  debouching  on  our  side. 

' '  These  operations  would  possibly  be  resistr 
ed,  and  it  would  require  some  time  to  effect 
them.  As  nearly  at  the  same  time,  as  pos 
sible,  we  should  gain  the  fords  necessary  to 
our  purposes  above  Broad  Run.  Having  se 
cured  our  right  flank,  it  would  become  nece&- 
sary  to  carry  Brentsville  at  any  cost,  for  we 
could  not  leave  it  between  our  right  flank  and 
the  main  body.  The  final  movement  on  the 
railroad  must  be  determined  by  circumstances 
existing  at  the  time. 

"  This  brief  sketch  brings  out  in  bold  re 
lief  the  great  advantage  possessed  by  the 
enemy  in  the  strong  central  position  he  occu 
pies,  with  roads  diverging  in  every 'direction, 
and  a  strong  line  of  defence,  enabling  him  to 
remain  on  the  defensive,  with  a  small  force 
on  one  flank,  while  he  concentrates  everything 
on  the  other  for  a  decisive  action. 

"  Should  we  place  a  portion  of  our  force  in 
front  of  Centreville,  while  the  rest  crosses  the 
Occoquan,  we  commit  the  error  of  dividing 
our  army  by  a  very  difficult  obstacle,  and  by 
a  distance  too  great  to  enable  the  two  parts 
to  support  each  other,  should  either  be  at- 


33 


tacked  by  the  masses  of  the  enemy,  while 
the  other  is  held  in  check. 

"I  should,  perhaps,  have  dwelt  more  de 
cidedly  on  the  fact  that  the  force  left  near 
Gangster's  must  be  allowed  to  remain  some 
where  on  that  side  of  the  Occoquan  until  the 
decisive  battle  is  over,  so  as  to  cover  our  re 
treat,  in  the  event  of  disaster  :  unless  it  should 
bo  decided  to  select  and  intrench  a  new  base 
somewhere  near  Dumfries,  a  proceeding  in 
volving  much  time. 

'•  After  the  passage  of  the  Occoquan  by 
the  main  army,  this  covering  force  could  be 
drawn  in  to  a  more  central  and  less  exposed 
position,  say  Brimstone  Hill,  or  nearer  the 
Occoquan. 

"  In  this  latitude   the^eather  will,  for  a 
considerable  period,  be  very  uncertain,  and  a  ! 
movement  commenced  in  force  on  roads  in  j 
tolerably  firm  condition,  will  be  liable,  almost  | 
certain  to  be    much   delayed   by   rains  and  ' 
snow.     It  will  therefore  be  next  to  impossi 
ble  to  surprise  the  enemy,  or  take  him  at  a 
disadvantage,    by   rapid  manoeuvres.       Our 
slow  progress  will  enable  him  to  divine  our 
purposes,  and  take  his  measures  accordingly. 
The  probability  is,  from  the  best  information 
we  possess,  that  the  enemy  has  improved  the 
roads  leading  to  his  line  of  defence,  while  we 
will  have  to  work  as  we  advance. 

*'  Bearing  in  mind  what  has  been  said,  and 
the  present  unprecedented  and  impassable 
condition  of  the  roads,  it  will  be  evident  that 
no  precise  period  can  be  fixed  upon  for  the 
movement  on  this- line,  Nor  can  its  duration 
be  closely  calculated ;  it  seems  certain  that 
many  weeks  may  elapse  before  it  is  possible 
to  commence  the  march.  Assuming  the  suc 
cess  of  this  operation,  and  the  defeat  of  the 
enemy  as  certain,  the  question  at  once  arises 
as  to  the  importance  of  the  results  gained.  I 
think  these  results  would  be  confined  to  the 
possession  of  the  field  of  battle,  the  evacua 
tion  of  the  line  of  the  Upper  Potomac  by  the 
enemy,  and  the  moral  effect  of  the  victory  ; 
important  results,  it  is  true,  but  not  decisive 
of  the  war,  nor  securing  the  destruction  of 
the  enemy's  main  army,  for  he  could  fall 
back  upon  other  positions  %nd  fight  us  again 
and  again,  should  the  condition  of  the  troops 
permit.  If  he  is  in  no  condition  to  fight  us 
again  out  of  range  of  the  intrcnchments  at 
.Richmond,  we  would  find  it  a  very  difficult 
and  tedious  matter  to  follow  him  up  there,  for 
he  would  destroy  his  railroad  bridges,  and 
otherwise  impede  our  progress  through  a 
region  where  the  roads  are  as  bad  as  they 
well  can  be,  and  we  would  probably  find  our 
selves  forced,  at  last,  to  change  the  whole 

8 


theatre  of  war,  or  to  seek  a  shorter  land  route 
to  Richmond,  with  a  smaller  available  force, 
and  at  an  expenditure  of  much  more  time 
than  were  we  to  adopt  the  short  line  at  once. 
We  would  also  have  forced  the  enemy  to  con 
centrate  his  forces,  and  perfect  his  measures, 
at  the  very  point  where  it  is  desirable  to  strike 
him  when  least  prepared. 

"  II.  The  second  base  of  operations,  avail 
able  for  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  is  that  of 
the  lower  Chesapeake  Bay,  which  affords  the 
shortest  possible  land  route  to  Richmond,  and 
strikes  directly  at  the  heart  of  the  enemy's 
power  in  the  east. 

"  The  roads  in  that  region  are  passable  at 
all  seasons  of  the  year. 

"  The  country  now  alluded  to  is  much 
more  favorable  for  offensive  operations  than 
that  in  front  of  Washington  (which  is  very 
unfavorable),  much  more  level,  more  cleared 
land,  the  woods  less  dense,  the  soil  more 
sandy,  the  spring  some  two  or  three  weeks 
earlier.  '  A  movement  in  force  on  that  line 
obliges  the  enemy  to  abandon  his  intrenched 
position  at  Manassas,  in  order  to  hasten  to 
cover  Richmond  and  Norfolk.  He  must  do 
this ;  for  should  he  permit  us  to  occupy 
Richmond,  his  destruction  can  be  averted 
only  by  entirely  defeating  us  in  a  battle,  in 
which  he  must  be  the  assailant.  This  move 
ment,  if  successful,  gives  us  the  capital,  the 
communications,  the  supplies  of  the  rebels ; 
Norfolk  would  fall ;  ail  the  waters  of  the  Ches 
apeake  would  be  ours  ;  all  Virginia  would  be 
in  our  power ;  and  the  enemy  forced  to  aban 
don  Tennessee  and  North  Carolina.  The 
alternative  presented  to  the  enemy  would  be, 
to  beat  us  in  a  position  selected  by  ourselves  ; 
disperse  or  pass  beneath  the  Caudine  Forks. 

"  Should  we  be  beaten  in  battle,  we  have 
a  perfectly  secure  retreat  down  the  Penin 
sula  upon  Fort  Monroe,  with  our  flanks  per 
fectly  covered  by  the  fieet.  During  the 
whole  movement  our  flank  is  covered  by  the 
water,  our  right  is  secure,  for  the  reason  that 
the  enemy  is  too  distant  to  reach  us  in  time  ;  • 
lie  can  only  oppose  us  in  front,  we  bring  our 
fleet  in  full  play. 

"After  a  successful  battle,  our  position 
would  be,  —  Burnside  forming  our  left,  Nor 
folk  held  securely,  our  centre  connecting 
Barnside  with  Baell  both  by  Raleigh  and 
Lvnchburg,  Buell  in  Eastern  Tennessee  and 
Northern  Alabama,  Halleck  at  Nashville  and 
Memphis. 

The  next  movement  would  be  to  connect , 
with  Sherman  on  the  left,  by  reducing  Wil 
mington  and    Charleston  :    to  advance  our 
centre  into  South  Carolina  and  Georgia ;  to 


push  Buell,  either  towards  Montgomery,  or  to 
unite  with  the  main  army  in  Georgia;  to 
throw  Halleck  southward  to  meet  the  naval 
expedition  from  New  Orleans. 

"We  should  then  be  in  a  condition  to 
reduce,  at  our  leisure,  all  the  Southern  pea- 
ports  ;  to  occupy  all  the  avenues  of  commu 
nication  ;  to  use  the  great  outlet  of  the  Mis 
sissippi  ;  to  reestablish  our  government  and 
arms  in  Arkansas,  Louisiana,  and  Texas ;  to 
force  the  slaves  to  labor  for  our  subsistence, 
instead  of  that  of  the  rebels ;  to  bid  defiance 
to  all  foreign  interference.  Such  is  the 
•  object  I  ever  had  in  view ;  this  is  the  general 
plan  which  I  hope  to  accomplish. 

"  For  many  long  months  I  have  labored  to 
prepare  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  to  play  its 
part  in  the  programme.  From  the  day  when 
'I  was  placed  in  command  of  all  our  armies, 
I  have  exerted  myself  to  place  all  the  other 
armies  in  such  a  condition,  that  they,  too, 
•could  perform  their  allotted  duties. 

"  Should  it  be  determined  to  operate  from 
the  lower  Chesapeake,  the  point  of  landing 
which  promises  the  most  brilliant  results  is 
Urbana,  on  the  lower  'Rappahannoek.  This 
point  is  easily  reached  by  vessels  of  heavy 
draught ;  it  is  neither  occupied  nor  observed 
by  the  enemy  ;  it  is  but  one  march  from  West 
Point,  the  key  of  that  region  ;  and  thence  but 
two  marches  to  Richmond.  A  rapid  move 
ment  from  Urbana  would  probably  cut  off 
Magrader  in  the  Peninsula,  and  enable  us  to 
occupy  Richmond  before  it  could  be  strongly 
reinforced.  Should  we  fail  in  that,  we  could, 
with  the  cooperation  of  the  navy,  cross  the 
James  and  show  ou>  selves  in  rear  of  Rich 
mond,  thus  forcing  th3  enemy  to  come  out 
and  attack  us ;  for  his  position  ^vould  be 
untenable,  with  us  on  the  southern  bank  of 
the  river. 

tl  Should  circumstances  render  it  not  ad 
visable  to  land  at  Urbana,  we  can  use  Mob 
Jack  Bay ;  or,  the  worst  coming  to  the 
worst,  we  can  take  Fort  Monroe*  as  a  base, 
'  and  operate  with  complete  security,  although 
with  less  celerity  and  brilliancy  of  results,  up 
the  Peninsula. 

' '  To  reach  whatever  point  may  be  selected 
as  a  base,  a  large  amount  of  cheap  water 
transportation  must  be  collected,  consisting 
mainly  of  canal-boats,  barges,  wood-boats, 
schooners,  &c.,  towed  by  small  steamers,  all 
of  a  different  character  from  those  required 
for  all  previous  expeditions.  This  can  cer 
tainly"  be  accomplished  within  thirty  days 
from  the  time  the  order  is  given.  I  propose 
as  the  best  possible  plan  that  can,  in  my 
judgment,  be  adopted,  to  select  Urbana  as 


I  a  landing-place  for  the  first  detachments, 
to  transport  by  water  four  divisions  of 
infantry  with  their  batteries,  the  regular 
infantry,  a  few  wagons,  one  bridge  train,  and 
a  few  squadrons  of  cavalry,  making  the 
vicinity  of  Hooker's  position  the  place  of 
embarkation  for  as  many  as  possible  ;  to 
j  move  the  regular  cavalry  and  reserve  artil 
lery,  the  remaining  bridge  trains  and  wagons 
to  a  point  somewhere  near  Cape  Lookout, 
then  ferry  them  over  the  river  by  means  of 
North  River  ferry-boats,  march  them  over  to 
the  Rappahannoek  (covering  the  movement 
by  an  infantry  force  near  Heathsville),  and  to 
cross  the  Rappahannoek  in  a  siinilar  way. 
The  expense  and  difficulty  of  the  movement 
will  thus  be  very  i^uch  diminished  (a  saving 
of  transportation  of  about  10,000  horses), 
and  the  result  none  the  less  certain. 

"The  concentration  of  the  cavalry,  &c., 
in  the  lower  counties  of  Maryland,  can  be 
effected  without  exciting  suspicion,  and  the 
movement  made  without  delay  from  that 
cause. 

"This  movement,  if  adopted,  will  not  at 
all  expose  the  city  of  Washington  to  danger. 

"  The  total  force  to  be  thrown  upon  the 
new  line  would  be,  according  to  circumstan 
ces,  from  110  to  140,000;  1  hope  to  use  the 
latter  number  by  bringing  fresh  troops  into 
Washington,  and  still  leave  it  quite  safe.  I 
fully  realize  that,  in  all  projects  offered,  time 
will  probably  be  the  most  valuable  considera 
tion.  It  is  my  decided  opinion,  that  in  that 
point  of  view,  the  second  plan  should  be 
adopted.  It  is  possible,  nay  highly  probable, 
that  the  weather  and  state  of  the  roads  may 
be  such  as  to  delay  the  direct  movement  from 
Washington,  with  its  unsatisfactory  results 
and  great  risks  ;  far  beyond  the  time  required 
to  complete  the  second  plan.  In  the  first 
case  we  cati  fix  no  definite  time  for  an 
advance.  The  roads  havd  gone  from  bad  to 
worse  —  nothing  like  their  present  condition 
has  ever  been  known  here  before  —  they  are 
impassable  at  present,  we  are  entiiely  at  the 
mercy  of  the  weather.  It  is  by  no  means 
certain  that  we  can  beat  them  at  Manassas. 
On  the  other  line,  I  regard  success  as  certain 
by  all  the  chances  of  war.  We  demoralize 
the  enemy  by  forcing  him  to  abandon  his  pre 
pared  position  for  one  which  we  have  chosen, 
in  which  all  is  in  our  favor,  and  where  suc 
cess  must  produce  immense  results. 

"  My  judgment,  as  a  general,  is  clearly  in 
favor  of  this  project.  Nothing  is  certain  in 
war,  but  all  the  chances  are  in  favor  of  this 
movement.  So  much  am  I  in  favor  of  the 
southern  line  of  operations,  that  I  would  pre- 


35 


fer  the  move  from  Fort  Monroe  as  a  base  — 
as  a  certain,  though  less  brilliant  movement, 
than  that  from  Urbana  —  to  an  attack  upon 
Manassas. 

"  I  know  that  his  Excellency  the  Presi 
dent,  you  and  I,  all  agree  in  our  wishes,  and 
that  tVeso  wishes  are  to  bring  the  war  to  a 
close,  as  promptly  as  the  means  in  our  pos 
session  will  permit.  I  believe  that  the  mass 
of  the  people  have  entire  coufidence  in  us.  I 
am  sure  of  it.  Let  us  then  look  only  to  the 
great  result  to  be  accomplished,  and  disre 
gard  everything  else.  I  am,  very  respect 
fully,  your  obedient  servant, 

"  G.  B.  McCLELLAN, 
"  Major-General'  Commanding" 

At  the  time  when  this  letter  was  written 
the  Western  armies  of  the  Union  were  already 
in  motion  and,  supported  by  the  gun-boats,  were 
beginning  that  campaign  which,  resulting  in 
tbe  capture  of  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson, 
compelled  the  evacuation  of  Nashville  by  the 
Confederates,  and  led  to  the  bloody  but  inde 
cisive  battles  of  Shiloh  and  Pittsburg  Landing. 
This  movement,  naturally  enough,  excited  the 
public  mind  to  a  still  greater  impatience  with 
what  the  Administration  press  persistently 
represented  as  'the  "unaccountable  delays" 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  still  fur 
ther  indisposed  the  President  to  give  the  com 
mander  of  that  army  the  cordial  support 
which  he  had  a  right  to  expect  from  the 
National  Executive,  and  which  was  absolutely 
necessary  to  the  success  of  its  own  far  more 
important  movements. 

1  Awakening  the  Southern  government  and 
people  to  a  lively  sense  of  the  peril  impend 
ing  over  them,  this  campaign  at  the  West 
accelerated  the  preparations  of  General  John- 
stone  in  Virginia,  for  the  evacuation  of  Manas 
sas,  and  redoubled  his  efforts  to  provide  for  the 
defence  of  the  Confederate  capital  against  any 
attack  from  the  line  of  the  James  or  the 
York  Rivers.  Against  the  loss  of  important 
opportunities  thus  incurred  in  consequence  of 
the  abandonment  of  General  McClellan's 
plan  of  a  general  and  simultaneous  advance, 
must  be  sob,  however,  the  fresh  confidence 
which  the  Western  victories  infused  into 
the  army  of  the  Union,  dispirited  by  the 
defeat  of  Bull  Run.  The  advantages  won 
over  the  enemy  at  Port  Royal  and  at  Roanoke 
Island,  though  not  otherwise  of  any  particu 
lar  importance,  concurred  in  producing  this 
wholesome  effect;  and,  had  the  correspondence 
of  the  beginning  of  February,  between  Gen 
eral  McClellan,  the  President,  and  the  Secre 
tary  of  War,  brought  about  a  frank  concession 


to  the  General  of  the  powers  necessary  to 
enable  him  to  act  with  freedom  and  with  force, 
great  results  might  still  have  been  secured. 

This,  however,  was  very  far  from  being  the 
case.  Mr.  Lincoln,  indeed,  gave  way  so  far 
as  to  permit  General  McClellan  to  endeavor 
to  proceed  with  the  necessary  arrangements 
for  opening  his  campaign  from  the  Lower 
Chesapeake,  but  it  was  not  until  the  27th  of 
February  that  the  Secretary  of  War  author 
ized  the  Assistant-Secretary,  Mr.  Tucker,  tc 
procure  the  transports  and  steamers  for  mov 
ing  the  forces  to  their  new  field  of  operations. 
Notwithstanding  the  urgent  representations 
of  General  McClellan  and  of  Mr.  Tucker, 
nothing  had,  before,  this  date,  been  permitted 
to  be  done  towards  accomplishing  this  vital 
preliminary  work  ;  and  it  is  worthy  of  notice 
by  all  those  who  have  thoughtlessly  and 
ignorantly  lent  themselves  to  the  outcry 
which  partizanship  has  raised  over  the  alleged 
''slowness"  o*f  General  McClellan's  move 
ments,  that  in  thirty-seven  days  from  the  time 
when  the  Government  at  last  put  the  General 
at  liberty  to  set  about  preparing  his  transpor 
tation,  he  had  moved,  with  the  assistance  of 
Mr.  Tucker,  his  whole  army  of 


121,500  men, 
14,552  animals, 
1.150  wagons, 


44  batteries, 
74  ambulances, 


together  with  pontoon  bridges,  telegraph  mate 
rials,  and  the  enormous  quantity  of  equipage, 
luggage,  and  the  like  required  for  a  force  of 
this  magnitude,  from  Washington  to  Fortress 
Monroe. 

This  was  done  with  the  loss  of  but  eight 
mules  and  nine  barges,  which  latter  went 
ashore  at  near  Fortress  Monroe  in  a  gale,  — 
the  cargoes,  however,  being  saved. 

Well  may  Mr.  Tucker  claim  for  this  extraor 
dinary  achievement  that,  "for  economy  and 
celerity  of  movement,  this  expedition  is  with 
out  a  parallel  on  record." 

While  General  McClellan  was  superintend 
ing  and  carrying  out  this  colossal  movement 
he  was  not,  however,  suffered  to  be  entirely 
his  own  master,  nor  was  he  delivered  from  the 
torment  of  the  Presidential  plan  of  campaign. 
His  own  conduct,  during  this  trying  time,  is 
admirably  depicted  by  an  observer  whose 
competency  and  whose  candor  no  man  of 
intelligence  and  of  character  will  be  likely  to 
dispute.  The  Prince  de  Joinville,  an  edu 
cated  and  accomplished  military  man,  whose 
sole  interest  in  the  events  passing  before  his 
eyes,  beyond  that  of  a  deep  and  cordial  sym 
pathy  with  the  cause  of  the  Union,  is  that  of 
a  student  of  the  political  and  military  history 


36 


of  his  times,  thus  describes  the  position  and 
Hie  bearing  of  General  McClellan,  during  the 
months  of  February  and  March,  1862. 

"  As  the  day  of  action  drew  near,  those  who 
suspected  the  General's  project,  and  were 
angry  at  not  being  informed  of  it;  those 
whom  his  promotion  had  excited  to  envy ;  his 
political  enemies  (who  is  without  them  in 
America  ?  ) ,  in  short,  all  those  beneath  him 
or  beside  him  who  wished  him  ill,  broke  out 
into  a  chorus  of  accusations  of  slowness,  in 
action,  incapacity.  McClellan,  with  a  patri 
otic  courage  which  I  have  always  admired, 
disdained  these  accusations,  and  made  no 
reply.  He  satisfied  himself  with  pursuing 
his  preparations  in  laborious  silence." 

On  the  8th  of  March,  while  these  prepara 
tions,  as  we  have  seen,  were  going  rapidly 
forward,  and  at  a  moment  when  the  complet- 
est  freedom  and  the  profoundest  secrecy  in 
regard  to  his  movements  were  essential  to  the 
General's  success,  he  was  suddenly  sent  for 
by  the  President  to  learn  that  the  whole  mat 
ter  must  once  more  be  reconsidered  and  de 
bated.  He  had  already  been  interrupted  in 
the  progress  of  the  arrangements,  begun  on 
the  27th  of  February,  by  the  importunities 
of  the  President  and  the  Secretary  of  War, 
that  he  would  secure  the  line  of  the  Baltimore 
and  Ohio  Railroad,  and  clear  the  Potomac 
River  of  the  rebel  batteries.  In  respect  to 
the  former,  General  McClellan  fully  showed, 
what  events  have  since  a  thousand  times  con 
firmed,  that  the  true  defence  of  the  Baltimore 
and  Ohio  Railroad  lay  in  the  occupation  of  the 
Shenandoah,  an  occupation  which  his  army, 
upon  the  eve  of  a  great  expedition,  was  not 
then  in  a  condition  to  effect,  for  which  it  was 
the  duty  of  the  President,  now  proclaimed 
by  himself  to  be  Commander-in-Chief,  to  pro 
vide,  and  which,  in  spite  of  repeated  lessons, 
the  President  has  never  since  intelligently 
attempted  to  carry  out. 

In  respect  to  the  rebel  batteries  on  the 
Potomac,  established  as  they  all  of  them 
were  independently  of  the  rebel  base  at 
Manassas,  it  had  been  long  settled  by  the 
report  of  General  Barnard,  that  their  estab 
lishment  "could  not  be  prevented  by  .the 
army."  It  was  by  the  navy  alone  that  the 
liver  could  be  cleared  of  them,  unless  the 
whole  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  to  be  em 
ployed  in  the  task  by  "forcing,"  to  use  the 
words  of  General  Barnard,  "  a  very  strong  line 
of  defence  of  the  enemy,  and  doing  all  that 
it  would  have  to  do  if  it  were  really  opening 
a  campaign  against  them." 

The  President,  however,  kept  insisting  upon 
this  latter  operation,  and  General  McClellan, 


on  the  8th  of  March,  1862,  called  his  divis 
ional  commanders  into  council  at  head-quar 
ters,  at  the  request  of  the  President,  for  the 
purpose  of  discussing  with  them  a  movement 
towards  the  Occoquan  upon  the  enemy's  river 
batteries.  At  this  council  the  grand  ulterior 
movement  to  the  Lower  Chesapeake  was  ne 
cessarily  revealed.  Upon  the  consequences 
of  this  revelation,  thus  directly  forced  upon 
General  McClellan  by  the  conduct  of  his 
"  Commander-in-Chief,"  the  President,  the 
Prince  de  Joinville  simply,  but  with  a  terrible 
significance,  remarks :  — 

"  McClellan  was  then  forced  to  explain  his 
projects,  and  the  next  day  they  were  known 
to  the  enemy ;  informed,  no  doubt,  by  one  of 
those  thousand  female  spies  who  keep  up  his 
communications  into  the  domestic  circles  of 
the  Federal  enemy,  Johnstone  evacuated  Ma 
nassas  at  once." 

Watchful  as  Johnstone  had  all  the  winter 
been  of  the  young  commander,  the  value  of 
whose  silent  and  patient  preparations  he  com 
prehended  far  better  than  the  petulant  and 
headstrong  politicians  by  whom  General  Mc 
Clellan  was  surrounded,  this  timely  notice 
enabled  him  to  reach  Richmond,  and  to  con 
centrate  his  attention  and  his  forces  upon  the 
Peninsular  defences  of  that  capital  a  month 
before  the  Federal  commander  was  suffered  to 
assume  the  initiative  of  his  campaign. 

Memorable  indeed,  on  many  accounts,  was 
this  ominous  eighth  day  of  March,  1862. 

On  the  8th  of  March  General  McClellan 
was  compelled,  as  we  have  seen,  to  make  his 
plan  of  campaign  known  far  beyond  what  hae 
ever  been  esteemed  proper  or  prudent  in  the 
annals  of  war. 

On  the  8th  of  March  another  blow  was 
struck  at  his  control  of  the  army  with  which 
he  was  to  operate,  in  the  publication  by  the 
President,  again  without  consultation  with 
himself,  of  two  more  "  General  War  Orders." 

The  first  of  these  divided  his  army  into 
arjny  corps,  and  assigned  to  these  corps  their 
several  commanders,  thus  practically  taking 
out  of  General  McClellau's  hands  the  organ 
ization  of  his  troops.  The  second  tied  up 
anew  his  whole  campaign  in  the  following 
almost  inconceivable  manner  :  — 


"  EXECUTIVE  MANSION,  WASHINGTON,  ) 
"  March  8,  1862.         j 

"  PRESIDENT'S  GENERAL  WAR  ORDER,  No.  3. 

"  Ordered,  That  no  change  of  the  base  of 
operations  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  shall 
be  made  without  leaving  in  and  about  Wash 
ington  such  a  force  as,  in  the  opinion  of  the 


37 


General-in-Chief  and  the  commanders  of  army 
corps,  shall  leave  said  city  entirely  secure. 

"  That  no  more  than  two  army  corps  (about 
fifty  thousand  troops)  of  said  Army  of  the  Po 
tomac  shall  be  moved  en  route  for  a  new  base 
of  operations  until  the  navigation  of'  the  Po 
tomac,  from  Washington  to  the  Chesapeake 
Bay,  shall  be  freed  from  the  enemy's  batteries 
and  other  obstructions,  or  until  the  President 
shall  hereafter  give  express  permission. 

"  That  any  movement,  as  aforesaid ,  en  route 
for  a  new  base  of  operations,  which  may  be 
ordered  by  the  General-in-Chief,  and  which 
may  be  intended  to  move  upon  the  Chesapeake 
Bay,  shall  begin  to  move  upon  the  bay  as 
early  as  the  18th  of  March  instant,  and  the 
General-in-Chief  shall  be  responsible  that  it  so 
moves  as  early  as  that  day. 

"  Ordered,  That  the  army  and  navy  co 
operate  in  an  immediate  effort  to  capture  the 
enemy's  batteries  upon  the  Potomac,  between 
Washington  and  the  Chesapeake- Bay. 

"  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
"L.  Thomas,  Adft  Gen" 

By  the  promulgation  of  his  General  AVar 
Order  No.  1,  the  President  had  assumed  the 
command  of  all  the  armies  of  the  Union.  By 
the  promulgation  of  this  "  Order  No.  3  "  he 
assumed  the  command  of  the  campaign  of  the 
Potomac. 

A  single  comment  upon  one  single  clause 
of  this  "Order"  will  suffice  to  show  the 
knowledge  of  military  affairs,  and  the  respect 
for  the  feelings  towards  General  McClellan 
himself,  which  presided  over  its  composition. 
The  "  General-in-Chief,"  as  General  Mc 
Clellan  is  derisively  entitled,  ,is  made  "re 
sponsible  "  for  the  readiness  of  his  army  "  to 
move  upon  the  Bay  as  early  as  the  1 8th  of 
March." 

Now  it  will  be  remembered  that  the  araiy 
could  "move  upon  the  Bay"  only  by  the 
help  of  steamers  and  transports;  that  the 
President  had  never  consented  to  any  "  move 
ment  upon  the  Bay  "  at  all  until  the  middle 
of  February,  there  being  at  that  time  no 
transport  service  whatever  available  on  the 
Potomac  ;  and  that  the  Secretary  of  War  had 
never  authorized  the  establishment  of  a  trans 
port  service  until  the  27th 'of  February,  or 
less  than  ten  days  before  the  publication  of 
this  "  Order  "  which  thus  called  upon  Gen 
eral  McClellan  to  create,  within  twenty  days, 
the  complete  sea  transportation  service  neces 
sary  for  an  army  as  large  as  that  with  which 
the  Allies  first  invaded  the  Crimea  ! 

On  the  8th  of  March,  again,  the  Merrimac 
making  her  appearance  suddenly  from  the  port 


of  Norfolk,  —  in  which,  as  had  been  known 
for  months  to  the  Federal  Navy  Department, 
she  had  been  raised  from  the  bottom,  refitted 
and  equipped  for  a  new  and  terrible  experi 
ment  in  naval  warfare,  —  assailed  the  Federal 
fleet  lying  in  those  waters,  scattered  and  dis 
comfited  the  ships,  and,  for  the  moment,  rode 
supreme  over  the  lower  James. 

The  engagement  which  took  place  the  next 
day  between  the  Merrimac  and  the  Monitor, 
thougji  it  recovered  the  prestige  of  the  Fed 
eral  navy,  and  secured  the  safety  of  Fortress 
Monroe,  failed  to  establish  the  power  of  the 
Naval  Department  to  control  the  James 
River.  General  McClellan  was  thus  com 
pelled  to  modify  the  plans  of  his  campaign, 
upon  the  calculation  that  the  York  River  alone 
must  make  his  line  of  water  communication 
with  his  base  at  Fortress  Monroe. 

On  the  9th  of  March  Johnstone  began  to 
evacuate  Manassas  and  Centreville.  During 
the  night  of  that  day  General  McClellan  or 
dered  a  general  movement  of  the  army  towards 
the  enemy's  abandoned  positions,  less,  of 
course,  with  the  hope  of  being  able  to  inflict 
any  serious  loss  upon  him,  than  in  order  to  pre 
pare  the  troops  for  their  entry  upon  the  great 
campaign  before  them.  The  observations  which 
this  movement  enabled  the  General  to  make 
of  the  strength  of  the  enemy's  position  con 
firmed  him  in  the  double  belief  that  an  advance 
upon  those  positions,  during  the  winter,  would 
have  been  extremely  dangerous  to  the  untried 
army  of  the  Union,  and  that  they  had  been 
held  so  long  only  that  Johnstone  might  ascer 
tain  distinctly  from  what  quarter  Richmond 
was  likely  to  be  menaced.  General  McClellan's 
own  language  on  this  subject *has  acquired  a 
weight,  from  the  subsequent  course  of  events, 
which  demands  its  reproduction  here  :  — 

"  New  levies  that  have  never  been  in  battle 
cannot  be  expected  to  advance  without  cover 
under  the  murderous  fire  from  such  defences, 
and  carry  them  by  assault.  This  is  work  in 
which  veteran  trdops  frequently  falter,  and 
are  repulsed  with  loss.  That  an  assault  of 
the  enemy's  positions  in  front  of  Washington, 
with  the  new  troops  composing  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  during  the  winter  of  1861-'2, 
would  have  resulted  in  defeat  and  demoral 
ization,  was  too  probable.  The  same  army, 
though  inured  to  war  in  many  battles  hartley 
fought  and  bravely  won,  has  thrice,  under 
other  generals,  suffered  such  disasters  as  it 
was  no  excess  of  prudence  then  to  avoid. 

"  My  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  dated 
February  3,  1862,  and  given  above,  ex 
pressed  the  opinion  that  the  movement  to  the 
Peninsula  would  compel  the  enemy  to  retire 


38 


from  his  position  at  Mauassas,  and  free  Wash 
ington  from  danger. 

"  When  the  enemy  first  learned  of  that  plan, 
they  did  thus  evacuate  Manassas.  During 
tho  Peninsular  campaign,  as  at  no  former  pe 
riod,  northern  Virginia  was  completely  in  our 
possession,  and  the  vicinity  of  Washington 
free  from  the  presence  of  the  enemy.  The 
ground  so  gained  was  not  lost,  nor  Washing 
ton  again  put  in  danger,  until  the  enemy 
learned  of  the  orders  for  an  evacuation  of  the 
Peninsula,  sent  to  me  at  Harrison's  Bar,  and 
were  again  left  free  to  advance  northward, 
and  menace  the  National  Capital.  Perhaps  no 
one  now  doubts  that  the  best  defence  of 
Washington  is  a  Peuinsula  attack  on  Rich 
mond." 

While  this  movement  on  Centre ville  and 
Manassas  was  going  on,  another  complete  and 
formal  change  in  the  organization  of  the  army 
was  made  by  the  President,  the  order  making 
it,  like  so  many  preceding  orders,  being  pub 
lished  without  consultation  with  General  Mc- 
Clellan,  and  coming  this  time  ,tp  his  knowledge 
through  one  of  his  aids-de-camp,  who,  having 
seen  it  in  the  National  Intelligencer  of  March 
12,  1862,  telegraphed  a  copy  of  it  to  the 
General  at  Fairfax  Court  House. 

The  Order  ran  as  follows  :  — 

"  EXECUTIVE  MANSION, 
"  WASHINGTON,  March  11, 1862. 

"Presidents  War  Order,  No.  3. 

"  Major-General  McClellan,  having  person 
ally  taken  the  field,  at  the  head  of  the  army 
of  the  Potomac,  until  otherwise  ordered,  he 
is  relieved  from  the  command  of  the  other 
military  departments,  he  retaining  command 
of  the  Department  of  the  Potomac. 

*'  Ordered,  further,  That  the  departments, 
now  under  the  respective  commands  of  Gen 
erals  Halleck  and  Hunter,  together  with  so 
much  of  that  under  General  Buell  as  lies 
west  of  a  north  and  south  line  indefinitely 
drawn  through  Knoxville,  Tennessee,  be  con 
solidated  and  designated  the  Department  of 
the  Mississippi,  and  that  until  otherwise 
ordered,  Major-General  Halleck  have  com 
mand  of  said  department. 

"  Ordered,  also,  Jhat  the  country  west  of 
the  Department  of  the  Mississippi  be  a  mili 
tary  department,  to  be  called  the  Mountain 
^Department,  and  that  the  same  be  com 
manded  by  Major-General  Fremont. 

"  That  all  the  commanders  of  the  depart 
ments,  after  the  receipt  of  this  order  by  them, 
respectively  report,  severally  and  directly,  to 
the  Secretary  of  War,  and  that  prompt,  full, 


aad  frequent  reports  will  be  expected  of  all 
and  each  of  them. 

"  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN." 

When  it  is  remembered  that  the  President 

had  permitted  General   McClellan  to  "take 

the  field  "  two  days  before  this  order  was 

issued,  without  the  slightest  intimation  that 

any  such  change  in  the  organization  of,  thu 

army  was  contemplated ,    it  would  certainly 

\  seem  to  be   unnecessary  to    look  elsewhere 

j  than   to  the  habitual   state  of  mind  of  the 

I  Chief  Executive  of  the  nation  for  an  adequate 

!  explanation  of  the  "unaccountable  delays," 

|  disappointments,  and  deceptions  which  have 

unhappily   marked    the   course  of   the  war 

under  Mr.  Lincoln's  administration  oF  affairs. 

General   McClellan  met  this   fresh   blow 

with  his  usual  fortitude  and  patience. 

On  the  10th  of  August,  1861,  being  appeal 
ed  to  by  Mr.  Lincoln  to  "withdraw,''  a  letter 
addressed,  at  his  own  request,  to  General 
Scott,  on  the  subject  of  the  then  imminent 
peril  of  Washington,  General  McClellan  had 
replied :  — 

""WASHINGTON,  Aug.  10,  1SC1. 

"  The  letter  addressed  by  me  under  dato 
of  the  8th  inst.  to  Lieutenant-General  Scott, 
commanding  the  United  States  Army,  was 
designed  to  be  a  plain  and  respectful  expres 
sion  of  my  views  of  the  measures  demanded 
for  the  safety  of  the  Government  in  the  immi 
nent  peril  that  besets  it  at  the  present  hour. 
Every  moment's  reflection  and  every  fact 
transpiring,  convinced  me  of  the  urgent  neces 
sity  of  the  measures  there  indicated,  and  'I 
felt  it  my  duty  to  him  and  to  the  country  to 
communicate  them  frankly.  It  is  therefore 
with  great  pain  that  I  have  learned  from  you, 
this  morning,  that  my  views  do  not  meet 
with  the  approbation  of  the  Lieutenant-Gen 
eral,  and  that  my  letter  is  unfavorably  regard 
ed  by  him.  The  command  with  which  I  am 
entrusted  was  not  sought  by  me,  and  has  onlv 
been  accepted  from  an  earnest  and  humble 
desire  to  serve  my  country  in  the  moment  of 
the  most  extreme  peril.  With  these  views  T 
am  willing  to  do  and  suffer  whatever  may  be 
required  for  that  service.  Nothing  could  bo 
farther  from  my  wishes  than  to  seek  any  com 
mand  or  urge  any  measures  not  required  for 
the  exigency  of  the  occasion,  and,  above  all, 
I  would  abstain  from*  any  conduct  that  could 
give  offence  to  General  Scott  or  embarass  the 
President  or  any  department  of  the  Govern 
ment. 

"  Influenced  by  these  considerations,  I 
yield  to  your  request,  and  withdraw  the  letter 


39 


referred  to.  The  Government  and  my  supe 
rior  officer  Toeing  apprised  of  what  I  consider 
to  be  necessary  and  proper  for  the  defence  of 
the  National  Capital,  I  shall  strive  faithfully 
«;nd  zealously  to  employ  the  means  that  may 
be  placed  in  my  power  for  that  purpose,  dis- 
r.iWing  every  personal  feeling  or  considera 
tion,  and  praying  only  the  blessing  of  Divine 
Providence  on  my  efforts. ' ' 

In  the  same  temper  of  single-minded  devo 
tion  to  the  duty  which  he  had  undertaken, 
General  McCleilan  now  wrote  to  the  Presi 
dent,  who  was  so  recklessly  and  so  wilfully 
trifling  with  the  gravest  military  interests  of 
the  nation,  — 

"  I  believe  I  said  to  you  some  weeks  since, 
in  connection  with  some  western  matters, 
that  no  feeling  of  self-interest  or  ambition 
should  ever  prevent  me  from  devoting  myself 
to  the  service.  I  am  glad  to  have  the  oppor 
tunity  to  prove  it,  and  you  will  find  that, 
under  frequent  circumstances,  I  shall  walk 
just  as  cheerfully  as  before,  and  that  no  con 
sideration  of  self  will  in  any  manner  inter 
fere  with  the  discharge  of  my  public  duties/' 

The  way  seemed*  now  to  be  cleared  at 
last  for  the  grand  movement  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  against  Richmond  by  the 
route  upon  which  its  commander  had  fixed. 

The  line  of  the  Rappahanriock  and  the 
Manassas  Gap  Railway  were  left  secure  from 
all  important  menace  by  the  enemy,  and  a 
council  of  generals  being  held  at  Fairfax 
Court  IJouse,  March  lo,  1862,  it  was 
agreed  that  if  the  Merrimac  could  be  neu 
tralized  aad  the  transportation  arrangements 
speedily  completed,  the  operations  against 
Richmond,  from  Fortress  Monroe,  should  be 
at  once  commenced.  The  proceedings  of  this 
council  were  submitted  to  the  President,,  by 
whom  they  were  approved,  upon  condition 
that  Washington  should  be  entirely  secured, 
and  Manassas  Junction  occupied  in  suffi 
cient  force.  General  Banks  was  accordingly 
charged  by  General  McCleilan  with  the  occu- 
});u:o!i  of  Manassas  Junction,  and  the  defences 
of  Washington  were  put  under  the  command 
of  General  Wadsworth. 

At  this  time  General  "Stonewall  Jack 
son  "  was  at  Winchester,  from  which  on  the 
12th  of  March,  he  retreated  upon  the  advance 
of  General  Shields,  and  a  brief  campaign  in 
the  Valley  of  .the  Shenandoah  followed,  with 
such  results  as,  had  that  Valley  continued  to 
form  a  part  of  General  McClellan's  com 
mand,  and  had  the  instructions  given  by  him 
to  General  Banks  been  carried  out,  would  have 
enabled  the  Union  forces  completely  to  clear 
the  country  of  the  enemy. 


But  the  Valley  of  the '  Shenandoah  was 
comprised  by  the  President  in  a  new  Moun 
tain  Department,  created  by  him  at  the  re 
quest  of  the  political  friends  of  General  Fre 
mont,  and  the  lamentable  events  which  speed 
ily  signalized  that  portion  of  the  theatre  of 
the  war  have  no  further  connection  with  the 
grand  campaign  of  General  McCleilan  than 
the  sinister  influence  which  they  exercised 
upon  its  fortunes,  and  for  which  the  Presi 
dent  alone  must  be  held  finally  responsible. 

For  the  defence  of  Washington,  General 
McCleilan  left  a  force  in  all  amounting  to 
67.428  men  and  85  pieces  of  light  artillery. 
His  dispositions  taken  for  the  safety  of 
the  Capital  being  fully  known  to  the  Pres 
ident  and  the  (Secretary  of  War,  General 
McCleilan  was  permitted  by  them  to  de 
part  on  his  way  to  the  seat  of  operations 
with  the  fully  implied  understanding  tint 
these  dispositions  were  satisfactory  not  to  him 
self  alone,  but  to  them.  On  the  day  after  his 
departure,  however,  the  President  submitted 
these  dispositions  to  two  subordinate  gen 
erals,  to  be  by  them  revised  and  passed 
upon,  and  upon  their  report  proceeded  to 
detach  from  the  grand  expeditionary  army, 
and  to  detain  at  Washington  no  less  than 
fifty  thousand  men,  forming  one  full  third  of 
the  force  upon  which  General  McCleilan  had 
been  suffered  to  count  not  only  in  preparing 
his  plan  of  operations,  but  in  actually  com 
mencing  his  movement  against  the  enemy. 
Had  the  President,  in  taking  this  step,  been 
acting  under  direct  instructions  from  the  War 
Office  at  Richmond,  he  could  not  have  more 
effectually  forwarded  the  purposes  of  the  ene 
my.  Restrained  by  the  conventional  pro 
prieties  of  his  position,  General  McClellan 
contents  himself  with  describing  it,  in  his  offi 
cial  report,  as  a  "fatal  error."  It  was  in 
truth  "  a  fatal  error;  "  but  the  circumstances 
attending  a  similar  step  which  had  been  taken, 
by  the  President  a  few  days  befoie,  upon  the 
eve  of  General  MeCIellan's  departure,  will 
abundantly  justify  the  use  of  sterner  lan 
guage  from  unofficial  lips. 

The  division  of  General  Blenker,  10,000 
strong,  had  been  attached  to  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  during  the  whole  time  of  the  prepa-. 
rations  for  the  Peninsular  campaign.  ' '-  A  few 
days  before  sailing  for  Fortress  Monroe," 
says  General  McClellan,  in  his  Report,  "while 
still  encamped  near  Alexandria,  I  met  the 
President  by  appointment,  on  a  steamer,  if  3 
then  informed  me  that  he  had  been  strc  ngly 
pressed  to  take  General  Blenker's  fli.v'.sion. 
from  my  command  and  give  it  to  U(  i^iirl 
Fremont.  His  Excellency  was  good  enough* 


40 


to  suggest  several  reasons  for  not  taking 
Blenker's  division  from  me.  I  assented  to 
the' force  of  his  suggestions,  and  was  extreme 
ly  gratified  by  his  decision  to  allow  the  divis 
ion  to  remain  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 
It  was  therefore  with  surprise  that  I  received, 
on  the  31st,  the  "following  note  :  — 
J 

" '  EXECUTIVE  MANTSIOX, 
"  'WASHINGTON,  March  31,  18ii2. 

"  'MAJOR- GENERAL  MCCLELLAII, — 

"  (  MY  DEAR  SIR  :  This  morning  I  felt 
constrained  to  order  Blenker's  division  to 
Fremont ;  and  I  write  this  to  assure  you  that 
I  did  so  with  great  pain,  understanding  that 
you  would  wish  it  otherwise.  If  you  could 
know  the  full  pressure  of  the  case,  I  an  con 
fident  you  would  justify  it,  even  beyond  a 
mere  acknowledgment,  that  the  Commandei- 
in-Chief  may  order  what  be  pleases. 
"  '  Yours,  very  truly, 

"  *  A.  LINCOLN." 

"  To  this  I  replied,  in  substance,  that  I 
regretted  the  order,  and  could  ill  afford  to  lose 
10,000  troops  which  had  been  counted  upon 
in  forming  rny  plan  of  campaign  ;  but  as  there 
was  no  remedy,  I  would  yield  and  do  the  best 
I  could  without  them.  In  a  conversation 
with  the  President  a  few  hours  afterwards,  I 
repeated  verbally  the  same  thing,  and  express 
ed  my  regret  that  Blenker's  division  had 
been  given  to  Fremont,  from  any  '  pressure,' 
other  than  the  requirements  of  the  national 
exigency.  I  was  partially  relieved,  however, 
by  the  President's  positive  and  emphatic  assur 
ance  that  I  might  leave,  confident  that  no 
more  troops  beyond  these  10,000  should,  in 
any  event,  be  taken  from  me,  or  in  any  way 
detached  from  my  command.' ' 

What  the  "  full  pressure  of  the  case  "  was  to 
which  the  President  thus  confidently  alludes, 
as  his  justification  for  an  act  at  once  insulting 
and  unjust  to  the  Commander  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  to  that  army  itself,  and  to 
the  whole  country,  whose  dearest  interests  it 
imperilled ;  we  may  learn  now  from  the  best 
'    authority.     In  bis  "Life  of  President  Lin 
coln,"  Mr.  Raymond  carelessly  informs  us 
t  *that  this  thing  was  done  "  out  of  deference  of 
«  the  importunities  of  General  Fremont  and  his 
friends,  and  from  a  belief  that   this  officer 
could  make  a  good  use  of  a  larger  force  than 
he  then  had  at  his  command  in  the  Mountain 
Department." 

The  bitterest  opponent  of  Mr  Lincoln  and 
of  his  Administration  may  vainly  ransack 
the  vocabulary  of  contempt  for  phrases  which 
shall  intensify  the  terrible,  though  unconscious, 


sarcasm  of  this  bland  and  indifferent  para 
graph.  It  will  stand  upon  the  record  of  our 
times  forever  in  melancholy,  but  irrefragable, 
proof  that  the  leader  of  the  finest  army  which 
the  Union  had  ever  sent  into  battle,  went 
forth  upon  the  most  important  campaign  of 
the  war  for  the  Union  at  the  mercy  of  a 
"  Commander-in-Chief  "whose  profound  igno 
rance  of  the  military  art  was  only  equalled 
by  his  boundless  confidence  in  his  own  genius 
for  war,  and  whose  inability  to  comprehend  the 
relative  importance  of  different  operations  in 
the  field  was  only  less  conspicuous  than  his  ' 
subservience  to  political  terrorism,  and  to  the 
lowest  considerations  of  personal  expediency 
in  the  Cabinet. 

So  vital  is- a  distinct  understanding  of  this 
fact  to  the  just  comprehension  of  all  the  sub 
sequent  events  of  the  campaign  of  the  Penin 
sula,  that  we  may  well  pause  at  this  point  of 
our  narrative  long  enough  to  fix  the  truth 
clearly  in  the  reader's  mind. 

We  have  already  seen  that,  while  General 
McClellan  has  been  commonly  represented  as 
having  been  in  command  of  the  armies  of 
the  Union  for  the  greater*  part  of  a  year,  he, 
in  truth,  occupied  that  position  for  a  little 
more  than  two  months.  All  the  details  of 
the  practical  organization  of  the  vast  force 
contributed  by  the  patriotism  of  the  people 
to  the  policy  of  the  President  were,  indeed, 
confided  to  him.  He  was  charged  with  these 
serious,  exhausting,  and  important,  but  obscme 
duties  from  the  moment  when  he  appeared  at 
Washington  upon  the  Macedonian  cry  of  the 
paralyzed  and  panic-stricken  Cabinet  in  July, 

1861,  down  to  the  time  of  his  departure  for 
the  Peninsula.     But  the  formal  authority  to 
plan   and  direct  the  great  campaigns  of  the 
army  was  committed  to  him  on  the  first  of 
November,  1861,  and  was  withdrawn  from 
him    again    before   the   middle  of  January, 

1862,  by  the  President,  whose  idea  of  the 
whole  duty  of  the  military  head  of  the  State 
is  happily  summed  up  in  his  own  phrase,  that 
"the  Commander-in-Chief  may  direct  what 
ever  he  pleases." 

Upon  resuming  the  absolute  control  of  all 
tho  forces,  the  President  proceeded  to  debate 
plans  of  campaign  with  the  commanding  gon- 
/eral,  suspendii.g  the  necessary  preparations 
for  the  most  vital  operations  of  the  war  until 
he  had  convinced  himself  by  the  verdict  of  a 
jury  of  twelve  officers,  that  his  own  notions 
of  the  wise  and  practicable  in  war  were  not 
absolutely  better  and  more  profound  than 
those  of  the  young  chieftain,  of  whom  Gen 
eral  Scott,  even  at  a  moment  when  the  retiring 
veteran  imagined  that  he  had  reasons  to  be 


41 


offended  with  his  rising  junior,  had  felt  him 
self  obliged  to  say  that  he  possessed  "  very 
high  qualifications  for  military  command." 

When  at  last  the  President  somewhat  un 
graciously  made  up  his  mind  not  to  insist 
upon  moving  the  army  into  the  field  by  the 
unassisted  light  of  nature,  he  resolved  that 
his  own  genius  should  still  determine  the 
form  in  which  that  army  should  move ;  and 
revolving  this  weighty  matter  in  the  recesses 
of  his  own  mind,  he  took  such  order  upon  it, 
as,  on  three  successive  occasions,  completely 
modified  all  the  conditions  of  the  tremendous 
problem  which  General  McClellan  was  work 
ing  out,  at  the  most  critical  moments  for  the 
successful  solution  of  that  problem. 

And  this  not  by  any  means  in  exclusive  obe 
dience  to  such  purely  military  inspirations  as 
may  be  supposed  to  have  boon  vouchsafed  to 
a  "  Commandcr-in-Chief  who  could  direct 
whatever  he  pleased,"  but  under  the  pressure 
of  strictly  political  considerations,  utterly  and 
fatally  foreign  to  the  stern  and  serious  busi 
ness  in  hand.  o 

How  these  considerations  affected  the 
a-'.nonnt  of  the  forces  dispensable  by  General 
McClellan  for  his  campaign,  Mr.  Lincoln's 
friendly  biographer,  Mr.  Raymond,  has  al 
ready  shown  us.  From  the  same  source  we 
derive  the  following  light  upon  the  scarcely 
less  important  conclusions  which  the  President 
suddenly  sprang  upon  the  commander  of  the 
troops,  in  relation  to  the  division  of  his  army 
into  army  corps,  and  to  the  assignment  of  va 
rious  general  ofiicers  to  the  command  of  those 
corps. 

Mr.  Raymond  favors  us  with  the  following 
letter,  "never  before,"  as  he  says,  "made 
public,"  upon  this  subject :  — 

"FORTRESS  MONROE,  May  9,  1S62. 

"  MY  DEAR  SIR  :  I  have  just  assisted  the 
Secretary  of  War  in  forming  the  part  of  a 
dispatch  to  you,  relating  to  army  corps, 
which  dispatch,  of  course,  will  have  reached 
you  long  before  this  will.  I  wish  to  say  a 
f .'W  words  to  you  privately  on  this  subject. 
I  ordered  the  army  corps  organization  not  only 
on  the  unanimous  opinion  of  the  twelve  gen 
erals  of  division,  but  also  on  the  unanimous 
opinion  of  every  military  man  I  could  get  an 
opinion  from,  and  every  modern  military 
book,  yourself  only  excepted.  Of  course  I 
did  not,  on  my  own  judgment,  pretend  to  un 
derstand  the  subject-.  I  now  think  it  indis 
pensable  for  you  to  know  how  your  struggle 
against  it  is  received  in  quarters  which  we 
cannot  entirely  disregard.  It  is  looked  upon 
as  merely  an  effort  to  pamper  one  or  two  pets, 


and  to  persecute  and  degrade  their  supposed 
rivals.  I  have  had  no  word  from  Sumner, 
Heintzelman,  orKeyes.  The  commanders  of 
these  corps  are  of  course  the  three  highest 
ofiicers  with  you,  but  I  am  constantly  told 
that  you  have  no  consultation  or  communica 
tion  with  them,  that  you  consult  and  commu 
nicate  with  nobody  but  Fitz  John  Porter,  and, 
perhaps,  General  Franklin.  I  do  not  say 
these  complaints  are  true  or  just ;  but,  at  all 
events,  it  is  proper  you  should  know  of  their 
existence.  Do  the  commanders  of  corps  dis 
obey  your  orders  in  anything  V 

"  When  you  relieved  General  Hamilton  of 
his  command,  the  other  day,  you  thereby  lost 
the  confidence  of  at  least  one  of  your  best 
friends  in  the  Senate.  And  here  let  me  say, 
not  as  applicable  to  you  personally,  that  Sen 
ators  and  Representatives  speak  of  me,  in 
their  places,  as  they  please  without  question; 
and  that  officers  of  the  army  must  cease  ad 
dressing  insulting  letters  to  them  for  taking 
no  greater  liberty  with  them.  But  to  return, 
are  you  strong  enough,  even  with  my  help, 
to  set  your  foot  upon  the  neck  of  Sumner, 
Heintzelman,  and  Keyes,  all  at  once  ?  This 
is  a  practical  and  very  serious  question  for 
you.  Yours  truly,  A.  LINCOLN." 

Upon  this  letter  it  is  only  necessary  to  ob 
serve  that  General  McClellan,  as  he  shows  us 
in  his  Report,  had  never  opposed  the  organi 
zation  of  the  army  into  army  corps.  He 
had  merely  insisted  that  it  was  necessary  to 
test  the  merits  of  the  divisional  commanders 
under  his  orders  before  deciding  upon  their 
respective  fitness  to  be  trusted  with  the  vitally 
important  responsibilities  of  a  corps  command . 
Regarding  the  army  under  his  orders  as  the 
hope  of  the  nation  in  the  field,  and  not  as,  in 
any  sense,  a  machine  for  organizing  political 
influence  and  power,  General  McClellan  never 
permitted  himself  to  reflect  upon  the  view 
which  "  Senators  and  Representatives"  might 
take  of  his  action  in  regard  to  one  or  another 
office.  •He  was  absorbed  in  the  duty  of  as 
certaining  and  selecting  the  men  to  whom  the 
lives  of  his  soldiers  and  the  honor -of  the 
country  might  be  most  safely  entrusted. 

Whether  those  whom  he  found  reason  to 
trust  would  be  considered  by  their  rivals  as 
his  "pets,"  or  those  whom  he  hesitated  to 
advance  would  be  regarded  by  their  friends 
as  his  "  victims,"  were  questions  which  it 
would  have  forever  and  justly  disgraced  him, 
as  a  commander,  to  entertain. 

The  President  looked  upon  the  matter 
from  quite  another  point  of  view,  and  being 
the  "  Commander-in-Chief,  who  could  direct 


42 


whatever  he  pleased, "he  accordingly  relieved 
himself  of  the  "pressure"  brought  against 
him  by  "  Senators  and  Representatives."  and 
compelled  the  general  commanding  the  army 
to  accept  such  corps  commanders  as  he  thought 
fit  to  assign  to  the  service. 

It  is  with  no  invidious  feeling  towards  any 
of  the  officers  so  assigned  by  Mr.  Lincoln, 
that  we  call  attention  to  the  fact  that  of  the 
four  corps  commanders,  selected  by  the 
President,  with  the  help  of  the  "  Senators 
and  Representatives  "  afore-mentioned,  every 
one  has  been  removed  from  that  high  station 
since  General  McClellan  was  relieved  of  his 
command. 

One  of  these  generals,  the  brave  and  vet 
eran  Smniier,  has  been  taken  by  death  from 
the  country  he  had  so  nobly  served.  He 
had  previously,  however,  been  removed  by 
Mr.  Lincoln  from  the  command  of  his  corps 
in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

Another,  General  McDowell,  has  been 
sent  by  Mr.  Lincoln  to  a  post  of  comparative 
obscurity  in  the  Far  West.  A  third,  General 
Heintzelman,  has  been  assigned  by  Mr.  Lin 
coln  to  the  duties  of  a  sort  of  grand  police 
inspector  in  the  States  of  Ohio  and  Indiana. 
The  fourth,  General  Keyes,  has  been  dis 
missed  by  Mr.  Lincoln  from  the  army  of  the 
Union. 

Whether  it  would  have  been  better  for  the 
fame  of  those  commanders  and  for  the  general 
service  of  the  Union  that  General  j)feClcl!an 
should  have  been  suffered  to  come7to  his  own 
conclusions  in  respect  to  the  rank  which 
ought  to  be  assigned  to  them  after  a  practical 
experience  in  the  field,  is  a  question  which 
the  reader  may  be  profitably  left  to  ponder 
for  himself. 

General  McClellan  reached  Fortress  Mon 
roe  on  the  2d  of  April.  It  had  been  understood 
that  the  troops  at  this  point,  10,000  in  num 
ber,  under  General  Wool,  were  to  compose  a 
part  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  During 
the  night  of  April  3d,  a  telegram  from  Wash 
ington  announced  that  this  understanding  was 
revoked  by  the  "  Commander-in-Chief  who 
could  direct  what  he  pleased "  j  and  that 
General  McClellan  was  deprived  of  all  con 
trol  over  General  Wool  and  the  troops  under 
his  command.  This  order  left  the  base  of  all 
General  McClellan 's  operations  under  the 
command  of  another  and  independent  gen 
eral  ! 

General  McClellan,  in  his  Report,  tells  us 
that  "  The  council,  composed  of  four  corps 
commanders,  organized  by  the  President  of 
the  United  States,  at  its  meeting  on  the  13th 
of  March,  adopted  Fort  Monroe  as  the  base 


of  operations  for  the  movement  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  upon  Richmond. 

For  the  prompt  and  successful  execution 
of  the  projected  operation,  it  was  regarded 
by  all  as  necessary  that  the  whole  of  the  four 
corps  should  be  employed,  with  at  least  the 
addition  of  ten  thousand  men  drawn  from  the 
forces  in  the  vicinity  of  Fortress  Monroe: 
that  position  and  its  dependencies  being  re 
garded  as  amply  protected  by  the  naval  force 
in  its  neighborhood,  and  the  advance  of  the 
main  army  up  the  Peninsula,  so  that  it  could 
be  safely  left  with  a  small  garrison. 

The  President  having  thus  been  clearly 
informed,  not  merely  by  General  McClellan, 
but  by  the  four  corps  commanders  whom  he 
had  himself  selected  from  among  the  divisional 
generals  for  promotion,  that,  "for  the  prompt 
and  successful  execution  of  the  projected 
operation,  "  it  was  necessary  that  the  whole  of 
the  four  corps  commanded  by  these  officers, 
with  at  least  ten  thousand  additional  men 
from  Fortress  Monroe,  should  be  employed, 
how  did  it  come  to  pass  nod  only  that  one  of 
these  corps,  and  that  the  strongest  of  them, 
was  withdrawn  bodily  from  General  Mc'Clel- 
lan's  expedition,  but  that  the  general  com 
manding  it  was  nominated  to  the  command  of  a 
new  and  independent  department,  created  ex 
pressly  for  him?  To  withdraw  nearly  one- 
third  of  the  force  ' '  necessary ' '  for  the  prompt 
and  successful  execution  of  a  great  military 
movement,  was  for  the  President  to  takfc  upon 
himself  the  terrible  responsibility  of  the  fail 
ure  of  that  movement.  Ignorant  as  the  Pres 
ident  was  of  all  military  matters,  and  sur 
rounded  by  counsellors  no  more  enlightened 
than  himself,  some  dim  sense  of  this  formid 
able  truth,  one  would  suppose,  might  have 
dawned  upon  his  mind.  By  what  was  this 
healing  ray  obscured  ? 

"  The  order  creating  a  new  department  for 
Gen.  Irwin  McDowell,"  says  the  well  inform 
ed  New  York  Times  of  April  7,  1862,  "  is  but 
the  culmination  of  a  long  cherished  plan  of 
the  progressive  Republicans."  In  other 
words,  the  President  of  the  United  States 
deliberately  assumed  the  dread  responsibility 
of  ruining  the  most  important  campaign  of 
the  most  important  army  of  the  nation,  for 
the  sake  of  propitiating  the  most  "progres 
sive  "  and  impatient  and  annoying  members 
of  his  own  political  party.  This  was  so  dis 
tinctly  understood  at  the  time  in  Washington 
that  it  was  the  subject  of  public  as  well  as 
private  conversation ;  and  the  following  ex 
tract  from  the  New  York  Times  of  April  6, 
1862,  will  show  the  pleasant  and  humorous 
light  in  which  the  trifling  of  the  Commanders- 


43 


in-Chief  who  could  "direct  whatever  they 
pleased,"  and  of  "progressive  Republicans, " 
who  could  control  these  Conimanclers-iri-Chief 
with  the  lives  of  our  soldiers,  the  honor  of 
t!i oil-  generals,  and  the  hopes  of  the  nation 
was  regarded  by  those  who  were  at  home  be 
hind  the  political  scenes:  "It  looks  now 
very  much  as  though  the  two  Macs  had  been 
pitted  against  each  other,  and  it  would  be  a 
good  joke,  after  all,  if  Banks's  dashing  move 
ment  down  the  valley  should  frighten  the 
rebels  out  of  Gordonsville,  and  drive  them 
precipitately  out  of  Virginia,  thus  cheating 
both  Macs  out  of  a  fight." 

While  the  Administration  and  its  friends  at 
Washington  were  taking  these  cheerful  and 
jocose  views  of  war,  its  responsibilities  and 
its  conditions,  .General  McClellan,  at  Fortress 
Monroe,  was  earnestly  endeavoring  to  ascertain 
the  truth  in  regard  to  the  rebel  forces  before 
him,  resolved  to  do  his  best  with  his  army  and 
for  the  country,  in  spite  of  official  reckless 
ness  and  executive  injustice.  He  found  this 
task  not  much  more  easy  than  Lord  Raglan 
had  found  it  before  Sevastopol.  His  only 
proper  dependence,  of  course,  was  upon  the 
reports  of  General  Wool,  and  General  Wool,  ( 
astonishing  as  it  may  appear,  had  no  authentic 
or  intelligent  reports  to  give.  He  could  pro 
tect  General  McClellan's  rear,  but  could 
throw  no  safe  light  on  the  state  of  affairs  in 
his  front.  On  the  5th  of  April,  for  example, 
General  Wool  telegraphed  to  the  Secretary 
of  War  :  "  The  Army  of  the  Potomac  will  not 
find  many  rebel  troops  to  contend  with."  On 
the  6th  of  April,  he  telegraphed:  "General 
Magruder  has  thirty  thousand  men  at  York- 
town."  Clearly,  General  McClellan  was  left  to 
find  out  all  the  conditions  of  the  situation 
for  himself.  His  engineer  officers,  headed  by 
General  Barnard,  found  the  strength  of  the 
enemy's  lines  on  the  Warwick  River  and  be 
fore  Yorktown  so  great,  that  it  was  "not 
deemed  practicable  to  break  them,"  and 
"too  hazardous"  to  attempt  the  capture  of 
Yorktown  by  assault. 

The  Merrimac,  which  the  President  had 
promised  General  McClellan  should  be  neutral 
ized  by  the  navy,  was  still  so  far  mistress  of 
the  James  that  the  naval  forces  in  Hampton 
Roads  were  entirely  unable  to  assist  the  army 
in  the  reduction  of  the  water-batteries  of 
Yorktown  and  Gloucester. 

In  short,  all  the  elements  of  the  position 
in  Virginia  were  so  completely  different  from 
those  upon  which  General  McClellan  had 
been  officially  led  to  count,  that  his  whole 
plan  of  campaign  had  now  to  bo  re-cast  in  the 
face  of  the 'enemy. 


The  following  letter  from  General  Keyes, 
one  of  the  four  officers  appointed  by  the  Pres 
ident  himself  to  the  command  of  army 
corps,  states  the  true  condition  of  affairs  at 
this  time,  so  well,  that  we  give  it  in  full :  — 

"  HEAD-QUARTERS,  4xn  CORPS, 
"  WARWICK  COURT  HOUSE,  VA.;  April  7,  1862. 

"Mr  DEAR  SENATOR:  The  plan  of  cam 
paign  on  this  line  was  made  with  the  distinct 
understanding  that  four  army  corps  should 
be  employed,  and  that  the  navy  should  co 
operate  in  the  taking  of  Yorktown,  and  also 
(as  I  understood  it)  support  us  on  our  left 
by  moving  gun-boats  up  James  River. 

"To-day  I  have  learned  that  the  1st  Corps, 
which,  by  the  President's  order,  was  to  em 
brace  four  divisions,  and  one  division  (Blen- 
ker's)  of  the  2d  Corps,  have  been  withdrawn 
altogether  from  this  line  of  operations,  and 
from  the  Army  of  the  Potomae.  At  the  same 
time,  as  I  am  informed,  the  navy  has  not 
means  to  attack  Yorktown,  and  is  afraid  to 
send  gun-boats  up  James  River  for  fear  of 
the  Merrimac. 

"  The  above  plan  of  campaign  was  adopted 
unanimously  by  General  McDowell  and  Brig 
adier-Generals  Sumncr,  Heintzeiman,  and 
Keyes,  and  was  concurred  in  by  Major-Gen 
eral  McClellan,  who  first  proposed  Urbana  as 
our  base. 

"  This  army  being  reduced  by  forty-five 
thousand  troops,  some  of  them  among  the 
best  in  the  service,  and  without  the  support 
of  the  navy,  the  plan  to  which  we  are  reduced 
bears  scarcely  any  resemblance  to  the  one  I 
voted  for. 

"  I  command  the  James  River  column,  and 
I  left  my  camp,  near  Newport  News,  the 
morning  of  the  4th  instant.  I  only  succeeded 
in  getting  my  artillery  ashore  the  afternoon 
of  the  day,  before,  and  one  of  my  divisions 
had  not  all  arrived  in  camp  the  day  I  left, 
and,  for  the  want  of  transportation,  has  not  yet 
joined  me.  So  you  will  observe  that  not  a 
day  was  lost  in  the  advance  ;  and  in  fact  we 
marched  so  quickly  and  so  rapidly  that  many 
of  our  animals  were  twenty-four  and  forty- 
eight  hours  without  a  ration  of  forage.  But, 
notwithstanding  the  rapidity  of  our  advance, 
we  are  stopped  by  a  line  of  defence  nine  or 
ten  miles  long,  strongly  fortified  by  breast 
works,  erected  nearly  the  whole  distance, 
behind  a  stream  or  succession  of  ponds  no 
where  fordable,  one  terminus  being  York- 
town  and  the  other  ending  in  the  James  River, 
which  is  commanded  by  the  enemy's  gun- 
(  boats.  Yorktown  is  fortified  all  around  with 
i  bastioned  works,  and,  on  the  water  side,  it 


44 


and  Gloucester  are  so  strong  that  the  navy 
are  afraid  to  attack  either. 

"  The  approaches  on  our  side  are  generally 
through  low,  swampy,  or  thickly  wooded 
ground,  over  roads  which  we  are  obliged  to 
repair  or  to  make,  before  we  can  get  forward 
our  carriages.  The  enemy  is  in  great  force, 
and  is  constantly  receiving  reinforcements 
from  the  two  rivers.  The  line  in  front  of  us 
is  therefore  one  of  the  strongest  ever  opposed 
to  an  invading  force  in  any  country. 

"  You  will  then  ask  why  I  advocated  such 
a  line  for  our  operations  ?  My  reasons  are 
few,  but,  I  think,  good. 

With  proper  assistance  from  the  navy,  we 
could  take  Yorktown,  and  then,  with  gun 
boats  on  both  rivers,  we  could  beat  any  force 
opposed  to  us  on  Warwick  River,  because  the 
shot  and  shells  from  the  gun-boats  would 
nearly  overlap  across  the  Peninsula,  so  that, 
if  the  enemy  should  retreat,  and  retreat  he 
must,  he  would  have  a  long  way  to  go  with 
out  rail  or  steam  transportation,  and  every 
soul  of  his  army  must  fall  into  our  hands  or 
be  destroyed. 

"  Another  reason  for  my  supporting  the  new 
base  and  plan  was,  that  this  line,  it  was  ex 
pected,  would  furnish  water  transportation 
nearly  to  Richmond. 

"Now,  supposing  we  succeed  in  breaking 
through  the  line  in  front  of  us,  what  can  we 
do  next?  The  roads  are  very  bad,  and  if 
the  enemy  retains  command  of  James  River, 
and  we  do  not  first  reduce  Yorktown,  it  would 
be  impossible  for  us  to  subsist  this  army 
three  marches  beyond  where  it  is  now.  As 
the  roads  are  at  present,  it  is  with  the  utmost 
difficulty  that  we  can  subsist  it  in  the  position 
it  now  occupies. 

"  You  will  sec  therefore,  by  what  I  have 
said,  that  the  force  originally  intended  for  the 
capture  of  Richmond  should  be  all  sent  for 
ward.  If  I  thought  the  four  army  corps 
necessary  when  I  supposed  the  navy  would 
cooperate,  and  when  I  judged  of  the  obstacles 
to  be  encountered  by  what  I  learned  from 
maps  and  the  opinions  of  officers  long  stationed 
at  Fort  Monroe,  and  from  all  other  sources, 
how  much  more  should  I  think  the  full  com 
plement  of  troops  requisite,  now  that  the  navy 
cannot  cooperate,  and  now  that  the  strength 
of  the  enrmy's  lines  and  the  number  of  his 
guns  and  men  prove  to  be  almost  immeasura 
bly  greater  than  I  had  been  led  to  expect ! 

'•  The  line  in  front  of  us,  in  the  opinion  of 
all  the  military  men  here  who  are  at  all  com 
petent  to  judge,  is  one  of  the  strongest  in  the 
world,  and  the  force  of  the  enemy  capable  of 
being  increased  beyond  the  numbers  we  now 


have  to  oppose  to  him.  Independently  of 
the  strength  of  the  lines  in  front  of  us,  and 
of  the  force  of  the  enemy  behind  them,  we 
cannot  advance  until  we  get  command  of 
either  York  River  or  James  River.  The  effi 
cient  cooperation  of  the  navy  is,  therefore, 
absolutely  essential,  and  so  I  considered  it 
when  I  voted  to  change  our  base  from  the 
Potomac  to  Fort  Monroe. 

"  An  iron-clad  boat  must  attack  Yorktown, 
and  if  several  strong  gun-boats  could  be  sent 
up  James  River  also,  our  success  will  be  cer 
tain  and  complete,  and  the  rebellion  will  soon 
be  put  down. 

"  On  the  other  hand,  we  must  butt  against 
the  enemy's  works  with  heavy  artillery  and  a 
great  waste  of  time,  life,  and  material. 

"  If  we  break  through  and  advance,  both  our 
flanks  will  be  assailed  from  two  great  water 
courses  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy  ;  our  sup 
plies  would  give  out,  and  the  enemy,  equal, 
if  not  superior,  in  numbers,  would,  with  the 
other  advantages,  beat  and  destroy  this  army. 

"  The  greatest  master  of  the  art  of  war  has 
said  that  '  if  you  would  invade  a  country 
successfully,  you  must  have  one  line  of  opera 
tions  and  one  army,  under  one  general.' 
But  what  is  our  condition?  The  State  of 
Virginia  is  made  to  constitute  the  command, 
in  part  or  wholly,  of  some  six  generals,  viz.  : 
Fremont,  Banks,  McDowell,  Wool,  Burnside, 
and  McClclian.  besides  the  scrap,  over  the 
Chesapeake,  in  the  care  of  Dix. 

"  The  great  battle  of  the  war  is  to  come  off 
here.  If  we  win  it,  the  rebellion  will  be 
crushed.  If  we  lose  it,  the  consequences  will 
be  morej  horrible  than  I  care  to  foretell.  The 
plan  of  campaign  I  voted  for,  if  carried  out 
with  the  means  proposed,  will  certainly  suc 
ceed.  If  any  part  of  the  means  proposed 
are  withheld  or  diverted,  I  deem  it  due  to 
myself  to  say  that  our  success  will  be  uncer 
tain. 

"It  is  no  doubt  agreeable  to  the  commander 
of  the  1st  Corps  to  have  a  separate  depart 
ment,  and,  as  this  letter  advocates  his  return 
to  General  McClellan's  command,  it  is  proper 
to  state  that  I  am  not  at  all  influenced  by 
personal  regard  or  dislike  to  any  of  my  sen 
iors  in  rank.  If  I  were  to  credit  all  the 
opinions  which  have  been  poured  into  my 
ears,  I  must  believe  that,  in  regard  to  my 
present  fine  command,  I  owe  much  to  Gen 
eral  McDowell  and  nothing  to  General  Mc- 
Clellan.  But  I  have  disregarded  all  such 
officiousness,  and  I  have  from  last  July  to  the 
present  day  supported  General  McClellan 
and  obeyed  all  his  orders  with  as  hearty  a 
good-will  as  though  he  had  been  my  brother 


45 


or  the  friend  to  whom  I  owed  most.  I  shall 
continue  to  do  so  to  the  last,  and  so  long  as 
he  is  my  commander,  and  I  am  not  desirous 
to  displace  him,  and  would  not  if  I  could. 
He  left  Washington  with  the  understanding 
that  he  was  to  execute  a  definite  plan  of 
campaign  with  certain  prescribed  means.  The 
plan  was  good  and  the  means  sufficient ;  and, 
without  modification,  the  enterprise  was  cer 
tain  of  success.  But,  with  the  reduction  of 
force  and  means,  the  plan  is  entirely  changed, 
and  is  now  a  bad  plan,  with  means  insufficient 
for  certain  success. 

"  Do  not  look  upon  this  communication  as 
the  offspring  of  despondency.  I  never  de 
spond;  and  when  you  see  me  working  the 
hardest,  you  may  be  sure  that  fortune  is 
frowning  upon  me.  I  am  working,  now,  to 
my  utmost. 

"  Please  show  this  letter  to  the  President, 
and  I  should  like,  also,  that  Mr.  Stanton  should 
know  its  contents.  Do  me  the  honor  to  write 
to  me  as  soon  as  you  can,  and  believe  me, 
with  perfect  respect, 

"  Your  most  obedient  servant, 

"  E.  D.  KEYES, 
"  Brig.-Gen.  Com'g  Mh  Army  Corps. 

"  HON.  IRA  HARRIS, 

"C7.  S.  Senate." 

While  General  McClellan  and  his  subordi 
nates,  in  the  field,  were  thus  anxiously  con 
templating  the  conditions  and  seeking  the 
solutions  of  the  problem  before  them,  the 
"  Commander-in-$hief,"  in  Washington,  stood 
amazed  at  their  hesitation.  He  saw  what 
was  to  be  done  at  once,  and  suggested  it,  by 
telegraph,  to  General  McClellan,  in  this  light 
and  airy  fashion  :  — 

"  WASHINGTON,  April  6, 1862.    8  p.  M. 
"  GEN.  GEO.  B.  MCCLELLAN,  — 

"  Yours  of  11  A.  M.  to-day  received.  Sec 
retary  of  War  informs  me  that  the  forwarding 
of  transportation,  ammunition,  and  Wood- 
bury's  Brigade,  under  your  orders,  is 
not  and  will  not  be  interfered  with.  You 
have  now  over  one  hundred  thousand  troops 
with  you,  independent  of  General  Wool's 
command.  I  think  you  had  better  break  the 
enemy's  line  from  Yorktown  to  Warwick 
River  at  once.  This  will  probably  use  time 
as  advantageously  as  you  can. 

"A.  LINCOLN,  President" 

This  despatch,  it  will  be  observed,  bears 
date  April  6th.  The  "  enemy's  line,"  which 
the  Commander-in-Chief  who  could  "  direct 
whatever  he  pleased,"  thus  cavalierly  recom 


mended  should  be  "broken  at  once/' had 
only  been  discovered  by  our  forces  two  days 
before,  and  is  described  by  General  Keyes, 
who  led  the  advance,  as  "one  of  the  strong 
est  ever  opposed  to  an  invading  foe  in  any 
country."  No  trustworthy  information  being 
accessible  to  General  McClellan  as  to  the 
strength  of  the  enemy  behind  this  line,  and 
General  Johnston  having  had  ample  time, 
thanks  to  the  premature  revelation  of  General 
McClellan's  plans,  forced  upon  him  by  the 

Commander-in-Chief,"  to  throw  his  whole, 
army,  if  it  should  have  so  pleased  him, 
upon  this  point,  General  McClellan  ventured 
to  think  that  he  might  "  use  time  "  more  "  ad 
vantageously  "  than  in  risking  thousands  of 
heroic  lives  upon  the  more  than  dubious  as 
sault  of  such  a  position. 

The  army  and  the  country  have  since 
learned,  in  an  agonizing  experience  of  such 
' '  murderous  assaults  ' '  at  Frerlericksburg  and 
elsewhere,  to  appreciate  the  humane  soldierly 
wisdom  which  declined  to  act  upon  Mr.  Lin 
coln's  brilliant  suggestion.  It  is  the  glory  of 
General  McClellan  that,  at  a  moment  when  a 
more  vulgar  mind  might  have  sought  popular 
eclat,  and  the  favor  of  "  Senators  and  Repre 
sentatives,  ' '  by  hurling  the  army  of  the  Union 
upon  this  bristling  front  of  death,  he  chose 
that  better  part  which  all  the  ex  post  facto 
declamation  in  the  world  shall  never  take  away 
from  him ;  and  the  second  siege  of  Yorktown 
crowns  him,  in  the  history  of  his  country,  with 
that  title  which  was  held  especially  honorable 
by  the  most  warlike  race  of  all  time,  —  Victor 
sine  clade, —  the  bloodless  conqueror  who  had 
the  moral  courage  to  hold  to  what  he  felt  to 
be  wise  and  right  while  all  the  journals  of 
"progressive  Republicanism  "  rang  with  exul 
tation  over  the  sanguinary  conflicts  of  Shiloh 
and  Pittsburg  Landing,  and  with  insulting 
comparisons  between  the  loud  noise  of  battle 
at  the  West,  and  the  silent  but  irresistible 
growth  of  "  great  designs  "  in  the  East. 

These  comparisons,  too,  be  it  remembered, 
were  condensed  and  hurled  at  the  young  Gen 
eral  in  despatches  from  the  seat  of  govern 
ment  at  Washington,  as,  for  example,  in  the 
following  characteristic  letter  from  the  Presi 
dent  :  — 

"  And  once  more,  let  me  tell  you,  it  is 
indispensable  to  you  that  you  strike  a  blow, 
/am  powerless  to  help  this.  You  will  do  me 
the  justice  to  remember,  I  always  insisted  that 
going  down  the  bay  in  search  of  a  field,  in 
stead  of  fighting  at  or  near  Manassas,  was 
only  shifting  and  not  surmounting  a  difficulty  ; 
that  we  would  find  the  same  enemy,  and  the 
same  or  equal  intrenchments,  at  either  place. 


46 


The  country  will  not  fail  to  note  —  is  now 
noting  —  that  the  present  hesitation  to  move 
upon  an  intrenched  enemy,  is  but  the  story  of 
Manassas  repeated. 

"I  beg  to  assure  you  that  I  have  never 
written  you,  or  spoken  to  you,  in  greater 
kindness  of  feeling  than  now,  nor  with  a 
fuller  purpose  to  sustain  you,  so  far  as  in  ray 
most  anxious  judgment  I  consistently  can. 
But  you  must  act. 

"  Yours  very  truly, 

"  A.  LINCOLN." 

Not  less  characteristic  is  the  calm  comment 
which  General,  McClellan,in  his  Report,  makes 
upon  this  appeal  to  his  selfish  fears  and 
hopes.  "I  could  not  forego  the  conclusions 
of  my  most  instructed  judgment  for  the  mere 
sake  of  avoiding  the  personal  consequences 
intimated  in  the  President's  despatch." 

A  speedier  evacuation  of  Yorktown  might 
have  been  forced  upon  the  Confederates  by  a 
movement  which  General  McClellan  had  plan 
ned  of  the  corps  of  McDowell  up  the  left 
bank  of  the  York  River,  but  the  creation  of 
the  Department  of  the  Rappahannock  had 
made  this  movement  impossible. 

Finally,  on  the  4th  of  May,  1862,  the 
overwhelming  batteries  of  the  Union  army 
having  just  been  completed,  and  ready  to  open, 
from  all  quarters,  their  irresistible  fire  upon 
the  rebel  positions,  General  Johnstone  com 
manded  the  evacuation  of  Yorktown. 

The  news  of  this  event  was  hailed  with 
delight  throughout  the  North,  and  in  Congress 
a  vote  of  thanks  was  moved  to  the  General  and 
to  his  army,  by  a  member  from  the  West 
belonging  to  the  extreme  section  of  the 
Republican  party,  Mr.  Owen  Lovejoy.  Those 
who  have  since  honored  as  -a  martyr  this  lead 
er  in  their  own  faith  now  departed,  are  now  not 
ashamed  to  deride  the  great  and  substantial 
victory  which  then  moved  him  to  this  just  and 
creditable  action. 

The  evacuation  of  Yorktown  was  followed 
immediately  by  an  advance  of  the  victorious 
army  as  rapid  as  the  horrible  condition  of  the 
roads  and  the  necessity  of  establishing  a  new 
base  of  supplies  on  the  York  River  would 
permit.  Having  the  advantage  of  the  rail 
way  in  his  rear,  and  being  much  too  strong  in 
point  of  numbers  to  be  easily  pushed,  in 
retreating  through  a  friendly  country,  General 
Johnstone  fell  back  fighting.  General  Sum- 
nor,  in  the  front  of  General  McClellan's  pur 
suit,  came  with  a  small  part  of  bis  corps  upon 
the  -enemy  strongly  intrenched  in  front  of 
Willianisburg.  Such  was  the  state  of  the 
roads,  "narrow  and  full  of  frightful  mo 


rasses  from  which  it  was  difficult  to  extricate 
the   cannon,"  says  the   Prince  de   Joinville, 
*  although  the  weather  had  been  fine  and  dry 
for  several   days,"  that   no  such   thing  as  a 
general  action  was  to  be  thought  of  in  these 
virgin   forests.       The    Confederate    intrench- 
ments  were  gallantly,  but  fruitlessly  assailed  by 
General    Sumner's    cavalry    under    General 
Stoneman.      The  infantry  of   Sumner  came 
up  too  late  in  the  evening  to  affect  anything, 
and   during   the  night   one  of  those   tropical 
rains  began,  which  in  the  early  spring  so  often 
onvert  whole    square   miles   of  country,    in 
Eastern    Virginia,   into  one   immense    lake. 
The  next  day  was  fought  the  battle  of  Wil- 
liamsburg,    begun,    practically    by  accident, 
while  the  commander  of  the  army  was  where 
his  duty  called  him  to  be,  in  the  rear,  organ 
izing  and   pushing   forward   the   tremendous 
work   of  the  general   advance.      The  Union 
troops  of  General  Hooker  were  first  engaged, 
and  although  they  fought  with  extraordinary 
gallantry,  suffered  terribly,  and  had  begun  to 
fall  back  when  the  battle  was  reestablished  by 
General  Hancock,  and  by  General  McClellan, 
who,  having  been  notified  of  what  was  going 
on,    had   made   his   way   through   incredible 
difficulties  to  the  front,  and  appeared  in  person 
on  the  field  at  the  decisive  moment  to  secure 
the  victory  to  the  army  of  the  Union.     The 
Prince  de  Joinville  thus  paints,  in  simple  but 
burning  words,  this  critical  and  glorious  scene : 
"The  Federal  General   Hancock,   seizing 
the  moment,  cried  to  his  soldiers,  as  he  waved 
his  cap,  '  Now,  gentlemen,  the  bayonet ! '  and 
charged  with  his  brigade.     The  enemy  could 
not  withstand  the  shock,  broke  and  fled,  strew 
ing  the   field   with   his  dead.     At  this  very 
moment   General   McClellan,  who   had  been 
detained  at  Yorktown,  appeared  on  the  field. 
It  was  dusk,  the  night  was  coming  on,  the 
rain  still  falling  in  torrents.     On  three  sides 
of  the  plateau  on  which  the  General  was,  the 
cannon  and  the  musketry  were  rattling  unin 
terruptedly.     The   success  of  Hancock  had 
been    decisive,    and    the    reserves    brought 
up  by  the  General-in  Chief,  charging  upon  die 
field,  settled  the  affair.     Then  it  was  that  I 
saw  General  McClellan  pressing  in  front  of 
the  Sixth   Cavalry,  give   his  hand   to  Major 
Williams,  with  a   few  words  on  his  brilliant 
charge  of  the  day  before.     The  regiment  did 
not  hear  what  he  said,  but  it  knew  what  he 
meant,  and  from  every  heart  went  up  one  of 
those  masculine,  terrible  shouts  which  are  only 
to  be  heard   on   the   field  of  battle.     These 
shouts,  taken  up  along  the  whole  line,  struck 
terror   to   the  enemy.     W*e  saw   them  come 
upon  the  parapets  and  look  out  in  silence  and 


47 


motionless  upon  the  scene.  Then  the  firing 
died  away,  and  night  fell  on  the  combat,  which, 
in  America,  is  called  the  battle  of  Williams- 
burg." 

The  battle  of  Williamsburg  was  but  an 
episode  in  the  march  upon  Richmond,  and, 
in  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  could  not 
possibly  have  been  any  more  than  an  epi 
sode  in  that  march.  But  it  threw  the  elec 
tric  light  of  battle  over  that  love  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  for  its  commander, 
which  had  already  developed  itself,  and 
which  has  since  inwrought  itself  so  deeply 
into  the  moral  substance  of  that  splendid 
organization  that,  in  spite  of  two  years  of 
incessant  obloquy,  misrepresentation,  and 
calumny  poured  out  upon  his  head,  the 
name  of  General  McClellan  rings  still  like 
a  trumpet  through  its  heart. 

"  It  seems,"  observes  one  of  the  most 
brilliant  of  modern  historical  writers, 
"that  although  by  human  contrivance  a 
whole  people  may  be  shut  out  from  the 
knowledge  of  momentous  events,  in  which 
its  armies  are  taking  a  part,  there  is  yet  a 
subtile  essence  of  truth  which  will  per 
meate  into  the  heart  of  a  nation  those  kept 
in  ignorance." 

Through  all  the  cloud,  which  partizan 
passion  has  raised  about  the  name  of  Gen 
eral  Mc'Jlellan,  through  all  the  rolling  and 
swelling  slanders  of  a  partizan  press,  and 
the  wordy  mists  of  partizan  reports  on  the 
conduct  of  the  war,  this  truth  has  made  its 
way  into  the  nation's  heart,  that  the  real 
history  of  that  arduous  march  through  the 
swampy  forests  of  the  Peninsula,  and  of 
that  great  siege  which  has  made  the  rude 
name  of  the  Chickahominy  immortal,  is 
written  in  the  love  which  the  soldiers  of 
McClellan  bear  to  their  commander. 

Criticism  may  assail  this  love  ;  malignity 
may  denounce  it ;  but  impartial  history  has 
only  one  verdict  upon  such  affections. 
Their  root  is  in  reality  —  reality  proved  and 
tested  by  all  that  is  sharpest  and  sternest 
in  human  experience.  Their  meaning  is 
incontrovertible.  He  who  wins  such  affec 
tions  is  worthy  to  have  won  them. 

The  progress  of  our  sketch  has  brought 
us  now  to  that  portion  of  Qeneral  McOlel- 
lan's  career  which  is  best  known  to  the 
public,  which  has  been  most  discussed  by 
friends  and  foes,  and  which  has  been  most 
tally  set  forth  by  himself  in  his  Report  upon 
the  Peninsular  Campaign. 

it  is  not  necessary  that  we  should  here 
re-write,  in  detail,  the  history  of  the  siege  of 
Richmond.  It  has,  already,  we  trust,  been 


made  sufficiently  clear  that  the  course  of 
policy  pursued  towards  General  McClellan 
and  his  army  from  the  moment  when,  on 
the  8th  of  March,  the  President  found 
himself  constrained  to  waive  the  adoption 
of  his  own  "  plan,"  for  the  campaign  against 
Richmond  had  made  it  impossible  for  Gen 
eral  McClellan  to  look  for  success  in  his 
enterprise  to  anything  like  those  bold  and 
decisive  movements  by  which,  when  un 
trammelled  and  at  liberty  to  act,  he  had 
organized  victory  in  Western  Virginia.  In 
the  execution  of  such  movements  it  is 
vitally  essential  that  he  who  undertakes 
them  should  know  precisely  upon  what 
amount  of  force  he  may  count,  and  that  he 
should  be  the  absolute '  master  of  the  dis 
positions  of  that  force. 

For  General  McOlellan,  in  the  face  of  his 
experience  of  the  President's  theory  and 
practice  of  the  "  command-in-chief "  of  the 
armies,  to  have  risked  a  single  important 
manoeuvre  upon  the  belief  that  any  one  of 
the  corps  under  his  orders  was  so  attached 
to  his  army  that  it  might  .not  at  any  mo 
ment  be  detached  from  him  by  telegram, 
for  service  in  the  Rocky  Mountains  of  the 
West,  or  the  sea  islands  of  the  South, 
would  have  been  little  less  than  a  crime. 

Immediately  after  the  evacuation  of 
Yorktown,  the  Confederates  abandoned 
Norfolk,  and  blew  up  the  Mcrrimac.  The 
troops  of  General  Huger,  to  the  number  of 
18,000  men,  were  drawn  in  upon  the  main 
body  at  Richmond,  before  which  city  John- 
stone  prepared  himself  for  a  desperate 
stand  on  the  formidable  defensive  line  of 
the  Chickahominy.  The  crew  of  the  Mer- 
rimac  were  transferred  to  the  naval  batter 
ies,  which,  suddenly  thrown  up  at  Drury's 
Bluff,  on  the  James  River,  proved  them 
selves,  when  assailed  by  the  gun-boats  and 
iron-clads  of  the  Federal  fleet,  a  not  less 
formidable  barrier  to  the  passage  of  that 
river  than  the  Merrwiac  in  her  time  had 
been. 

This  repulse  of  the  gun-boats,  and  this 
increase  of  the  force  assembled  at  Rich 
mond,  made  it  impossible  for  General  Mc 
Clellan,  situated  as  he  was,  to  venture  upon 
the  grand  flank  movement  for  transferring 
his  base  to  the  James,  to  which  the  de 
struction  of  the  Mcrrimac  would  otherwise 
have  invited  him.  Although  his  army  had 
been  reduced  by  the  policy  of  the  Adminis 
tration  far  below  the  figure  which  had  been 
deemed  necessary  to  its  safety  by  the  Presi 
dent  himself  and  his  councillors,  when 
the  expedition  was  decided  upon,  it  was 


48 


still  however  strong  enough,  with  the  aid  of 
the  gun-boats  on  the  York  and  the  Pamun- 
key,  to  threaten  and  advance  upon  Rich 
mond,  to  drive  the  Confederates  within  the 
lines  of  their  capital,  and  to  compel  them 
to  a  decisive  battle  whenever  it  should 
receive  the  reinforcements  which  it  could 
scarcely  be  deemed  the  Government  would 
hesitate  to  throw  into  its  thinned  but  tri 
umphant  ranks. 

"  Who,"  exclaims  the  Prince  de  Join- 
ville,  with  very  natural  amazement, — "  who 
could  foresee  that  the  80,000  men  assem 
bled  before  Washington,  would  do  noth 
ing  and  less  than  nothing  to  aid  the  army 
in  overcoming  the  concentration  of  forces 
it  was  called  upon  to  encounter  ?  " 

General  McClellan  urged  the  exigency 
of  the  position,  in  repeated  telegrams,  upon 
the  President  and  the  Secretary  of  War, 
as  he  advanced.  Imperfect  as  all  sources 
of  information  necessarily  were  in  a  coun 
try  profoundly  and  passionately  hostile  to 
his  army,  he  yet  learned  -enough  of  the 
true  state  of  things  in  Richmond  to  satisfy 
him  that  it  was  the  intention  of  the  Con 
federate  government,  reassured  as  they 
were,  by  the  repulse  of  the  gun-boats,  as  to 
the  safety  of  their  capital  from  an  ^attack 
by  the  James,  to  concentrate  all  their  avail 
able  forces  for  defence  on  the  line  of  the 
Chickahominy.  The  following  telegram,  of 
May  14,  will  show  how  his  representations 
of  these  facts  were  received  at  Washing 
ton  :  — 

4 

"  CAMP  AT  CUMBERLAND,  May  14,  1862. 

"  His  EXCELLENCY,  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN, 
"  President  of  the  United  States  : 

"  I  have  more  than  twice  telegraphed  to 
the  Secretary  of  War,  stating  that,  in  my 
opinion,  the  enemy  were  concentrating  all 
their  available  force  to  fight  this  army  in 
front  of  llichmond,  and  that  such  ought 
to  be  their  policy.  I  have  received  no 
reply  whatever  to  any  of  these  telegraphs. 

"  I  beg  leave  to  repeat  their  substance  to 
your  Excellency,  and  to  ask  that  kind  con 
sideration  which  you  have  ever  accorded 
to  my  representations  and  views.  All  my 
information  from  every  source  accessible 
to  me,  establishes  the  fixed  purpose  of  the 
rebels  to  defend  Richmond  against  this 
army  by  offering  us  battle  with  all  the 
troops  they  can  collect  from  east,  west, 
and  south,  and  my  own  opinion  is  confirmed 
by  that  of  all  my  commanders  whom  1 
tave  been  able  to  consult. 


"  Casualties,  sickness,  garrisons,  and 
guards  have  much  weakened  my  force, 
and  will  continue  to  do  so.  I  cannot  bring 
into  actual  battle  against  the  enemy  more 
than  eighty  thousand  men  at  the  utmost, 
and  with  them  I  must  attack  in  position, 
probably  intrenched,  a  much  larger  force 
—  perhaps  double  my  numbers.  It  is  pos 
sible  that  Richmond  may  be  abandoned 
without  a  serious  struggle ;  but  the  enemy 
are  actually  in  great  strength  between  here 
and  there,  and  it  would  be  unwise,  and 
even  insane,  for  me  to  calculate  upon  any 
thing  but  a  stubborn  and  desperate  resist 
ance.  If  they  should  abandon  Richmond, 
it  may  well  be  that  it  is  done  with  the  pur 
pose  of  making  the  stand  at.  some  place  in 
Virginia,  south  or  west  of  there,  and  we 
should  be  in  condition  to  press  them  with 
out  delay.  The  Confederate  leaders  must 
employ  their  utmost  efforts  against  this 
army  in  Virginia,  and  they  will  be  sup- 
popted  by  the  whole  body  of  their  military 
officers,  among  whom  there  may  be  said  to 
be  no  Union  feeling,  as  there  is  also  very 
little  among  the  higher  class  of  citizens  in 
the  seceding  States. 

"  I  have  found  no  fighting  men  in  this 
Peninsula  —  all  are  in  the  ranks  of  the 
opposing  foe. 

"  Even  if  more  troops  than  I  now  have 
should  prove  unnecessary  for  purposes  of 
military  occupation,  our  greatest  display 
of  imposing  force  in  the  capital  of  the 
rebel  government  will  have  the  best  moral 
effect.  I  most  respectfully  and  earnestly 
urge  upon  your  Excellency  that  the  oppor 
tunity  has  come  for  striking  a  fatal  blow  at 
the  enemies  of  the  Constitution,  and  I  beg 
that  you  will  cause  this  army  to  be  rein 
forced  without  delay  by  all  the  disposable 
troops  of  the  Government.  I  ask  for  every 
man  that  the  Government  can  send  me. 
Any  commander  of  the  reinforcements, 
whom  your  Excellency  may  designate,  will 
be  acceptable  to  me,  whatever  expression  I 
may  have  heretofore  addressed  io  you  on 
that  subject. 

"  I  will  fight  the  enemy,  whatever  their 
force  may  be,  with  whatever  force  I  may 
have,  and  I  firmly  believe  that  we  shall 
beat  them ;  but  our  triumph  should  be 
made  decisive  and  complete.  The  soldiers 
of  this  army  love  their  Government,  and 
will  fight  well  in  its  support;  you  may  rely 
upon  them.  They  have  confidence  in  me 
as  their  General,  and  in  you  as  their  Presi 
dent.  Strong  reinforcements  will,  at  least, 
save  the  lives  of  many  of  them.  The 


49 


greater  our  force,  the  more  perfect  will  be 
our  combinations,  and  the  less  our  loss. 

"  For  obvious  reasons,  I  beg  you  to  give 
immediate  consideration  to  this  communi 
cation,  and  to  inform  me  fully  at  the  ear 
liest  moment  of  your  final  determination. 

"  GEO.   B.    McCLELLAN, 

"  Major-  General  Com'g." 

To  this  telegram  a  reply  finally  came, 
dated  May  18,  and  signed  by  Mr.  Stanton, 
who  had  now  begun  to  rule  the  situation. 

"  WASHINGTON,  May  18  — 2  P.  M. 

"  GENERAL:  Your  despatch  to  the  Presi 
dent,  asking  reinforcements,  has  been  re 
ceived  and  carefully  considered. 

"  The  President  is  not  willing  to  uncover 
the  Capital  entirely;  and  it  is  believed  that 
even  if  this  were  prudent,  it  would  require 
more  time  to  effect  a  junction  between  your 
army  and  that  of  the  Rappahannock  by  the 
way  of  the  Potomac  and  York  Rivers,  than 
by  a  land  march.  In  order,  therefore,  to 
increase  the  strength  of  the  attack  upon 
Richmond  at  the  earliest  moment,  General 
McDowell  has  been  ordered  to  march  upon 
that  city  by  the  shortest  route.  He  is  or 
dered,  keeping  himself  always  in  position, 
to  save  the  Capital  from  all  possible  attack, 
so  to  operate  as  to  put  his  left  wing  in 
communication  with  your  right  wing  •  and 
you  are  instructed  to  cooperate  so  as  to  es 
tablish  this  communication  as  soon  as  pos 
sible  by  extending  your  right  wing  to  the 
north  of  Richmond. 

"  It  is  believed  that  this  communication 
can  be  safely  established  either  north  or 
south  of  the  Panmnkey  River. 

"  In  any  event,  you  will  be  able  to  prevent 
the  main  body  of  the  enemy's  forces  from 
leaving  Richmond,  and  falling  in  over 
whelming  force  upon  General  McDowell. 
He  will  move  with  between  thirty-five  and 
forty  thousand  men. 

"  A  copy  of  the  instruction  to  General 
McDowell  are  with  this.  The  specific  task 
assigned  to  his  command  has  been  to  pro 
vide  against  any  danger  to  the  Capital  of 
the  nation. 

"At  your  earnest  call  for  reinforcements, 
he  is  sent  forward  to  cooperate  in  the  re 
duction  of  Richmond,  but  charged,  in  at 
tempting  this,  not  to  uncover  the  city  of 
Washington,  and  you  will  give  no  order, 
either  before  or  after  your  junction,  which 
can  put  him  out  of  position  to  cover  this 
city.  You  and  he  will  communicate  with 
each  other  by  telegraph  or  otherwise,  as 
7 


frequently  as  may  be  necessary  for  suffi 
cient  cooperation.  When  Gen.  McDowell 
is  in  position  on  your  right,  his  supplies 
must  be  drawn  from  West  Point,  and  you 
will  instruct  your  staff  oificers  to  be  pre 
pared  to  supply  him  by  that  route. 

"  The  President  desires  that  General  Mc 
Dowell  retain  the  command  of  the  Dcpart- 
me.nt  of  the  Rappahannock,  and  of  the 
forces  with  vjhich  he  moves  forward. 

"  By  order  of  the  President. 

"EDWIN  M.  STANTON." 

The  sentences  which  we  have  italicized 
in  this  strange  despatch  are  an  apocalypse 
of  the  views  which  had  prevailed  in  Wash 
ington  as  to  the  Peninsular  campaign. 
That  movement  against  Richmond  had  now 
become  entirely  secondary  in  the  minds  of 
Mr.  Lincoln  and  his  advisers  to  the  "  de 
fence  of  Washington."  The  commander  of 
the  Department  of  the  Rappahannock  was 
to  vindicate  the  wisdom  of  the  White  House 
by  moving  against  Richmond  "  by  the 
shortest  route,"  and  Richmond  was  to  be 
taken  by  his  forces,  those  of  General  Mc- 
Clellan  cooperating. 

By  advancing  General  McDowell  on  this 
route  instead  of  sending  him  by  water,  the 
Administration,  as  a  glance  at  the  map  will 
show,  not  only  compelled  General  McClel- 
lan  to  abandon  entirely  all  hope  of  taking 
advantage  of  the  possible  reopening  of  the 
James,  but  forced  him  to  extend  his  right 
wing  inordinately  in  order  to  meet  and 
make  his  junction  with  McDowell  march 
ing  from  the  north ;  drove  him  to  the 
tedious  and  wasting  work  of  bridging  the 
Chickahominy,  and  finally  exposed  him,  by 
the  sudden  withdrawal  of  McDowell's  army, 
—  which  took  place  as  soon  as  those  peril 
ous  preparations  for  "  cooperating  "  with 
it  were  fairly  under  way,  — -  to  the  terrible 
blow  which  the  Confederates  eventually 
struck. 

A  telegram  from  Mr.  Lincoln,  on  the 
4th  of  May,  put  General  McDowell  under 
the  orders^  of  General  McClellan,  in  the 
case  of  the  junction  of  their  forces,  and 
announced  that  the  Army  of  the  Rappa 
hannock  would  positively  move  on  the  next 
day  but  one. 

While  all  this,  however,  was  going  on, 
the  Confederates  had  not  been  idle.  They 
had  clearly  ascertained  that  the  relative 
importance  of  the  operations  on  the  Poto 
mac  and  in  the  Shenandoah  Yalley,  and  of 
those  before  Richmond,  was  far  from  being 
understood  at  Washington,  and  they  were 


50 


swift  to  take  advantage  of  the  discovery. 
General  "  Stonewall  "  Jackson  appeared  in 
the  valley,  and  spread  such  consternation 
by  his  movements,  that  in  the  afternoon  of 
the  24th  of  May  the  President  telegraphed 
again  to  General  McClellan,  announcing 
that,  in  consequence  of  "  Banks's  critical 
position,"  he  had  been  obliged  to  "  sus 
pend  "  McDowell'^  advance. 

This  change  of  purpose  leaving  General 
McClellan  with  a  line  immensely  and  dan 
gerously  extended,  and  entirely  in  the  dark 
as  to  what  he  might  ultimately  expect  in 
the  way  of  support  from  McDowell,  it  be 
came  more  than  ever  necessary  for  him  to 
strengthen  himself  artificially,  and  to  con 
struct  such  a  number  of  bridges  over  the 
Chickahominy  as  would  enable  him  safely 
to  hold  both  banks  of  that  stream  in  order 
to  guard  his  communications.  Arduous  at 
all  times  in  the  face  of  a  powerful  and  ac 
tive  enemy,  this  work  was  made  trebly 
arduous  by  the  unprecedented  state  of  the 
weather.  Incessant  rains,  such  as  had  not 
been  known  for  twenty  years,  flooded  the 
low  and  swampy  banks  of  the  Chickahom 
iny  and  swelled  that  brook  itself  to  a  river. 
Still  the  General  urged  his  men  to  their 
ungrateful  toil,  and  still  the  men  unmur- 
muringly  responded  to  his  calls.  That  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  was  tojbe  left  to 
itself  to  await,  as  best  it  might,  the  moment 
when  the  enemy  should  feel  himself  strong 
enough  to  assume  the  offensive,  became 
daily  more  and  more  plain.  Such  was  the 
panic  spread  by  the  dashing  and  eccentric 
demonstrations  of  Jackson,  and  such  the 
profound  obfuscation  which  he  contrived 
to  breed  in  the  official  mind  at  Washington, 
that  he  actually  wrung  from  Mr.  Lincoln, 
on  the  25th  of  May,  the  following  tel 
egram  :  — 

"  WASHINGTON,  May  25, 1862,  — 2  p.  M. 

"  MAJ.-GEN.  MCCLELLAN  :  The  enemy 
is  moving  north  in  sufficient  force  to  drive 
Gen.  Banks  before  him  ;  precisely  in  what 
force  we  cannot  tell.  He  is  also  threaten 
ing  Leesburg  and  Geary  on  the  Manassas 
Gap  Railroad  from  both  north  and  south  — 
in  precisely  what  force  we  cannot  tell.  I 
think  the  movement  is  a  general  and  a  con 
certed  one,  such  as  could  not  be  if  he  was 
acting  upon  the  purpose  of  a  very  desperate 
defence  of  Richmond.  I  think  the  time  is 
near  when  you  must  either  attack  Richmond 
or  give  up  the  job,  and  come  back  to  the  de 
fence  of  Washington.  Let  me  hear  from 
you  instantly.  "  A.  LINCOLN, 

"President." 


Possessed  with  an  extraordinary  infatu 
ation  as  to  the  probability  of  the  enemy's 
swooping  down  upon  Washington  by  the 
way  of  Fredericksburg,  the  President,  for 
some  days,  could  not  be  made  to  compre 
hend  that  there  was  anything  important  in 
the  world  to  be  done  excepting  to  cut  the 
Fredericksburg  and  Richmond  Railroad. 
In  vain  did  General  McClellan  urge  some 
attention  to  the  true  principles  of  the  de 
fence  of  Washington,  as  laid  down  by  him 
before  leaving  the  Potomac.  The  whole 
concern  of  the  Administration  centred 
upon  the  city  of  the  Rappahannock. 

On  the  26th  General  McDowell  advanced 
beyond  the  Rappahannock,  and  the  enemy 
in  that  quarter  began  to  fall  back  towards 
Hanover  Court  House  and  Richmond. 
This  rebel  force,  commanded  by  Generals 
Anderson  and  Branch,  was  considerable 
enough  in  numbers  to  threaten  the  right 
and  rear  of  General  McClellan's  extended 
line,  and  he  at  once  ordered  General  Fitz 
John  Porter — justly  described  by  the 
New  York  Times,  as  one  of  the  "  noblest, 
most  painstaking,  and  trustworthy  of  our 
officers  "  —  to  attack  and  dislodge  it. 

General  Porter  performed  this  duty  with 
signal  success.  The  battle  of  Hanover 
Court  House  was  fought  by  him  on  the  27th 
of  May.  The  whole  division  of  General 
Branch,  about  10,000  strong,  was  utterly 
routed,  and  General  Anderson,  who  was 
supporting  him  at  Ashland,  hastily  re 
treated  upon  Richmond.  The  fugitives 
from  these  points  carried  the  news  of  the 
disaster  into  the  rebel  capital,  where  it  was 
universally  supposed  that  the  action  indi 
cated  the  junction  of  the  army  of  McDowell 
with  the  army  of  McClellan.  This  belief 
threw  the  city  into  the  greatest  alarm  and 
confusion.  The  roads  leading  to  the  South 
were  crowded  with  escaping  citizens,  women 
and  children;  and  had  th$  junction  of  the 
two  Union  armies  been  really  now  effected, 
and  General  McClellan  been  thus  enabled 
to  force  a  decisive  battle  for  the  possession 
of  Richmond,  it  can  scarcely  be  doubted 
that  the  place  must  have  fallen  into  his 
hands.  So  well  aware  of  this  was  General 
McClellan,  that  immediately  after  the  vic 
tory  he  telegraphed  to  the  Government  — 
"  There  is  no  doubt  that  the  enemy  are 
concentrating  everything  on  Richmond.  I 
will  do  my  best  to  cut  off  Jackson,  but  am 
doubtful  whether  I  can." 

"  It  is  the  policy  and  duty  of  the  Govern 
ment  to  send  me  by  water  all  the  well- 
drilled  troops  available.  I  am  confident 


51 


that  Washington  is  in  no  danger.  Engines 
and  cars  in  large  numbers  have  been  sent 
up  to  bring  down  Jackson's  command. 

11 1  may  not  be  able  to  cut  them  off,  but 
will  try  •  we  have  cut  all  but  the  F.  &  11. 
R.  R.  The  real  issue  is  in  the  battle  about 
to  be  fought  in  front  of  Richmond.  All 
our  available  troops  should  be  collected 
here,  not  raw  regiments,  but  the  well- 
drilled  troops.  It  cannot  be  ignored  that 
a  desperate  battle  is  before  us  ;  if  any  regi 
ment  of  good  troops  remain  unemployed  it 
will  be  an  irreparable  fault  committed. 

"  G.  B.  McCLELLAN,  Major- General. 
"  HON.  E.  M.  STANTON,  Sec'y  of  War." 

On  the  next  day,  the  29th,  having 
gained  information  that  there  was  positively 
no  rebel  force  between  Hanover  Junction 
and  Fredericksburg,  he  telegraphed  this 
also  to  Washington.  The  President  and 
Secretary  of  War,  however,  on  the  au 
thority  of  certain  contrabands,  preferred  to 
believe  that  the  rebels  were  nofc  concen 
trating  on  Richmond,  but,  on  the  con 
trary,  reinforcing  the  terrible  Stonewall 
Jackson,  who  might  at  any  moment  de 
stroy  Gen.  Banks,  devour  Gen.  Fremont, 
and  annihilate  Washington. 

They  accordingly  threw  away  all  the  re 
sults  of  the  battle  of  Hanover  Court  House, 
by  refusing  to  permit  McDowell  to  join  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac. 

Two  years  of  waiting  and  fruitless  efforts 
have  since  atoned  for  the  colossal  blunder 
then  committed  at  Washington. 

The  golden  opportunity  offered  to  the 
country  at  the  end  of  May,  1862,  by  Por 
ter  and  McClellan,  has  never  since  re 
turned.  The  Confederates  were  not  slow 
to  avail  themselves  of  the  advantages  held 
out  to  them  by  the  bewilderment  and  vac 
illation  of  the  Washington  government. 
Gen.  McClellan,  as  we  have  already  seen, 
had  been  obliged  to  extend  his  line  danger 
ously,  in  order  to  meet  the  overland  ad 
vance  of  McDowell,  and  to  attempt  to  hold 
both  banks  of  the  Chickahominy,  in  order 
to  secure  his  own  communications. 

As  soon  as  it  was  ascertained  that  Stone 
wall  Jackson  had  arrested  the  advance  of 
McDowell,  Gen.  Johnstone  at  Richmond,  at 
once  determined  to  throw  himself  upon  the 
weakest  point  of  Gen.  McClellan's  position. 

A  rain-storm  of  unparalleled  violence, 
on  the  night  of  May  80th,  favored  his  de 
sign.  In  a  few  hours  the  Chickahominy 
was  converted  into  a  roaring  torrent.  All 
the  bridges  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 


with  a  single  exception,  were  rendered  im 
practicable.  The  roads  were  destroyed. 
And  on  the  31st  of  May,  the  Confederates 
furiously  assailed  the  left  wing  of  Gen. 
McClellan's  army  at  Fair  Oaks.  Gen. 
Casey's  redoubts,  in  the  advance  of  this 
wing,  were  stormed  and  carried  •  and  after 
a  desperate  battle,  in  which  the  advantage 
rested  with  the  Confederates,  their  victori 
ous  progress,  threatening .  the  absolute  de 
struction  of  the  whole  left  wing,  was  arrest 
ed  with  difficulty,  just  at  nightfall,  by  the 
artillery  of  Gen.  Suniner. 

Night  put  an  end  to  the  conflict.  Dur 
ing  the  night  an  attempt  was  made  to 
throw  new  bridges  across  the  stream,  and 
pass  over  the  whole  right  wing  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac.  It  was  too  late ; 
the  floods  increasing  prevented  the  execu 
tion  of  the  work.  All  that  men  could  do 
General  McClellan  and  his  subordinates 
did.  The  General-in-Chief,  rising  from  a 
sick-bed,  spent  the  greater  part  of  the 
night  on  horseback  conferring  with  his 
generals  and  pushing  on  the  operations. 
Snatching  a  slight  repose  towards  day 
break,  he  remounted  his  horse  at  the  first 
sound  of  the  guns,  arid  appeared  in  the  ad 
vance  of  Simmer's  corps  when  the  battle 
began  again  in  the  morning ;  on  the  side  of 
the  Federal  troops,  with  all  the  valor  of  des 
peration  ;  on  the  side  of  the  Confederates  in 
a  fierce,  confused  disorderly  fashion,  attrib 
utable  to  the  fact,  not  then  generally  known 
to  either  army,  that  Gen.  Johnstone,  expos 
ing  himself  with  his  usual  gallantry,  had 
fallen  dangerously  wounded.  This  circum 
stance  left  the  rebel  army  for  a  time  with 
out  a  recognized  leader.  Failing  to  over 
come  the  determined  resistance  of  the  Fed 
eral  troops,  the  Confederates  about  noon  on 
the  1st  of  June  fell  back  in  confusion  on 
Richmond. 

Thus  ended  the  battle  of  Fair  Oaks. 
Had  it  been  possible  for  Gen.  McClellan 
at  this  time  to  throw  his  right  wing,  with 
his  artillery,  across  the  Chickahominy,  and 
advance  upon  Richmond  during  the  two  or 
three  days  of  confusion  which  followed 
the  failure  of  the  Confederate  attack  and 
the  fall  of  Gen.  Johnstone,  Richmond  might 
have  been  seized  and  occupied. 

Thanks  to  the  confused  and  contradic 
tory  orders  from  Washington,  by  which  his 
army  had  been  forced  to  assume  the  posi 
tion  which  it  held  before  the  battle,  and  to 
the  tremendous  rains  of  the  3Uth  of  May, 
this  was  simply  impossible. 

Gen.  Lee  succeeded  immediately  to  the 


52 


command  of  Gen.  Johnstone ;  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  strengthened  itself  in  its  posi 
tion  ;  and  on  the  3d  of  June  Mr.  Lincoln 
kindly  telegraphed  to  Gen.  McClellan  to 
keep  a  close  eye  "  on  the  Chickahominv 
River ! " 

The  first  days  of  June  passed  on ;  con 
tinual  rains  surrounded  the  operations  of 
the  army  with  difficulties,  which,  as  Mr. 
Stantou,  on  the  llth,  telegraphed  to  Gen. 
McClellan,  "  No  art  or  skill  could  possibly 
avoid,  but  onlj-  endure ; "  the  reinforce 
ments,  so  urgently  needed,  still  failed  to 
arrive. 

So  weak  had  now  become  the  extended 
lines  that,  on  the  loth  of  June,  the  rebel 
Gen  Stuart,  with  1500  cavalry  and  four 
guns,  was  able  to  make  a  clever  circuit  of 
the  whole  army. 

Thoroughly  appreciating  the  dangers  of 
his  position,  and  determined  not  to  imitate 
the  inaction  which  had  paralyzed  the  army 
before  Corinth,  Gen.  McClellan,  after  tak 
ing  the  precaution  to  order  supplies  to 
City  Point  on  the  James,  in  preparation 
for  a  movement  which  he  was  already  med 
itating,  to  a  new,  safer,  and  stronger  base, 
on  that  river,  devoted  himself  to  bringing 
on  a  general  engagement  before  Richmond. 

The  Prince  de  SToinville  thus  describes 
some  of  the  adventures  which  attended  the 
preliminary  reconnoissances  now  become 
necessary :  — 

"  On  one  occasion,"  says  the  Prince, 
"  the  General  had  climbed,  with  several  of 
his  officers,  to  the  top  of  a  high  tree,  and 
there,  every  man  on  his  branch,  with  spy 
glass  in  hand,  they  had  held  a  sort  of  coun 
cil  of  war.  This  took  place  within  a  hun 
dred  paces  of  the  hostile  pickets,  whom  no 
attempt  at  observation  could  escape.  We 
dreaded  to  hear  the  crack  of  the  rifles  of: 
the  famous  Southern  squirrel-shooters ;  but 
they  were  magnanimous,  and  the  reconnois- 
sance  ended  without  a  mishap.  On  an 
other  occasion,  the  staff'  of  a  Confederate 
commander  appeared,  simultaneously  with 
our  own,  upon  the  banks  of  the  Chicka- 
homiuy.  At  once,  the  hostile  gentlemen 
ordered  up  one  of  their  bands,  which 
played  a  popular  air;  but  it  was  hardly 
ended  before  the  musicians  gave  way  to  a 
battery,  which,  coming  up  at  full  gallop, 
opened  a  terrible  fire,  to  which  we  soon  re 
sponded.  These  examinations  convinced 
us  that  the  enemy  was  not  idle,  and  that 
he  had  thrown  up  works,  armed  with  heavy 
guns,  precisely  where  we  did  not  wish  to 
see  them." 


During  all  this  time  General  McClellan 
was  vainly  attempting  to  convince  the 
Government  of  the  importance  of  con 
centrating  all  its  efforts  on  the  reduction 
of  Richmond.  He  suggested  that  move 
ment  upon  Atlanta  which  has  since,  after 
two  years,  been  adopted,  as  a  means  of 
compelling  the  enemy  to  divide  the  force 
which  they  were  gathering  up  for  the 
decisive  struggle  before  their  capital. 
He  reiterated  his  appeal  for  the  coopera 
tion  of  McDowell,  and  his  conviction 
that  the  movements  of  "  Stonewall " 
Jackson  were, .designed  to  culminate  in 
the  sudden  return  of  that  commander  to 
Richmond,  when  he  should  have  suc 
ceeded  in  preventing  this  cooperation. 

Meanwhile,  if  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac,  thinned  by  battle  and  disease,  was 
really  to  be  left  to  itself,  General  McClel 
lan  determined  so  to  wield  it  that  when 
attacked,  as  he  saw  that  he  in  that  case 
should  be,  by  an  overwhelming  concen 
tration  of  the  enemy,  he  might  hold  his 
communications  by  the  York  River  long 
enough  to  enable  him  to  change  his  base 
successfully  to  the  James.  This  once 
effected,  lie  supposed,  as  he  had  a  right 
to  suppose,  that  the  Government  at 
Washington,  awakened  at  last  to  under 
stand  the  designs  of  the  Confederates, 
would  finally  abandon  its  strange,  inco 
herent,  and  inconclusive  military  policy, 
and  throw  the  whole  strength  of  the 
army  upon  this  decisive  point. 

On  the  25th  of  June,  the  bridge  and 
intrenchments  being  at  last  completed,  an 
advance  of  Heintzelman's  corps  brought 
on  a  smart  action,  preliminary  to  the 
general  advance,  which  resulted  advan 
tageously  to  the  Federal  troops.  But 
in  the  evening  of  the  same  day  McClel 
lan  learned  that  Jackson,  with  30,000 
men,  had  reached  Hanover  Court  House, 
threatening  his  right  and  rear.  Other 
rumors,  some  of  them  no  doubt  incor 
rect,  were  brought  in  to  him,  of  the  re 
inforcements  pouring  into  Richmond ; 
but  the  substantial  truth  that  the  Confed 
erate  Commander-in-chiefhad  completejy 
outwitted  the  Government  at  Washing 
ton,  and  was  ready  to  pour  his  whole 
available  force  upon  the  devoted  army 
before  Richmond,  was  no  longer  to  be 
questioner].  On  the  next  day,  the  26th, 
the  Confederates  attacked  the  right  wing 
of  the  army  in  force,  and  the  retreat  to 
the  James  began. 

The  forces  which   had  been  befooled 


53 


and  beaten  by  Jackson,  in  the  valley  and 
along  the  Potomac,  were  now  consoli 
dated  by  the  Administration  into  the 
"  Army  of  Virginia,"  a  commander  for 
which  army  was  sought  in  the  person  of 
General  Pope,  and  the  Army  of  the  Po 
tomac  was  left  to  Providence,  to  the  skill 
of  its  commander,  and  to  its  own  heroic 
bravery. 

The  history  of  the  seven  days  which 
followed  need  not  here  be  written. 
Through  every  hour  of  that  tremendous 
week  the  army  proved  itself  worthy  of 
the  firm  reliance  upon  its  conduct  and 
its  courage  in  which  its  General  began 
one  of  the  most  dangerous  and  difficult 
undertakings  ever  attempted  in  war. 

"  I  was  confident,"  says  McClellan,  in 
his  Report,  "  in  the  valor  and  discipline 
of  my  brave  army,  and  knew  that  it 
could  be  trusted  equally  to  retreat  or 
advance,  and  to  fight  the  series  of  battles 
now  inevitable,  whether  retreating  from 
victories  or  marching  through  defeats; 
in  short,  I  had  no  doubt  whatever  of  its 
ability,  even  agmnst  superior  numbers,  to 
fight  its  way  through  to  the  James,  and 
get  a  position  whence  a  successful  ad 
vance  npon  Richmond  would  be  again 
possible.  Their  superb  conduct  through 
the  next  seven  days  justified  my  faith." 

How  well  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
might  have  borne  itself  through  this  ter 
rible  ordeal  had  it  been  commanded  by 
a  "  Congressional  Committee  on  the  Con 
duct  of  the  War,"  or  even  by  the  adminis 
trative  officers  who  suffered  Gen.  Jackson 
to  paralyze  for  weeks  with  twenty  thousand 
men  the  powerful  armies  of  the  Rappahan- 
nock,  the  Mountains,  and  Washington  City, 
might  be  an  interesting  subject  of  histori 
cal  inquiry.  By  what  qualities  it  was  that 
the  general  who  actually  led  them  through 
a  week  of  battle  and  of  victory,  without 
the  loss  of  a  gun,  unbroken  in  discipline, 
and  unshaken  in  spirit,  from  positions 
which  the  folly  or  the  recklessness  of  their 
own  government  had  rendered  untenable, 
back  to  the  most  formidable  base  of  opera 
tions  which  has  ever  been  held  by  an  army 
of  the  Union  operating  against  Richmond, 
a  foreign  witness,  competent  to  the  task, 
has  very  adequately  set  forth. 

Mr.  Motley,  the  accomplished  Minister 
of  the  United  States  in  Austria,  in  October, 
1362,  sent  to  Mr.  Seward  the  following  ex 
tract  from  the  leading  military  journal  of 
the  Austrian  Empire.-  "It  is  not  to  be 
wondered  at,  then,  if  the  General-in-Chief 


of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  in  haste 
to  save  the  army  intrusted  to  him  from 
the  dangers  surrounding  it,  even  from  cer 
tain  destruction  ;  from  a  noose,  in  fact, 
which  required  only  to  be  drawn  a  little 
closely  together  in  order  to  suffocate  the 
soul  of  the.  Union.  The  manner  in  which 
he  acquitted  himself  of  this  most  difficult 
of  all  military  tasks  redounds  to  his  infinite 
honor,  and  places  him  at  once  in  the  ranks 
of  those  memorable  commanders  whose 
names  history  treasures  for  posterity  ;  men 
who,  if  they  have,  perhaps,  not  had  the 
art  to  chain  victory  to  their  banners,  pos 
sessed,  at  any  rate,  the  fortitude,  the  audac 
ity,  and  the  circumspection  to  rescue  their 
armies  from  impending  ruin.  •  The  Ameri 
can  General  has  made  a  thorough  study 
of  war  in  the  swamps  of  the  Chickahom- 
iny,  and  has  made  himself  a  complete  mas 
ter  in  that  most  difficult  of  professions. 
.He  has  manifested  the  unquestioned  talent 
to  save  his  army  in  a  manner  not  suffi 
ciently  to  be  admired,  out  of  the  most  des 
perate  of  situations.  Moreau  made  himself 
immortal  by  his  famous  retreat  from  the 
Iller  to  the  Rhine,  in  the  year  1796.  What 
is  due  to  the  American  General-in-Chief, 
who  conducted,  with  a  morally  and  physi 
cally  exhausted  army  through  a  swampy, 
pathless  country,  covered  with  ancient  for 
ests,  and  in  face  of  an  open  enemy  out 
numbering  him  two  to  one,  the  most  clas 
sical  of  all  retreats  recorded  in  military 
history,  without  a  single  disaster  !  " 

The  President  of  the  United  States 
seems  to  have  conceived  that  this  great 
achievement  was  adequately  recognized 
in  the  following  telegrams  sent  imme 
diately  after  that  magnificent  victory  of 
Malvern  Hill,  which  dissipated  all  the 
hopes  formed  by  the  Confederates  of 
the  destruction  of  McClellan's  army,  and 
assured  its  quiet  reorganization  at  its  new 
base  :  — 


,  July  3,  1SC2  —  5  r.  M., 
"  MA.T.-GENERAL  G.  B.  MCCLELLAN,  — 

"  Yours  of  5.30  yesterday,  is  just  re 
ceived.  I  am  satisfied  that  yourself,  offi 
cers,  and  men  have  done  the  best  you 
could.  All  accounts  say  better  fighting 
was  never  done.  Ten  "thousand  thanks 
for  it." 

"JULY  5,  1862  —  9P.M. 

"  A  thousand  thanks  for  the  relief 
your  two  despatches  gave  me.  Be  assured 
the  heroism  of  yourself,  officers,  and  men 


54 


is,  and  forever  will  be,  appreciated.  If 
you  can  hold  your  present  position  we 
can  hive  the  enemy  yet. 

"A.  LINCOLN." 

These  despatches  are  the  more  signif 
icant  that,  coming  as  they  did  after  a  des 
patch  sent  by  Gen.  McClellan  on  the  28th 
of  June,  from  Savage's  Station,  in  which, 
standing  amid  the  dead  and  dying  of  his 
heroic  army,  and  "  feeling  in  his  heart,"  to 
use  his  own  warm  words,  the  loss  of  every 
brave  man  who  had  been  needlessly  sac 
rificed,  he  had  plainly  said  to  Mr.  Stan- 
ton  "  you  have  done  your  best  to  sacrifice 
this  army,"  the  words  of  the  President 
virtually  indorsed  this  terrible  indict 
ment,  and  authorized  the  General,  who 
made  it  to  anticipate  that  the  necessary 
means  would  be  given  him,  to  "  hold  his 
position  and  to  hive  the  enemy." 

But  irresolute  and  vacillating  as  ever, 
the  President  speedily  subsided  into  fresh 
acquiescence  in  the  will  of  those  who  had 
determined  to  eliminate  General  McClel 
lan  and  his  army  from  the  contest.  * 

To  the  latter,  after  all  that  they  had 
borne  and  done,  no  word  of  recognition 
or  of  gratitude  came  from  the  Govern 
ment,  and  when  their  commander,  after 
waiting  many  days,  ventured  to  ask  for 
them  this  simple  act  of  justice,  in  the  fol 
lowing  touching  words,  no  reply,  what 
ever,  was  made  to  his  request. 

"  Please  say  a  kind  word  to  my  army, 
that  I  can  repeat  to  them  in  general  or 
ders,  in  regard  to  their  conduct  at  York- 
town,  Willinmsburg,  West  Point,  Hano 
ver  Court  House,  and  on  the  Chickahom- 
iny,  as  well  as  in  regard  to  the  (7)  seven 
days,  and  the  recent  retreat. 

"No  one  has  ever  said  anything  to 
cheer  them  but  myself.  Say  nothing 
about  me,  nxercly  give  my  men  and  offi 
cers  credit  for  what  they  have  done.  It 
will  do  you  much  good,  and  will  strength 
en  you  much  with  them  if  you  issue  a 
handsome  order  to  them  in  regard  to 
what  they  have  accomplished.  They  de 
serve  it.  «G  £  McCLELLAN, 

"  Major-General. 
"  MAJ.-GENEKAL  HALLECK, 

"  Comd'g  U.   S.  Army,  Washington,  D.  C." 

During  the  whole  month  of  July  Gen. 
McClellan  remained  at  Harrison's  Bar, 
pleading  for  the  reinforcements  which 
were  never  to  come ;  refused  even  the 
slightest  light  as  to  the  future  plans  of 


the  Government;  and  watching  the  pow 
erful  and  vigilant  enemy  at  Richmond 
with  the  full  knowledge  that  they  wait 
ed  only  the  moment  of  the  embarkation 
of  his  troops,  should  so  mad  a  measure 
be  adopted,  to  precipitate  themselves  in 
force  upon  the  "Army  of  Virginia,"  and 
overwhelming  its  boastful  and  incompe 
tent  leader  in  the  North. 

Military  literature  has  nothing  more 
solemn,  nothing  which  in  the  light  of  the 
misfortunes  which,  since  it  was  written, 
have  overtaken  the  country,  can  be  re 
garded  as  more  wisely  prophetic  than 
the  letter  which,  during  this  weary  sea 
son,  General  McClellan,  on  the  7th  of 
July,  1862,  addressed  to  the  President. 

All  that  he  had  affirmed  in  the  hour 
of  victory  among  the  mountains  of  West 
Virginia  in  respect  to  the  true  aims  and 
policy  of  the  war  for  the  Union,  General 
McClellan,  in  this  letter,  reaffirms  with  all 
the  weight  of  his  subsequent,  his  sadder, 
and  his  larger  experience.  • 

"  HEAD-QUARTERS,  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 
CAMP  NEAR  HARRISON  LANDING,  Va.,  July  7r  1862. 

"MR.  PRESIDENT, — 

"  You  have  been  fully  informed  that  the 
rebel  army  is  in  our  front,  with  the  pur 
pose  of  overwhelming  us  by  attacking 
our  positions  or  reducing  us  by  blocking 
our(river-oemmunications.  I  cannot  but 
regard  our  condition  as  critical,  and  I 
earnestly  desire,  in  view  of  possible  con 
tingencies,  to  lay  before  your  Excellency, 
for  your  private  consideration,  my  gen 
eral  views  concerning  the  existing  state 
of  the  rebellion,  although  they  do  not 
strictly  relate  to  the  srtuaticn  of  this 
army,  or  strictly  come  within  the  secrpe 
of  my  official  duties.  These  views  amount 
to  convictions,  and  are  deeply  impressed 
upon  my  mind  and  heart.  Our  cause 
must  never  be  abandoned;  it  is  the  cause 
of  free  institutions  and  self-government. 
The  Constitution  and  the  Union  must 
be  preserved,  whatever  may  be  the  cost 
in  time,  treasure,  and  blood.  If  secession 
is  successful  other  dissolutions  are  clearly 
to  be  seen  in  the  future.  Let  neither 
military  disaster,  political  faction,  nor 
foreign  war,  shake  your  settled  purpose 
to  enforce  the  equal  operation  of  the 
laws  of  the  United  States  upon  the  peo 
ple  of  every  State. 

"  The  time  has  come  when  the  Govern 
ment  must  determine  upon  a  civil  and 
military  policy  covering  the  whole  ground 


55 


of  our  national  trouble.  The  responsi 
bility  of  determining,  declaring,  and  sup 
porting  such  civil  and  military  policy, 
and  of  directing  the  whole  course  of  na 
tional  affairs  in  regard  to  the  rebellion, 
must  now  be  assumed  and  exercised  by 
you,  or  our  cause  will  be  lost.  The  Con 
stitution  gives  you  power  sufficient  even 
for  the  present  terrible  exigency. 

"  This  rebellion  has  assumed  the  charac 
ter  of  war ;  as  such  it  should  be  regard 
ed,  and  it  should  be  conducted  upon  the 
highest  principles  known  to  Christian 
civilization.  It  should  not  be  a  war 
looking  to  the  subjugation  of  the  people 
of  any  State  in  any  event.  It  should  not 
be  at  all  a  war  upon  populations,  but 
against  armed  forces  and  political  organ 
izations.  Neither  confiscation  of  prop 
erty,  political  executions  of  persons, 
territorial  organizations  of  states,  or  for 
cible  abolition  of  slavery  should  be  con 
templated  for  a  moment.  In  prosecuting 
the  war,  all  private  property  and  unarmed 
persons  should  be  strictly  protected,  sub 
ject  only  to  the  necessity  of  military 
operations.  All  private  property  taken 
for  military  use  should  be  paid  or  re 
ceipted  for :  pillage  and  waste  should  be 
treated  as  high  crimes :  all  unnecessary 
trespass  sternly  prohibited,  and  offensive 
demeanor  by  the  military  towards  cit 
izens  promptly  rebuked.  Military  ar 
rests  should  not  be  tolerated,  except  in 
places  where  active  hostilities  exist,  and 
oaths  not  required  by  enactments  con 
stitutionally  made,  should  be  neither  de 
manded  nor  received.  Military  govern 
ment  should  be  confined  to  the  preserva 
tion  of  public  order  and  the  protection,  of 
political  rights.  Military  power  should 
not  be  allowed  to  interfere  with  the  rela 
tions  of  servitude,  either  by  supporting 
or  impairing  the  authority  of  the  master, 
except  for  repressing  disorder,  as  in  other 
cases.  Slaves  contraband  under  the  act 
o£i  Congress,  seeking  military  protection, 
should  receive  it.  The  right  of  the  Gov 
ernment  to  appropriate  permanently  to 
its  own  service,  claims  to  slave  labor, 
should  be  asserted,  and  the  right  of  the 
owner  to  compensation  therefor  should 
be  recognized. 

"This  principle  might  be  extended,  upon 
grounds  of  military  necessity  and  security, 
to  all  the  slaves  within  a  particular  State, 
thus  working  manumission  in  such  State; 
and  in  Missouri,  perhaps  in  Western  Vir 
ginia  also,  and  possibly  even  in  Maryland, 


the  expediency  of  such  a  measure  is  only 
a  question  of  time. 

"  A  system  of  policy  thus  constitutional 
and  conservative,  and  pervaded  by  the 
influences  of  Christianity  and  freedom, 
would  receive  the  support  of  almost  all 
truly  loyal  men,  would  deeply  impress 
the  rebel  masses  and  all  foreign  nations, 
and  it  might  be  humbly  hoped  that  it 
would  commend  itself  to  the  favor  of  the 
Almighty. 

"  Unless  the  principles  governing  the 
future  conduct  of  our  struggle  shall  be 
made  known  and  approved,  the  effort 
to  obtain  requisite  forces  will  be  almost 
hopeless.  A  declaration  of  radical  views, 
especially  upon  slavery,  will  rapidly  dis 
integrate  our  present  armies. 

"The  policy  of  the  Government  must  be 
supported  by  concentrations  of  military 
power.  The  national  forces  should  not 
be  dispersed  in  expeditions,  posts  of 
occupation,  and  numerous  armies,  but 
should  be  mainly  collected  into  masses, 
and  brought  to  bear  upon  the  armies  of 
the  Confederate  States.  Those  armies 
thoroughly  defeated,  the  political  struct 
ure  which  they  support  would  soon  cease 
to  exist. 

"  In  carrying  out  any  system  of  policy 
which  you  may  form,  you  will  require  a 
commander-in-chief  of  the  army ;  one 
who  possesses  your  confidence,  under 
stands  your  views,  and  who  is  compe 
tent  to  execute  your  orders  by  directing 
the  military  forces  of  the  nation  to  the 
accomplishment  of  the  objects  by  you 
proposed.  I  do  not  ask  that  place 'for 
myself.  I  am  willing  to  serve  you  in 
such  position  as  you  may  assign  me,  and 
I  will  do  so  as  faithfully  as  ever  subordi 
nate  served  superior. 

"  I  may  be  on  the  brink  of  eternity,  and 
as  I  hope  for  forgiveness  from  my  Maker, 
I  have  written  this  letter  with  sincerity 
towards  you,  and  from  love  for  my 
country. 
"  Very  respectfully,  your  oVt  servant, 

"  G.  B.  McCLELLAN, 

"  Major-General  ComcTg" 

The  response  to  this  letter  was  long  in 
coming.  But  it  came  at  last  on  the  3d 
of  August,  in  this  brief  and  imperative 
sentence  from  General  Helleck,  — 

"It  is  determined  to  withdraw  your 
army  from  the  Peninsula  to  Acquia 
Creek." 

In  the  morning  of  the  next  day,  Gen- 


56 


eral  McClellan  thus  replied  to  this  fatal 
order :  — 

"  Your  telegram  of  last  evening  is  re 
ceived.  I  must  confess  it  has  caused  me 
the  greatest  pain  I  ever  experienced,  for 
I  am  convinced  that  the  order  to  with 
draw  this  army  to  Acquia  Creek  will 
prove  disastrous  to  our  cause. 

"  I  fear  it  will  be  a  fatal  blow. 

"  Several  days  are  necessary  to  complete 
the  preparations  for  so  important  a  move 
ment  as  this  ;  and  while  they  are  in  prog 
ress  I  beg  that  careful  consideration 
may  be  given  to  my  statements. 

"  This  army  is  now  in  excellent  disci 
pline  and  condition.  We  hold  a  de- 
bouche  on  both  banks  of  the  James 
River,  so  that  we  are  free  to  act  in  any 
direction,  and,  with  the  assistance  of  the 
gun-boats,  I  consider  our  communications 
as  now  secure.  We  are  (25)  twenty-five 
miles  from  Richmond,  and  are  not  likely 
to  meet  the  enemy  in  force  sufficient  to 
fight  a  battle,  until  we  have  marched 
(15)  fifteen  to  (18)  eighteen  miles,  which 
brings  us  practically  within  (10)  ten 
miles  of  Richmond.  Our  longest  line 
of  land  transportation  would  be  from 
this  point  (25)  twenty-five  miles ;  but 
with  the  aid  of  the  gun-boats  we  can 
supply  the  army  by  water  during  its  ad 
vance,  certainly  to  within  (12)  twelve 
miles  of  Richmond. 

"  At  Acquia  Creek  we  would  be  (75) 
seventy-five  miles  from  Richmond,  with 
land  transportation  all  the  way. 

"From  here  to  Fort  Monroe  is  a  march 
of  about  (70)  seventy  miles  ;  for  I  regard 
it  as  impracticable  to  withdraw  this  army 
and  its  material  except  by  land. 

"  The  result  of  the  movement  would 
thus  be  a  march  of  (145)  one  hundred 
and  forty-five  miles  to  reach  a  point  now 
only  (25)  twenty-five  miles  distant,  and 
to  deprive  ourselves  entirely  of  the  pow 
erful  aid  of  the  gun-boats  and  water 
transportation.  Add  to  this  the  certain 
demoralization  of  this  army,  which 
would  ensue,  the  terribly  depressing 
effect  upon  the  people  of  the  North,  and 
the  strong  probability  that  it  would  influ 
ence  foreign  powers  to  recognize  our 
adversaries,  and  there  appear  to  me  suffi 
cient  reasons  to  make  it  my  imperative 
duty  to  urge,  in  the  strongest  terms 
afforded  by  our  language,  that  this  order 
may  be  rescinded,  and  that,  for  from 
recalling  this  army  it  be  promptly  rein 
forced  to  enable  it  to  resume  the  offensive. 


"  It  may  be  said  that  there  are  no  rein 
forcements  available.  I  point  to  Burn- 
side's  force,  to  that  of  Pope,  not  neces 
sary  to  maintain  a  strict  defensive  in 
front  of  Washington  and  Harper's  Fer 
ry,  to  those  portions  of  the  Army  of  the 
West  not  required  for  a  strict  defensive 
there.  Here,  directly  in  front  of  this  ar 
my,  is  the  heart  of  the  rebellion  ;  it  is  here 
that  all  our  resources  should  be  collected 
to  strike  the  blow  which  will  determine 
the  fate  of  the  nation.  All  points  of  sec 
ondary  importance  elsewhere  should  be 
abandoned,  and  every  available  man 
brought  here,  —  a  decided  victory  here, 
and  the  military  strength  of  the  rebellion 
is  crushed,  —  it  matters  not  what  partial 
reverses  we  may  meet  with  elsewhere ; 
Here  is  the  true  defence  of  Washington, 
it  is  here,  on  the  banks  of  the  James,  that 
the  fate  of  the  Union  should  be  decided. 

"  Clear  in  my  conviction  of  right,  strong 
in  the  consciousness  that  I  have  ever 
been,  and  still  am,  actuated  solely  by 
love  of  my  country,  knowing  that  no 
ambitious  or  selfish  motives  have  influ 
enced  me  from  the  commencement  of 
this  war,  I  do  now,  what  I  never  did 
in  my  life  before,  —  I  entreat  that  this 
order  may  be  rescinded. 

"If  my  council  does  not  prevail,  I  will, 
with  a  sad  heart,  obey  your  orders  to  the 
utmost  of  my  power,  directing  to  the 
movement,  which  I  clearly  foresee  will  be 
one  of  the  utmost  delicacy  and  difficulty, 
whatever  skill  I  may  possess. 

"  Whatever  the  result  may  be,  and  may 
God  grant  that  I  am  mistaken  in  my 
forebodings,  I  shall  at  least  have  the 
internal  satisfaction  that  I  have  written 
and  spoken  frankly,  and  have  sought  to 
do  the  best  in  my  power  to  avert  dis,as- 
ter  from  my  country. 

"G.    B.    McCLELLAX, 

"  Major-General  Commanding. 

«  MAJ.-GEN.  H.  W.  HALLECK, 

"Major-General  Comd'g  U.  S.  A." 

Vain  entreaty !  answered  only  by  or 
ders  more  peremptory  and  positive  than 
the  first,  for  the  instant  removal  of  the 
whole  army.  No  adequate  means  of 
transportation  having  been  provided  by 
the  Government  for  the  execution  of 
these  orders,  the  movement  went  on 
more  slowly  than  they  wished. 

This  was  regarded  at  Washington  as^ 
a  misfortune.  In  point  of  fact  the 
delay  probably  saved  General  Pope  from 


57 


a  still  more  crushing  defeat  than  that 
which  he  was  soon  to  experience.  For 
it  induced  General  Lee  to  doubt  whether 
the  removal  from  Harrison's  Bar  upon 
which  he  was  counting  was  after  all  real 
ly  to  take  place,  and  led  him  accordingly 
to  delay  the  movement  of  the  mass  of 
his  troops  from  Kichmond.  On  the  18th 
of  August  General  McClellan  determined 
to  push  forward  two  of  his  army  corps, 
on  their  return,  as  far  as  Yorktown  by 
land ;  and  on  the  same  day,  there  being 
no  longer  any  question  as  to  the  reality 
of  the  raising  of  the  siege  of  Richmond, 
the  Confederate  General  Longstreet  hur 
ried  forward  with  his  whole  force  to 
ward  the  North. 

General  Porter,  with  the  first  of  the 
Federal  Corps  which  left  Harrison's  Bar, 
having  intercepted  a  letter  at  Williams- 
burg  which  led  him  to  believe  that  the 
enemy  were  massing  themselves  rapidly 
against  Pope,  pushed  his  men  on  without 
a  pause  to  Newport  News,  which  he 
reached  on  the  18th  of  August,  having 
marched  his  troops,  with  but  one  halt  in 
three  days  and  one  night,  sixty  miles, 
through  the  tangled  and  swampy  wilder 
ness  of  the  Peninsula.  This  was  the 
same  General  Fitz  John  Porter  who  was 
destined  to  be  a'fterwards  persecuted  out 
of  the  army,  with  the  honorable  history 
of  which  his  name  is  indissolubly  con 
nected,  on  the  charge  of  withholding  his 
men  from  action  in  order  to  prevent 
General  Pope  from  winning  a  victory! 

After  giving  his  last  orders  for  the 
defence  of  the  Peninsula,  General  Mc 
Clellan  sailed  for  Aquia  Creek,  where  he 
reported  for  orders,  Aijgust  24th,  1862. 
When  he  arrived  there  he  found  every 
thing  in  the  wildest  confusion.  To  his 
request  for  information  as  to  the  wherea 
bouts  of  the  army,  the  General-in-Chief 
(General  Ilalleck)  replied:  "I  do  not 
know  where  General  Pope  is,  or  where 
the  enemy  in  force  is."  Two  days  af 
terwards  General  McClellan,  at  the 
request  of  the  General-in-Chief,  went  to 
Alexandria,  where  he  was  to  take  charge 
of  the  sending  out  of  the  troops,  nobody 
being  able  to  tell  him,  however,  where 
the  troops  were  to  be  sent,  or  to  whom. 
General  Pope,  indeed,  scarcely  seems 
to  have  known  where  he  was  himself. 
He  had  been  fighting,  or  rather  he  had 
been  fought,  ever  since  the  10th  of 
August,  and  it  is  a  curious  illustration 
of  the  way  in  which  General  McClellan's 


history  has  been  written  by  his  enemies, 
that  Mr.  Lincoln's  biographer  denounces 
him  for  not  having  begun  to  join  Pope  on 
the  10th  of  August,  —  the  order  moving 
General  McClellan  from  the  Peninsula 
having  been  issued  exactly  one  week 
before  that  date,  on  the  3d  of  August ! 

The  charge  of  delay  brought  against 
a  general  for  failure  to  move  ninety 
thousand  men  from  the  James  River  to 
Northern  Virginia  in  the  space  of  one 
week,  is  a  brilliant  novelty  in  the  history 
of  human  accusations.  The  telegrams 
of  General  Halleck  and  the  President  to 
General  McClellan,  during  the  week 
which  followed  his  arrival  at  Alexandria, 
tell  a  pitiful  story  of  executive  imbecility. 
Deprived  of  his  command,  charged  with 
neglecting  duties  which  he  had  no  means 
of  performing,  and  with  failing  to  exe 
cute  the  most  chaotic  and  contradictory 
orders,  General  McClellan  was  still  called 
upon  continually  for  light  and  counsel  in 
the  midst  of  the  general  darkness  and 
hurley-burley. 

On  the  30th  of  August,  for  example,  the 
War  Department  issued  an  order  reduc 
ing  General  McClellan's  command  to  his 
personal  staff*  and  about  one  hundred 
men.  On  the  next  day  General  'Halleck 
telegraphed  to  him :  "  I  beg  of  you  to 
assist  me  in  this  crisis,  with  your  ability 
and  experience,  I  arn  entirely  tired  out." 
Without  a  murmur  of  dissatisfaction  at 
the  indecent  treatment  to  which  he  had 
been  subjected,  General  McClellan  ear 
nestly  devoted  himself  to  the  task  of 
bringing  order  and  safety  out  of  the 
chaos  around  him,  —  chaos  so  complete 
that  it  compelled  him  to  telegraph  to 
General  Halleck,  "  There  appears  to  be 
a  total  absence  of  brains,  and  I  fear  the 
total  destruction  of  the  army."  On  the 
day  before  this  decided  despatch  was 
sent,  General  Pope  had  contrived  to  loose 
fifteen  thousand  men.  On  the  1st  of 
September  General  Halleck  sent  for 
General  McClellan  to  come  to  Washing- 
ington  and  take  command  of  its  defen 
ces.  He  went,  and  suggested  the  pro 
priety  of  sending  some  one  in  authority 
to  find  out  what  had  really  happened  to 
General  Pope,  The  suggestion  was 
adopted  in  the  afternoon  of  the  same 
day.  The  President  requested  an  inter 
view  with  General  McClellan  ;  came  to 
General  Halleck's  house  to  see  him ; 
assured  him  that  he  had  always  been  his 
friend,  and  begged  the  displaced  com- 


58 


mander,  as  a  personal  favor,  to  use  his 
influence  with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
to  secure  its;  cooperation  with  General 
Pope.  General  McClellan  replied  that 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  needed  no 
such  stimulus  to  its  duty,  but  the  Presi 
dent  insisting,  with  tears  in  his  eyes, 
General  McClellan  telegraphed  to  Gen 
eral  Porter :  — 

"  MAJOR-GENERAL  PORTER,  — 

"I  ask  of  you  for  my  sake,  and  that 
of  the  country,  and  the  old  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  that  you  and  all  my  friends 
will  lend  the  fullest  and  most  cordial 
cooperation  to  General  Pope,  in  all  the 
operations  now  going  on.  The  destinies 
of  our  country,  the  honor  of  our  army 
are  at  stake,  and  all  depends  now  upon 
the  cheerful  cooperation  of  all  in  the 
field.  •  This  week  is  the  crisis  of  our 
fate.  Say  the  same  thing  to  my  friends 
in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  that 
the  last  request  I  have  to  make  of  them 
is  that,  for  their  country's  sake,  they  will 
extend  to  General  Pope  the  same  sup 
port  they  ever  have  to  me. 

"  I  am  in  charge  of  the  defences  of 
Washington,  and  am  doing  all  I  can  to 
render  your  retreat  safe,  should  that 
become  necessary. 

"GEO.    B.    MCCLELLAN." 

To  this  telegram  General  Porter  re 
plied  :  — 

"FAIRFAX  COURT  HOUSK, 

10  A.  M.,  Sept.  2, 1802. 

"  You  may  rest  assured  that  all  your 
friends,  as  well  as  every  lover  of  his 
country,  will  ever  give,  as  they  have 
given,  to  General  Pope  -their  cordial 
cooperation  and  constant  support  in  the 
execution  of  all  orders  and  plans.  Our 
killed,  wounded,  and  enfeebled  troops 
attest  our  devoted  duty. 

"F.  J.  PORTER, 
"  Major- General  Commanding.'* 

The  next  day  the  President  and  Gen 
eral  Halleck  came  to  General  McClellan's 
house  with  news  from  General  Pope. 
They  announced  that  everything  was  in 
the  worst  possible  condition,  the  army 
retreating  rapidly  and  in  confusion  upon 
Washington,  and  ruin  impending  over 
the  country.  The  President  implored 
General  McClellan  to  take  the  whole 
matter  into  his  own  hands,  assume  com 
mand  of  the  troops,  and  save  the  state. 

Never,  perhaps,  in  the  history  of  the 


world,  has  a  man  of  character  and  of 
ability,  dishonorably  and  unworthily  dealt 
with  by  his  official  superiors,  been  so  sud 
denly  and  rapidly  avenged  by  the  course 
of  events  as  was  General  McCiellan  at 
this  moment.  J  • 

A  month  had  scarcely  elapsed  since 
-the  constitution  of  the  Army  of  Virginia, 
under  General  Pope,  had  deprived  him 
of  his  last  hope  of  vindicating,  by  the 
capture  of  Richmond,  the  wisdom  of  his 
plans  of  campaign  against  that  city.  All 
that  had  been  refused  to  him  had  been 
conceded  to  General  Pope  ;  and  when  he 
was  recalled  from  the  Peninsula  it  was 
with  the  scarcely  disguised  intention 
on  the  part  of  the  Government  to  dis 
miss  him  in  disgrace  from  the  service. 
So  late  as  the  18th  of  August,  the  mili 
tary  authorities  in  Washington  had  ridi 
culed  the  idea  that  Lee  could  possibly 
venture  upon  an  attempt  to  overwhelm 
Pope,  and  to  retaliate  upon  the  North 
the  invasion  of  Virginia. 

A  fortnight  later  the  heads  of  the 
Government  were  kneeling  to  the  Gen 
eral  whom  they  had  thus  insulted  and 
wronged,  and  praying  him  to  relieve 
them  of  a  burden  of  command  to  which 
their  force  was  no  longer  equal. 

That  this  was  asked  of  him  in  no  large 
and  magnanimous  spirit,  is  painfully  evi 
dent  from  the  fact  that  no  formal  order 
reinstating  him  in  the  command  of  his 
army  was  issued.  He  was  merely  ap 
pointed  to  the  command  of  the  "  troops 
for  the  defence  of  the  Capital." 

But  whatever  the  temper  in  which 
the  public  servants  of  the  Union  set  the 
Union's  sore  need  before  him,  General 
McClellan  saw  that  need  and  saw  no 
more.  Making  no  conditions,  nobly 
throwing  himself  on  the  justice  and 
honor  of  the  State,  he  accepted  the 
dread  responsibility  of  attempting  to 
rally  a  disorganized  army  and  to  beat 
back  with  it  an  exulting  and  confident 
foe. 

Getting  at  once  into  the  saddle,  Gen 
eral  McClellan  rode  out  to  meet  the 
retreating  forces.  He  came  upon  Gen 
eral  Pope  in  person  at  no  great  distance 
from  the  Capital,  but  could  learn  nothing 
from  him  as  to  the  position  either  of  the 
enemy  or  of  our  own  men.  It  was  not 
till  long  after  nightfall  that  he  succeeded 
in  gaining  such  a  definite  idea  of  the  con 
dition  of  things  as  enabled  him  to  begin 
to  issue  his  orders.  But  the  fact  of  his 


59 


reappearance  at  the  head  of  affairs  was 
'the  signal  of  a  sudden  and  astonishing 
change  in  the  morale  of  the  retreating 
troops.  The  soldiers  of  the  Potomac 
army  received  him  everywhere  with 
enthusiastic  cheers,  the  routed  horde 
became  a  formidable  host  again,  and 
before  midnight  of  the  2d  of  September, 
Washington  was  safe  against  any  attack 
from  the  enemy. 

The  ulterior  plans  of  Lee  now  began  to 
develop  themselves.  His  movements  on 
the  3d  of  September  indicated  his  inten 
tion  to,  cross  the  Upper  Potomac,  thus 
threatening  Maryland  and  Pennsylvania. 

By  the  7th  General  McCIellan  had 
restored  the  framework  of  the  army 
sufficiently  to  enable  him  to  take  the 
field  in  pursuit  of  the  adventurous  in 
vader.  It  is  curious  to  see  that  the 
same  authorities  who  had  so  constantly 
pursued  General  McCIellan  with  the 
charge  of  his  excessive  "slowness"  to 
move  during  the  spring  and  summer  of 
186'2,  now  opened  upon  him  eagerly  for 
moving  too  fast  and  too  far. 

General  Halleck,  unwilling  to  give  up 
his  pet  belief  that  Lee  would  never  ven 
ture  into  Pennsylvania,  followed  General 
McCIellan  on  his  march  with  telegrams, 
urging  such  movements  on  his  part  as,  if 
he  had  made  them,  would  have  resulted 
in  the  complete  success  of  Lee's  campaign 
of  invasion.  On  the  1*2 th  of  September 
the  President  sent  him  the  following  de 
spatch  :  "  Receiving  nothing  from  Har 
per'  s  Ferry  or  Martinsburg  to-day,  and 
positive  information  from  Wheeling  that 
the  line  is  cut,  corroborates  the  idea  that 
the  army  is  recrossing  the  Potomac. 
Please  do  not  let  him  get  off  without 
being  hurt" 

Three  days  before  this  despatch  was 
sent,  General  Lee  had  issued  his  orders 
to  his  army  for  the  capture  of  the  Balti 
more  and  Ohio  Railroad,  the  cutting  off 
and  seizure  of  Harper's  Ferry,  and  the 
concentration  of  the  main  body  in  Mary 
land,  at  a  point  from, which  it  would 
equally  menace  Baltimore  and  the  heart 
of  Pennsylvania.  And  at  the  very  mo 
ment  when  the  President  was  inditing 
this  despatch,  Stonewall  Jackson  was 
appearing  in  force  before  Harper's  Ferry. 

The  disgraceful  surrender  of  that  place 
by  Colonel  Miles  and  Colonel  Ford  al 
most  immediately  followed,  the  post 
being  given  up  to  the  Confederates  .it- 
eight,  A.  M.,  on  the  15th  of  September. 


General  Franklin,  moving  by  order  of 
General  McCIellan  to  its  relief,  was  then 
actually  within  three  miles  of  the  posi 
tion  of  Maryland  Heights,  and  within 
seven  miles  of  Harper's  Ferry,  at  a  point 
in  Pleasant  Valley  where  his  advance 
had  rested  the  night  before  from  the 
combat  and  victory  of  Crampton's  Gap. 

On  the  same  day  with  the  combat  at 
Crampton's  Gap,  the  battle  of  South 
Mountain  was  fought  and  won  for  the 
possession  of  Turner's  Gap.  In  this 
battle,  one  of  the  best  contested  of  the 
war,  about  30,000  men  were  engaged  on 
each  side.  Here  fell  General  Reno,  in 
whom  says  the  commander,  "the  nation 
lost  one  of  its  best  general  officers." 

The  President  acknowledged  the  tid 
ings  of  this  victory  in  the  following 
characteristic  manner  :  — 


DEPARTMENT, 
"WASHINGTON,  Sept.  15,  1862  —  2.45  p.  M. 

"Your  despatch  of  to-day  received. 
God  bless  you,  and  all  with  you.  De 
stroy  the  rebel  army  if  possible. 

"A.  LINCOLN. 

"  To  MAJ.-GEX.  MCCLELLAN." 

The  "  rebel  army,"  which  the  victors 
of  South  Mountain  were  thus  requested 
to  "destroy,"  was  the  same  army,  it  will  be 
remembered,  which  had  destroyed  Pope's 
"Army  of  Virginia,"  and  thrown  the  Capi 
tal  at  Washington  into  a  paroxysm  of 
terror.  The  army  invited  to  "destroy" 
it  was  an  army  which  had  become  almost 
a  mob  but  a  fortnight  before,  and  which 
had  only  been  brought  and  held  together 
in  the  advance  upon  a  victorious  enemy 
by  the  moral  power  which  the  name  and 
the  character  of  its  commanding  general 
exerted  upon  the  men. 

Two  days  afterward  was  fought  the 
signal  battle  of  Antictam  Creek,  near 
Sharpsburg,  by  which  the  whole  Confed 
erate  plan  of  campaign  was  broken  up  ; 
Maryland  and  Pennsylvania  were  de 
livered  from  the  presence  and  the  terror 
of  the  foe;  and  the  triumphant  and 
aggressive  enemy,  driven  across  the  Poto 
mac,  was  put  once  more  upon  the  defen 
sive.  Never  before  had  two  such  armies 
contended  for  victory  on  a  single  field 
in  the  new  world.  For  fourteen  hours 
nearly  two  hundred  thousand  men  and 
five  hundred  pieces  or*  artillery  had 
shaken  the  solid  earth,  with  their  thun 
der  of  battle,  among  the  Maryland  hills. 


60 


The  failure  of  General  Burn  side,  on 
the.  left  of  the  Federal  line,  to  attack  the 
enemy  at  the  time  when  he  was  ordered 
so  to  do,  and  the  subsequent  delay  of 
the  same  general  in  executing  one  of  the 
vital  movements  of  the  day,  prevented 
the  Federal  army  from  achieving  the 
complete  results  of  its  victory.  But  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  remained  masters 
of  the  field  of  battle.  Enough  had  been 
done  for  glory,  enough  for  the  safety  of 
the  State;  and  a  thrill  of  triumph  and 
of  gratitude  ran  through  the  whole  land. 

On  the  next  day  the  condition  of  the 
troops,  as  reported  by  their  commanders, 
Meade,  Sunnier,  Burnside,  Hooker,  and 
others,  was  not  such  as  to  make  a  re 
newal  of  the  action  desirable  during  this 
day,  the  18th;  reinforcements  came  up, 
though  by  no  means  in  the  numbers  which 
had  been  expected,  and  General  McClel- 
lan  made  his  preparations  for  a  fresh 
attack  on  the  positions  of  Lee  at  day 
light  of  the  19th. 

But  Lee  had  no  disposition  to  risk 
another  conflict  at  this  point.  After 
making  a  show,  during  the  day,  of  moving 
over  fresh  troops  from  Virginia,  Lee, 
under  cover  of  the  night,  withdrew  his 
army  to  the  south  side  of  the  Potomac. 

As  the  rebel  lines  were  but  a  short 
distance  from  the  river,  this  evacuation 
was  effected  without  difficulty  before 
daylight,  and  when,  the  Federal  advance 
reached  the  river,  early  in  the  morning 
of  the  19th,  it  was  discovered  that  their 
C?ar  was  then  escaping  under  cover  of 
eight  batteries,  placed  in  strong  positions 
upon  the  elevated  bluffs  on  the  Virginia 
shore. 

At  dark  on  the  same  day  a  detach 
ment  from  Fitz  John  Porter's  corps 
crossed  the  Potomac,  took  the  enemy's 
batteries,  and  drove  back  his  supports  a 
considerable  distance. 

After  recrossing  the  river,  General 
Lee,  who  knew  ho\v  completely  the  army 
which  defeated  him  at  Antietam  had 
been  exhausted  by  its  previous  efforts 
and  sufferings  before  Washington,  con 
centrated  his  forces  at  Martinsburg  and 
Winchester,  and  maintained  a  strong 
front  to  the  foe. 

On  the  19th  General  McClellan  tele 
graphed,  "No  fears  .need  now  be  enter 
tained  for  the  safety  of  Pennsylvania." 
It  is  probable  that  those  persons  in  power 
at  Washington,  whose  obstinacy  and  in 
capacity  alone  had  made  it  possible  that 


"fears"  ever  should  have  been  enter 
tained  for  the  "safety  of  Pennsylvania," 
found  it  impossible  to  forgive  the  man 
who  had  saved  themselves  arid  the 
nation  from  the  fruits  of  their  folly.  Be 
this  as  it  may,  the  only  acknowledgment 
vouchsafed  to  the  deliverer  of  the  North 
and  to  his  heroic  army,  was  the  follow 
ing  telegram  from  General  Halleck.  It 
bears  date  Sept.  20,  1862,  at  a  moment 
when  the  heart  of  the  whole  nation  out 
side  of  the  official  councils  at  Washing 
ton  was  throbbing  with  gratitude  to  God, 
and  with  admiration  of  the  gallant  chief 
tain  and  the  gallant  army  to  which,  un 
der  God,  the  safety  of  the  North  was 
due. 

"WASHINGTON,  Sept.  20,  1862—2  P.  M. 

"  MAJOR-GENERAL  G.  B.  MCCLELLAN, 

"  We  are  still  left  entirely  in  the  dark  in 
regard  to  your  own  movements  and  those  of 
the  enemy.  This  should  not  be  so.  You 
should  keep  me  advised  of  both,  so  far  as 
you  know  them. 

"  IT.  W.  HALLECK, 

"  General-in-Chief:' 

Patient  as  he  was,  General  McClellan, 
for  his  brave  army's  sake,  could  not  tamely 
brook  the  tone  of  this  peevish  and  insolent 
despatch  at  such  a  moment,  and  he  replied 
at  once  in  these  sharp,  but  dignified  words : 

"  I  regret  that  you  find  it  necessary  to 
couch  every  despatch,  I  have  the  honor  to 
receive  from  you,  in  a  spirit  of  fault-find 
ing,  and  that  you  have  not  yet  found  leisure 
to  say  one  word  in  commendation  of  the 
recent  achievements  of  this  army,  or  even  to 
allude  to  them. 

"  I  have  abstained  from  giving  the  num 
ber  of  guns,  colors,  small  arms,  prisoners, 
£c.,  captured,  until  I  could  do  so  with 
some  accuracy.  I  hope  by  to-morrow  even 
ing  to  be  able  to  give  at  least  an  approxi 
mate  statement. 

"  G.  B.  MCCLELLAN, 

"  Major-  Gen.  Gomd'y." 

Something  of  course  must  be  pardoned 
to  men  who,  being  no  more  than  mortal 
found  themselves  in  the  humiliating  position 
into  which  the  official  superiors  of  General 
McClellan  had  now,  by  their  real  inferiority 
to  that  officer,  been  brought.  The  campaign,1? 
of  Pope  in  Virginia,  and  McClellan  in 
Maryland  had  demonstrated  this  inferiority, 
not  merely  to  all  other  competent  observers, 
hut  to  these  official  superiors  themselves. 
The  President  and  General  Halleck  knew 


61 


that,  but  for  General  McClellan  and  the 
army  which  he  alone  had  been  able  to  hold 
toother,  the  beginning  of  September  would 
have  seen  them  fugitives  from  Washington 
or  prisoners  in  Richmond ;  and  it  would 
be  asking  too  much,  perhaps,  of  feeble  hu 
man  nature  to  find  fault  with  them  for  a 
certain  degree  of  restlessness  and  discomfort 
in  his  presence. 

But  that  they  should  have  set  themselves 
at  work,  as  soon  as  the  safety  of  the  North 
was  assured,  to  find  or  make  an  occasion  for 
depriving  its  saviour  of  his  command,  was  a 
crime  against  the  state,  the  magnitude  of 
which  is  only  to  be  measured  by  all  that  the 
nation  has  since  been  thereby  called  to  bear 
of  loss,  of  suffering,  and  of  shame. 

Yet  all  the  evidence  in  the  case  compels 
us  to  believe  that  of  this  crime  against  the 
state,  the  authorities  at  Washington  will 
eventually  be  found  guilty  at  the  bar  of  im 
partial  history. 

On  the  22d  of  September  the  President 
issued  his  proclamation  of  emancipation, 
declaring  a  general  war  against  the  social 
system  of  the  seceded  States,  to  begin  on 
the  1st  of  January,  1863. 

This  proclamation,  of  course,  was  utterly 
inconsistent  with  all  those  principles  in 
obedience  to  which  alone  General  McClellan, 
in  his  letter  from  Harrison's  Landing,  had 
expressed  his  belief  that  the  war  could  be 
honorably  and  successfully  conducted.  But 
General  McClellan  felt  that  this  circum 
stance  only  made  it  more  imperative  upon 
him  to  impress  on  the  minds  of  his  army 
the  true  nature  of  the  relations  between  the 
civil  and  the  military  authorities. 

"  The  principles  upon  which,  and  the 
object  for  which  armies,  shall  be  employed 
in  suppressing  rebellion,"  said  General 
McClellan,  in  a  General  Order  to  his 
troops,  October  7th,  1862,  "  must  be 
determined  and  declared  by  the  civil  au 
thorities  ;  and  the  Chief  Executive,  who  is 
charged  with  the  administration  of  the 
national  affairs,  is  the  proper  and  only 
source  through  which  the  needs  and  orders 
of  the  Government  can  be  made  known  to 
the  armies  of  the  nation.  Discussions  by 
officers  and  soldiers  concerning  public  meas 
ures  determined  upon  and  declared  by  the 
Government,  when  once  carried  beyond 
temperate  and  respectful  expressions  of 
opinion,  tend  greatly  to  impair  and  destroy 
the  discipline  and  efficiency  of  troops,  by 
substituting  the  spirit  of  political  faction 
for  that  firm,  steady,  and  earnest  support  of 
the  authority  of  the  Government  which  is 


the  highest  duty  of  the  American  soldier. 
The  remedy  for  political  errors,  if  any  are 
committed,  is  to  be  found  only  in  the 
action  of  the  people  at  the  polls." 

"  In  carrying  out  all  measures  of  public 
policy,"  added  the  General  in  conclusion, 
"  this  army  will,  of  course,  be  guided  by 
the  same  rules  of  mercy  and  Christianity 
that  have  ever  controlled  their  conduct 
towards  the  defenceless." 

General  McClellan's  abstinence  from  in 
terference  in  the  civil  policy  of  the  Admin 
istration  was  not  reciprocated  by  a  similar 
abstinence  on  the  part  of  the  Administra 
tion  from  interference  in  his  own  military 
plans. 

On  the  1st  of  October  the  President  vis 
ited  General  McClellan  at  his  head-quarters, 
went  through  the  camps,  and  went  over  the 
battle-fields  of  South  Mountain  and  Antie- 
tam.  It  was  upon  this  occasion  that  the 
President  shocked  the  army  and  the  nation 
by  calling  upon  one  of  his  suite  to  entertain 
him  with  certain  comic  songs  while  riding 
among  the  fresh  graves  of  the  soldiers  who 
had  fallen  in  the  terrible  battles  of  Sep-J 
tember. 

The  condition  of  the  army  was  fully  ex 
plained  to  the  President,  who  recognized,  or 
seemed  to  recognize,  the  absolute  impossi 
bility  of  moving  now  upon  a  new  cam 
paign  of  invasion  in  the  face  of  an  organized 
and  powerful  enemy,  and  who  expressed 
his  renewed  and  grateful  confidence  in  its 
commander. 

The  army  under  General  McClellan  was 
indeed  utterly  worn  down  by  the  efforts 
which  it  had  made.  The  main  body  was 
composed  of  the  troops  which  General  Pope 
had  exhausted  in  his  fatal  campaign  at  the 
end  of  August.  Hastily  reorganized  by 
General  McClellan  in  the  first  week  of  Sep 
tember,  the  army  had  been  marched  through 
the  mountains  of  Maryland  to  fight  the 
fierce  battles  of  South  Mountain  and  An- 
tietam.  It  needed  everything  that  an  army 
can  need. 

But  the  President,  returning  to  Wash 
ington,  caused  his  General-in-Chief  to  issue, 
on  the  6th  of  October,  an  order  directing 
General  McClellan  to  "  cross  the  Potomac 
and  give  battle  to  the  enemy  or  drive  him 
South." 

The  President,  the  Secretary  of  War, 
and  General  Halleck  knew,  when  this  order 
was  issued,  that  it  would  not  be  obeyed,  for 
they  knew  that  it  could  not  be  obeyed. 
Whether  they  expected  by  issuing  it  to 
drive  General  McGlellan  into  a  resignation, 


62 


or  were  merely  preparing  a  "record"  to 
which  they  might  afterwards  appeal  in 
proof  of  his  "tardiness"  and  their  own 
"energy"  is,  perhaps,  a  question.  There  can 
be  no  question,  however,  that  the  order  it 
self  was  an  outrage  alike  upon  common 
sense  and  all  military  propriety.  It  was 
followed  up,  a  week  later,  by  another  of 
those  astonishing  militarjr  letters  of  advice 
and  instruction  which  President  Lincoln 
seems  never  to  have  ceased  writing  until 
the  success  of  General  Grant  in  taking 
Vicksburg,  a  year  afterwards,  on  a  plan 
which  his  Excellency  had  not  suggested,  in 
duced  him  to  admit  that  a  general  in  the 
field  might  sometimes  understand  what  he 
was  doing  better  than  a  politician  in  the 
White  House. 

Whether  from  neglect  at  Washington, 
or  from  an  inadequate  organiiation  of  the 
transportation  service,  the  necessary  sup 
plies  came  forward  to  the  army  so  slowly, 
in  such  small  quantities,  and  in  such  poor 
condition,  that  the  "  horses,"  in  one  case,  as 
General  Meigs  testifies,  "  remained  fifty 
hours  on  the  cars  without  food  or  water." 

Before  moving  upon  the  enemy,  General 
McClellan  was  extremely  anxious  so  to 
guard  the  line  of  the  Potomac  as  to  put  a 
stop  to  the  possibility  of  those  raids  by  the 
Shenandoah  which  have  since  inflicted, 
through  three  consecutive  years,  so  much 
shame  upon  our  army,  arid  so  much  loss 
upon  the  people  of  the  Pennsylvania  and 
Maryland  border.  The  importance  of  tak 
ing  these  precautions  was  increased  in  the 
mind  of  General  McClellan  by  the  fact 
that  Bragg's  rebel  army  was  then  at  liberty 
to  reinforce  Lee,  and  so  to  enable  him  to 
do  precisely  what  he  has  since  done,  not 
once  nor  twice,  but  regularly  with  the  recur 
rence  of  the  harvest  season  of  the  Sheiian- 
doah. 

General  McClellan  urged  this  matter  upon 
Greneral  Halleck  at  Washington.  The  on 
ly  reply  which  the  "  General-in-chief " 
vouchsafed  was  the  information  that  "  no 
appropriation  existed  for  permanent  in- 
trenchments,"  and  a  silly  sneer  to  the  ef 
fect  that  Bragg  was  four  hundred  miles 
away  while  Lee  was  but  twenty. 

On  the  26th  of  October  the  army  began 
to  cross  the  Potomac,  and  marching  on  a 
line  east  of  the  Blue  llidge,  the  7th  of 
November  its  several  corps  were  massed  at 
and  near  Warrenton.  "  The  army,"  says 
General  McClellan,  "  was  in  admirable 
condition  and  spirits.  I  doubt  whether 
during  the  whole  period  that  I  had  the 


honor  to  command  the  Army  of  the  Poto 
mac  it  was  ever  in  such  excellent  condition 
to  fight  a  great  battle."  The  Confederates, 
under  Longstreet,  were  directly  in  front  at 
Culpepper,  and  the  rest  of  Lee's  army  lay 
west  of  the  Blue  Ridge.  The  army  and 
its  General  alike  expected,  with  confidence 
arid  hope,  the  issue  of  a  new  and  near  im 
pending  passage-of-arms  with  their  antag 
onists. 

Delivered  from  the  terror  of  Lee's  pres 
ence  in  the  North  ]  reassured  for  the  safety 
of  Washington  by  the  position  of  McClel-. 
lan's  army,  and  persuaded  that  victory 
must  crown  its  next  efforts,  the  Adminis 
tration  judged  the  moment  come  for  strik 
ing  down  the  General  whom  they  hated,  as 
men  hate  those  whom  they  have  injured. 

Late  on  the  night  of  November  7th,  in  a 
storm  of  wind  and  rain,  General  Bucking 
ham  reached  the  tent  of  General  Mc'Clel- 
lan  at  Rectortown.  He  found  the  com 
mander  surrounded  by  his  staff  and  by 
some  of  the  generals  of  the,  army,  and 
handed  him  a  despatch  of  which  he  was 
the  bearer. 

Opening  .the  despatch,  and  reading  it 
without  a  change  of  countenance  or  of 
voice,  General  McClellan  passed  over  to 
General  Burnside  a  paper  which  it  con-, 
tainecl,  saying,  as  he  did  so,  "  Well,  Burn- 
side,  you  are  to  command  the  army." 

Of  General  Burnside,  let  it  be  said,  that 
no  man  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  has 
ever  more  emphatically  than  himself  de 
nounced  the  fatal  step  by  which  he.  was 
called  to  take  the  place  of  a  commander 
whose  superiority  he  fully  recognized ;  and 
whose  well-earned  hold  upon  the  confidence 
of  his  whole  army  he  knew  could  never  be 
transferred  to  any  other  officer  by  the  de 
spatches  of  presidents  or  the  order  of  "  gen- 
erals-in-chief."  But  of  the  officials  who 
thrust  upon  the  destined  victim  of  Freder- 
icksburg  this  fearful  responsibility,  and  in 
flicted  upon  the  her.o  of  Antietam  this  un 
paralleled  wrong,  what  can  present  condem 
nation  say  that  shall  not  seem  tame  in  the 
eyes  of  future  contempt  ? 

The  order  relieving  General  McClellan 
instructed  him  to  repair  to  "  Trenton  in 
New  Jersey." 

A  soldier  to  the  last,  he  lost  no  time  in 
obeying  this  injunction.  On  Monday,  the 
10th,  he  rode  through  the  camps,  and  bade 
farewell  to  his  tried  and  trusty  men.  Ha 
tred  itself  has  never  ventured  to  question 
the  evidence  which  the  conduct  of  the  army 
on  that  day  bore  to  the  merit  and  the  char- 


63 


acter  of  its  commander ;  and  the  "  Fare 
well  at  Warrenton  "  will  one  day  take  its 
place  among  the  noblest  subjects  be 
queathed  by  American  history  to  American 
art,  with  the  "  Adieux  of  Fontainebleau  " 
in  the  fasti  of  France. 

The  words  of  General  McClellan's  Fare 
well  Order  are  weighty  with  manly  and 
mastered  emotion.  No  man  can  read  them 
and  fail  to  feel  that  in  the  heart  from  which 
they  sprang  lies  the  true  secret  of  that  faith 
in  their  commander  which,  in  the  soldiers 
of  Williamsburg  and  Fair  Oaks,  of  Games' 
Mill  and  Malvern,  of  South  Mountain  and 
Antietam,  has  lived  through  all  their  sub 
sequent  experience  of  war,  and  defies  alike 
the  wasting  influence  of  time  and  the  ma 
lignity  of  remorseless  and  unwearied  de 
traction  :  — 

"  Officers  and  Soldiers  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  :  —  An  order  of  the  President 
devolves  upon  Major-General  Burnside  the 
command  of  this  army.  In  parting  from 
ou  I  cannot  express  the  love  and  gratitude 

bear  you.  As  an  army  you  have  grown 
up  under  my  care.  In  you  I  have  never 
found  doubt  or  coldness.  The  battles  you 
have  fought  under  my  command  will 
proudly  live  in  our  nation's  history.  The 
glory  you  have  achieved,  our  mutual  perils 
arid  fatigues,  the  graves  of  our  comrades 
fallen  in  battle  and  disease,  the  broken 
forms  of  those  whom  wounds  and  sickness 
have  disabled,  the  strange  associations 
which  can  exist  among  men,  unite  us  still 
by  an  indissoluble  tie. 

"  We  shall  ever  be  comrades  in  support 
ing  the  Constitution  of  our  country,  and  the 
nationality  of  its  people. 

"  GEORGE  B.  MCCLELLAN, 

"Major- Gen.  U.  S.  Army." 


i 


Two  years  have  passed  since  these  brave 
and  touching  words  were  addressed  by 
George  Brinton  McClellan  to  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac.  Keviled,  calumniated,  per 
secuted  with  an  ever-increasing  malignity 
during  theye  two  years ;  every  act  of  his 
life  sifted  for  a  matter  of  accusation  against 
him;  every  conspicuous  officer  of  his  old 
army  who  could  be  proved  to  be  loyal  to  his 
merits,  made  the  partaker  of  his  disgrace, 
George  Brinton  McClellan  has  calmly 
waited  in  silence  for  the  certain  victorious 
vindication  which  time  and  the  justice 
of  the  popular  heart  reserve  for  honor, 
forbearance,  and  fortitude  in  the  long 
duel  with  power  and  calumny  and  corrup 
tion. 

No  word  has  he  uttered,  no  line  has 
he  written  during  this  long  ordeal  of 
patience,  which  fits  not  with  the  temper  of 
all  that  he  had  said  and  written  while  wear 
ing  the  triple  stars  and  marshalling  his 
great  army  for  battle.  From  the  dignified 
consistency  of  his  civil  record  he  speaks 
to-day  to  every  American  citizen  as  from 
the  untarnished  honor  of  his  military 
career  he  speaks  to  every  American 
soldier :  "  WE  SHALL  BE  COMRADES  IN 

SUPPORTING  THE  CONSTITUTION  OF  OUR 
COUNTRY  AND  THE  NATIONALITY  OF  ITS 
PEOPLE." 

With  these  words  a  deposed  general, 
whom  a  faction  in  power  sought  in  vain  to 
disgrace,  bade  farewell  to  the  grand  army 
of  the  Union  on  the  7th  of  November, 
18G2.  With  these  words  a  President  elect, 
whom  the  nation  has  determined  to  honor, 
will  greet  the  people  of  the  Union  regen 
erated  and  disenthralled,  on  the  7th  of 
November,  1864  ! 


WATCHWORDS    FOR    PATRIOTS. 


MOTTOES    FOB    THE    CAMPAIGN,    SELECTED    FROM    GENERAL 

McCLELLAN'S    WRITINGS. 

\ 

The  true  issue  for  which  we  are  fighting  is  the  preservation  of  the  Union  and 
upholding  the  laws  of  the  general  government.  —  Instructions  to  General  -Burn- 
side,  January  7,  1862. 

We  are  fighting  solely  for  the  integrity  of  the  Union,  to  uphold  the  power  of 
our  national  government,  and  to  restore  to  the  nation  tne  blessings  of  peace  and 
good  order.  —  Instructions  to  General  Ilalleck,  November  11,  1861. 

You  will  please  constantly  to  bear  in  mind  the  precise  issue  for  which  we  are 
fighting ;  that  issue  is  the  preservation  of  the  Union  and  the  restoration  of  the  full 
authority  of  the  general  government  over  all  portions  of  our  territory.  —  Instruc 
tions  to  General  JBuell,  November  7,  1861. 

We  shall  most  readily  suppress  this  rebellion  and  restore,  the  authority  of  the 
government  by  religiously  respecting  the  constitutional  rights  of  all. —  Instructions 
to  General  Buell,  November  7,  1861. 

Be  careful  so  to  treat  the  unarmed  inhabitants  as  to  contract,  not  widen,  the 
breach  existing  between  us  and  the  rebels.  —  Instructions  to  General  lyuell, 
November  12,  1861. 

I  have  always  found  that  it  is  the  tendency  of  subordinates  to  make  vexatious 
arrrests  on  mere  suspicion.  —  Instructions  to  General  Buell,  November  12,  1861. 

Say  as  little  as  possible  about  politics  or  the  negro.  —  Instructions  to  General 
Burnside,  January  7,. 1862. 

The  uiiity  of  this  nation,  the  preservation  of  our  institutions,  are  so  dear  to  me 
that  I  have  willingly  sacrificed  my  private  happiness  with  the  single  object  of  doing 
my  duty  to  my  country. — Letter  to  Secretary  Cameron,  October,  1861. 

Whatever  the  determination  of  the  Government  may  be,  I  will  do  the  best  I  can 
with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  will  share  its  fate,  whatever  may  be  the  task 
imposed  upon  me.  —  Letter  to  Secretary  Cameron,  October,  1861. 

Neither  confiscation  of  property,  political  executions  of  persons,  territorial  or 
ganization  of  States,  nor  forcible  abolition  of  slavery  should  be  contemplated  for  a 
moment.  —  Letter  to  President  Lincoln,  July  7, 1862. 

In  prosecuting  this  war,  all  private  property  and  unarmed  persons  should  be 
strictly  protected,  subject  to  the  necessity  of  miltary  operations. —  Letter  to  the 
President,  July  7,  1862. 

Military  arrests  should  not  be  tolerated,  except  in  places  where  active  hostilities 
exist;  and  oaths,  not.  required  by  enactments  constitutionally  made,  should  be 
neither  demanded  nor  received.  —  Letter  to  the  President,  July!,  1862. 

A  declaration  of  radical  views,  especially  upon  slavery,  will  rapidly  disintegrate 
our^rcsent  armies.  —  Letter  to  the  President,  July  7,  1862. 

If  it  is  not  deemed  best  to  entrust  me  with  the  command  even  of  my  own 
army,  I  simply  ask  to  be  permitted  to  share  their  fate  on  the  field  of  battle.  —  Des 
patch  to  General  Ilalleclt,  August  30,  1862. 

In  the  arrangement  and  conduct  of  campaigns  the  direction  should  be  left  to 
professional  soldiers. —  General  McClellaris  Report. 

By  pursuing  the  political  course  I  have  always  advised,  it  is  possible  to  bring 
about  a  permanent  restoration  of  the  Union  —  a  re-union  by  which  the  rights  ot 
both  sections  shall  be  preserved,  and  by  which  both  parties  shall  preserve  their  self- 
respect,  while  they  respect  each  other/—  General  Me Clell arts  Report. 

I  am  devoutly  grateful  to  God  that  my  last  campaign  was  crowned  with  a  vic 
tory  which  saved  the  nation  from  the  greatest  peril  it  had  then  undergone. —  Gen 
eral  McClelland  Report. 

At  such  a  time  as  this,  and  in  such  a  strn.jrgle,  political  partisanship  should  be 
merged  in  a  true  and  brave  patriotism,  which  thinks  only  of  the  good  of  the 
whole  country. —  General  McClellarfs  West  Point  Oration. 


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